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Summary 
This thesis contains 5 independent chapters together with an 
Introduction and a General Conclusion. All five chapters consider 
the problem of wage determination in an economy characterized by 
asymmetric information. The solution which is implemented, for 
example a pair consisting of the wage and the level of 
employment, is restricted to elicit all possible relevant 
information. This forces some additional constraints upon the 
optimization problem of the agents. 
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that since the firm does not 
voluntarily share its information with other agents, the level of 
employment is not efficient. In both a separating and a pooling 
equilibrium, underemployment is the case. Note here that the 
equilibrium obtained changes qualitatively from Chapter 2 to 
Chapter 3. We return to this in the General Conclusion. 
Chapter 4 elaborates upon Chapter 2. It is shown that in an 
otherwise competitive economy, employment and investment are 
lowered since they are used as signalling devices, compared to 
the case of symmetric and perfect information. In a model 
characterized by monopoly, this conclusion is no longer true. The 
effect upon investment is no longer unambiguous. We also return 
to this in the General Conclusion. 
Chapters 5 and 6 consider economic policy in the case of a 
separating, respectively, pooling equilibrium. It is shown that 
in the case of a separating equilibrium, taxation can improve 
upon the situation. For a pooling equilibrium we show the 
existence of multipliers. 
General for these models is that the introduction of asymmetric 
information certainly does have an effect, but also that the 
results are possibly non-robust to assumptions with respect to 
the market form. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
2 
I. General Introduction. 
Traditionally microeconomics, or perhaps more precisely value 
theory, has been characterized by rigorous models describing the 
interaction amongst atomistic agents: producers and consumers. 
The behavior of these agents are derived from primitives such as 
preferences and production possibilities (endowments and 
technology) and the analysis provides a coherent view of the 
economy. The conclusions reached in classical value theory are 
based upon assumptions of maximizing behavior, maximization 
taking place under idealised conditions such as for example fully 
flexible prices, perfect coordination, perfect information, 
absence of externalities, just to draw attention to a few of the 
simplifying assumptions made. This very general class of models 
is characterized in particular by the full employment of 
resources. Emphasis is upon the determination of relative prices 
and hence the allocation of scarce resources. 
In contrast to this, traditional macroeconomic theory focuses 
upon the level of utilization of resources - perhaps especially 
the level of as well as the dynamics of employment - and the 
general level of prices (Branson (1979». It is by now generally 
accepted, and has been for some time, that this traditional 
approach to macroeconomic issues has been proved to perform in an 
unsatisfactory way. Theoretically the traditional models are 
poorly founded. The essential flaw in traditional Keynesian 
macroeconomic theory is the absence of a consistent foundation 
based upon the choice theoretic framework of microeconomic 
theory. This was forcefully demonstrated by Friedman (1968) and 
Lucas (1976). Empirically Keynesian theory performs badly, 
especially the inflationary tendencies experienced during the 
sixties and seventies indicated the importance of expectations 
(cf. Laidler (1982» and the supply shocks demonstrated the 
fallacy of relying on models completely demand determined (Klein 
(1978». 
This once established distinction between microeconomics as the 
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study of the allocation of scarce resources and macroeconomics as 
the study of the level and dynamics of economic aggregates has 
been recognized to be unduly restrictive, perhaps due to the poor 
performance of macroeeconomics since the sixties. One of the 
consequences of this is the increased interaction between micro-
and macroeconomic theory. This interaction has proved successful 
/ 
since replacing some of the very strict assumptions traditionally 
adhered to in microeconomics by weaker assumptions, studies of 
fix-price economics (Dreze (1975», temporary equilibrium models 
(Hicks (1939), Grandmont (1977», uncertainty and imperfect 
information (Radner (1968», contracts (Hart and Holmstrom 
(1987» and moral hazard (Prescott and Townsend (1981») have been 
allowed for within the general equilibrium construct. All of 
these developments, in addition to being major achievements in 
economic theory, serve to illustrate that broadly interpreted 
microeconomic theory has an important role in macroeconomic 
theory. The insistence on optimizing behavior on the part of the 
agents is now as common to macroeconomics as it is a central 
feature of classical value theory. The question not yet resolved 
in macroeconomic theory is whether competitive equilibrium 
suffices to explain basic macroeconomic facts or whether it is 
the case that deviations from the competitive equilibrium 
paradigm is necessary (Blanchard and Fischer (1990), Kydland and 
Prescott (1990». It is not controversial that imperfections are 
present. It is, however, controversial that imperfections are 
important at the aggregate level. It will be argued below that 
with respect to the labour markets in the Nordic countries, the 
institutional setting allow for an analysis emphasizing 
imperfections relative to the perfectly competitive paradigm. 
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The theme of this thesis is the determination of the wage and the 
level of employment in economies characterized by asymmetric 
information. Since the focus is upon the level of employment the 
theme of the thesis can be said to be rooted in macroeconomic 
theory. However, as the process of wage determination is 
explicitly considered', and considered in a model firmly embedding 
the idea of optimizing agents, this thesis is also firmly rooted 
in microeconomic theory. Thus, although the models presented in 
the following are not general equilibrium models, the method used 
in addressing a macroeconomic issue is by now widely accepted as 
a method involing the core ideas of microeconomic theory (cf. 
Blanchard and Fisher (1990». Also, note in passing, that the 
insistence upon asymmetric information places this thesis within 
the branch of literature which attempts to explain macroeconomic 
phenomena by deviations from a fully competitive paradigm. Let us 
now turn attention to the questions which we attempt to address 
in this thesis. 
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Consider two agents, a producer of goods and a supplier of 
labour, who are engaged in a bargain over the wage which is to 
dictate the exchange of income for labour. The questions 
addressed here all evolve around the restriction on such a 
bargaining outcome which may arise due to the presence of 
asymmetric information. Information is asymmetric in the sense 
that the producer is better informed about the value of the 
marginal product of labour compared to the supplier of labour. We 
can offer two reasons why asymmetric information can arise in the 
relationship between an employer and an employee. First, if 
employees change their job by going from one employer to another, 
they may be badly informed about the characteristics of the new 
firm, as to, for example, the level of demand, price of raw 
materials, production function. Such a source of asymmetric 
information structures, despite being obviously present, appears 
to be relatively unimportant. In the long run agents will learn 
about these characteristics. Also, employees already with the 
firm may have this information and share it with newcomers. A 
second source of asymmetric information arises if it is accepted 
that the economy is inherently stochastic. It is fully 
conceivable that both demand and cost are subject to some 
stochastic innovation. For example the level of demand for a 
product of a particular firm may be state dependent. It 1s not 
unrealistic to argue that this is not so much of a problem to the 
firm who directly observes demand, whereas to the employees this 
poses a problem since the level of demand is observed only 
indirectly by the demand for labour. 
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At a general level a study emphasizing asymmetric information 
appears to be interesting since compared to the classical theory 
of value, additional restrictions upon the feasible set of 
allocations are added. The feasible set in the classical theory 
of value is unambiguously determined by technological constraints 
jointly with endowments. Under asymmetric information additional 
restrictions arise due to the revelation principle (Myerson 
(1979), Laffont (1980), Chapter 1, Radner (1982». To be more 
precise as to the question which we want to address here: let a 
bargain between an employer and an employee take place under 
symmetric information. This bargain dictates one pair of nominal 
wage and level of employment from the set of feasible pairs of 
nominal wage and employment. What is addressed in this thesis is 
whether or not the presence of asymmetric information enforces 
any restrictions upon this set, so that for any given wage the 
level of employment is lowered relatively to the situation under 
symmetric information. The idea behind such an approach is that 
that with asymmetric information the actual actions of the agents 
also have the role of eliciting information (on this, see Radner 
(1982), Laffont & Maskin (1982». For example, assume that the 
value of the marginal product of labour is state dependent and 
that only the employer is informed about the state. The outcome 
of the bargain between the employer and the employee is dependent 
upon the announcement of which state has actua)ly occurred. This 
announcement is made by the better informed agent, i.e., the 
employer. To implement a bargaining solution, that is for the 
solution to elicit all relevant information and thus confirm the 
announcement to the lesser informed party, it may well be that 
the level of employment serves as a signal as to the realized 
state of nature (for a relevant discussion, see Townsend (1987), 
Section 6). It is these problems which are studied here. 
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The questions as we phrased them above emphasize the allocative 
role of the wage. Consider the model of the classical value 
theory. In that model a price system exists which allocates the 
scarce amount of resources to achieve an equilibrium which is 
Pareto efficient. In the current context the important aspect of 
the price system is that prices in a very precise meaning elicit 
all relevant information. Consider the following simple 
situation. Let a consumer divide his income between two goods. It 
is trivial that in a competitive environment the optimal choice 
depends upon the relative price between the two goods. In general 
equilibrium it is also the case that the relative price of these 
two goods reflects that production is efficient. Thus, once the 
consumer observes the price, he is observing the technology and 
he realizes that he can do no better. This is also so for the 
producer. Observing market prices he is observing the preferences 
of the consumers and he realizes that he can do no better. 
Consequently, in equilibrium all agents know that no gains can be 
made by adhering to a different strategy. This, of course, also 
applies to the labour market equilibrium. Thus, one aspect of the 
general equilibrium is that the resources of the individual 
employee are divided efficiently between working hours and 
leisure. In this sense the classical value theory supports full 
employment. Such a notion of full employment, that is employment 
related to efficiency considerations, is alien to traditional 
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Keynesian theory (see for example the textbook by Branson 
(1979». This is not so, however, for newer approaches to 
macroeconomics since these are based upon an explicitly choice 
theoretic framework (see for example Mankiw (1989». The 
questions asked in this thesis and the methods used in the 
attempt to provide an answer, clearly place our approach within 
the latter of these two traditions. Thus, in the current study of 
labour market equilibrium efficiency considerations have an 
explicit role to play. Thus, concern is not so much for the 
level of employment, but rather for the level of employment 
compared to a first best situation. Here the first best is 
identified with the case of symmetric information. 
The main motivation for the current study is to be found within 
the realms of macroeconomic theory, not so much as to the method 
of analysis but as to the questions asked. Since it became 
apparent that the basic Keynesian paradigm was not appropriate 
for the understanding of the experiences of the seventies and 
onwards, two major traditions have developed within macroeconomic 
theory. 
The stage for one of these two traditions is based upon the work 
of Friedman (1968) and Lucas (1976). The central thesis is that 
business cycles are best understood within neoclassical theory. 
In this respect, note that the classical general equilibrium 
construct can be extended to a stochastic setting (Kydland and 
Prescott (1990». This attempt to understand business cycles is 
summarised by the real business cycle model (Plosser (1989), 
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Kydland and Prescott (1990). The simplest real business cycle 
model is the neoclassical model of consumption and investment 
(Ramsey (1928), Allais (1947), Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965». 
This model is explicitly dynamic and can thus be concerned with 
changes in the levels, and if the otherwise static model is 
extended to embed productivity shocks, it will generate 
fluctuations which are claimed to resemble observed facts 
(arguments in favour of this are given in Plosser (1989), 
arguments against are given in Mankiw (1989) and Pagan). 
The second major tradition emphasizes the necessity of deviating 
from the competitive paradigm in the attempt to understand 
business cycles. The basic postulate is not that real business 
cycle models are irrelevant, but that they do not suffice to 
explain what is observed. Mostly the models found within this 
tradition are partial in nature and focus attention upon one 
market at a time and they are primarily static (a good example of 
this is the recent textbook by Blanchard & Fischer (1989), 
Chapters 8 and 9). Thus, advances have been made within the price 
setting behavior of firms under monopolistic competition. 
Problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are introduced to 
models of the financial sector. These approaches have illustrated 
that despite the presence of optimizing agents, the economy may 
perform inefficiently. Also, attention has increasingly been 
focused upon the labour market. The theory of implicit contracts 
and search is discussed in relation to macroeconomic theory by 
Frank (1986) and the insider-outsider theory is well established 
(Lindbeck & Snower (1989» with an eye to macroeconomics. 
10 
There seems to be good reason to be concerned with the labour 
market. This is one of the markets which by casual observation 
appear to diverge the most from the competitive assumption of 
atomistic non-strategic agents. This 1s confirmed for the Nordic 
countries where union density (union members as percent of the 
total labour force) is in Sweden 90, in Finland 80, in Denmark 75 
and in Norway 60 (all figures are approximate, see Calmfors 
(1989». Hence, in this respect it is fully justified to analyse 
the implications of labour market imperfections. However, a high 
union density is not a sufficient reason for claiming that 
thorough deviations from the competitive framework have occurred. 
The organization as well as the behavior of unions must be taken 
into account. Most models of trade union behavior support a level ; 
of employment lower than the competitive (see Oswald (1985) for a 
survey). Also empirical support is found for the fact that a high 
union density is important. Based on comparative studies of the 
OECD countries (Calmfors & Driffill (1988), Freeman (1988» it is 
safe to conclude that in countries with a high union density 
bargaining will certainly have an effect upon macroeconomic 
performance {see also Calmfors (1989». 
In the literature concerned with bargaining and macroeconomic 
performance a distinction is often made between centralized and 
decentralized bargaining (Calmfors & Driffill (1988), Freeman 
(1988». It is normally assumed that bargaining is a centralized 
process in the sense that one all encompassing union bargains 
with one representative firm over wages or profits. This is the 
idea behind for example the literature deriving time consistent 
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policies for a government facing an active trade union. The 
current study is presumably best interpreted as a theoretical 
investigation into the effects of decentralized bargaining with 
asymmetric information. That is, the bargain takes place between 
a specific firm and the employees of this firm. That such a study 
is warranted derives from the fact that firstly centralized and 
decentralized bargaining may well coexist, and indeed does so at 
least in the Nordic countries. These are the countries normally 
claimed to have the most centralized bargaining process (Freeman 
(1988), Calmfors (1989». In fact, approximately half of the 
increases in the money wage rate for the Nordic countries are 
accounted for by such local settlements (Flanagan (1988). 
Secondly, in nearly all countries the tendency in recent years 
has been towards more decentralization (Elvander (1988), Calmfors 
(1989». In conclusion, it is potentially interesting also in a 
macroeconomic context to study the implications of local bargains 
between employers and employees as will be done here. 
Also the issues addressed in this thesis are potentially 
interesting also from a microeconomic point of view. Recently, 
several successful attempts have been made to model the labour 
market so as to escape some of the traditional conclusions of 
microeconomic theory. These include the theory of implicit 
contracts, search, efficiency wages and the insider-outsider 
theory. The current study can be seen as yet another attempted 
contribution to modelling the economics of the labour market. 
In particular, a comparison with the literature on implicit 
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contracts provides in its own right a motivation for this study. 
Abandoning the assumption that workers are passive will reverse 
the conclusion with respect to the level of employment obtained 
in the contracts literature. In Chapter 2 and in the first 
section of Chapter 3 it is shown that a separating equilibrium is 
characterized by underemployment. In contrast, the more realistic 
of the implicit contracts models support overemployment. 
The main difference between the models adhered to in this thesis 
and those of the implicit contracts literature is to be found in 
the description of the labour market. The latter approaches to 
the labour market assumes that workers are passive and let firms 
offer a contract subject to the constraint that it must secure 
the reservation level of utility to workers. In this thesis 
workers are assumed to participate actively in the determination 
of the wage. 
In most chapters (2, 3, 4, 6) the monopoly union model is 
applied. That is, the union alone determines the wage. However, 
Chapter 5, being only an example, suggests that as long as the 
union has a bargaining strength strictly bounded from below at 
zero, the level of employment is inefficiently low. 
Finally, since the emphasis in this thesis is on the implications 
of asymmetric information, the analysis can be seen as an 
illustration and exemplification of the rather abstract 
exposition of the diverse ways in which imperfect information 
affects the allocation of resources given by Laffont (1980). 
Although not a topic of this thesis, note here that the results 
presented in the following chapters suggest that the effects of 
asymmetric information may depend upon the market form. This is 
so qualitatively (that is, the nature of the equilibrium may 
change (see Chapter 3» as well as quantitatively (that is, the 
effect upon the quantities may change (see Chapter 4». 
II. This Thesis. 
II.a. Methodological considerations. 
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The aim of this section is to give the argument supporting 
unemployment; a theme which runs throughout this thesis. 
Furthermore, it is discussed whether one should interpret the 
models presented here so as to allow command-like equilibrium or 
whether a decentralized equilibrium should be applied. This is 
done with reference to the theory of incentives. Finally, we 
discuss the limitations to the results due to the choice of 
specific functional forms. 
In this thesis an analysis of wage and employment determination 
under asymmetric information is set forth. In all of the models 
analysed in the following the wage is determined by a bargain 
between a firm and a trade union. The decision with respect to 
the level of employment is left to the firm, thus the modal is a 
right to manage model (Andrews & Nickel (1983). The novel aspect 
of these models is that it is assumed that the firm is better 
informed with respect to a parameter which (jointly with other 
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variables) determines the value of the bargain. Let this 
parameter be denoted ~ and let the non-vanishing distribution of 
= be denoted by ~(.). The support is (~,~]. 
The information structure can then be described as follows. Let 
the actual realization of _ be drawn from ~(.) which jointly with 
the support is known by the firm as well as the union. This 
ensures that the subjective and the objective distributions 
coincide, i.e., the equilibrium which is studied is in full 
agreement with the rationality of expectations. The firm has 
superior information compared to the union assuming that the firm 
has direct access to the actual realized value of ~. The kind of 
eqilihria which is studied here is equilibria contingent upon the 
announcement made by the firm with respect to the value of =. 
This will in general impose restrictions upon the equilibrium 
level of employment since this serves as signal that the firm 
(the better informed party) has actually made a truthful 
announcement. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 2, in a 
sequential equilibrium (two periods) this will imply an 
insufficiently low level of labour demand. In a one period model 
the equilibrium is characterized by an insufficiently low level 
of labour supply, as is demonstrated by the first part of Chapter 
3. Apart from the exercise of the first part of Chapter 3, only 
sequential equilibria are examined. This allows the use of the 
Perfect Baysian Equilibrium, or Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps & 
Wilson (1982}}1), and is presumably the most reasonable setting 
for a problem of asymmetric information (on this, see Radner 
(1982». 
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To be more specific, assume that the production function of the 
firm is defined over labour and capital, where labour and capital 
are complements. The trade union as well as, of course, the firm 
has perfect knowledge as to the functional form. However, the 
trade union may be less than perfectly informed as to the value 
of the production, that is, the demand function, or as to the 
level or quality of the stock of capital. Examples of both 
situations are given in this thesis. During a first period the 
wage is taken to be exogenously given 2 ). The firm has to announce 
the value of E which is realized. Given this announcement and the 
actions of the firm the union draws inferences as to the real 
value of ~. Based upon this inference the trade union and the 
firm enter a bargain. Mostly we take the simplest possible 
bargaining process which can be imagined, namely that the un10n 
dictates the money wage which is to rule in the second period. In 
consequence the prof1t to the firm in the second period is 
related to its actions during the first period. Thus, some 
strategic considerations are imposed upon the firm due to this 
"dynamics" in an otherwise static economy. 
In standard (and static) microeconomic theory a firm employs 
labour up to the point where the wage (in a competitive 
framework) is equalled by the value of the marginal product of 
labour. Amongst other things this ensures efficiency, or to put 
it a little differently: full employment. All of the chapters to 
follow are concerned with the question of whether this notion of 
full employment can be supported in an economy characterized by 
asymmetric information, and thus strategic considerations of the 
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agents. 
The reason why unemployment can be expected to occur is that in a 
setting like that described just above the firm's second period 
profit is, ceteris paribus, higher the lower is the perception of 
the union of the value of the marginal product of labour. If then 
there is a strictly increasing relationship between the value of 
the marginal product of labour and the level of employment, this 
suffices to establish a result supporting unemployment. To be 
more precise, assume that the first period level of employment is 
an increasing function of the announced value of =, call this _. 
Thus we have L1 =e(§), where e'(·»O. Furthermore, assume that the 
second period wage is an increasing function of ~, that is, 
w2 =T(S),T ' (· »0. Assume that the second period profit of the firm 
be a strictly decreasing function of w2 , i.e., n=n(w2 ), nl(·)<O. 
Can the firm during the first period announce truthfully and be 
trusted, that is, can E=: be a feasible announcement? This cannot 
be an equilibrium since if it was, then the firm could announce 
:=:-£. Doing so, the firm suffers a loss of profit in the first 
period since it has to behave in accordance with its announce-
ment, this is the assumption on L1 • This loss is of the order of 
£2. However, if the firm is trusted, then in the second period it 
realizes an increase of profits of the order of E since the 
second period wage is lower than otherwise. Thus, the firm always 
has an incentive to claim that the realized value of E is lower 
than what is actually the case. Or to put it differently, if the 
firm announces ~, then the union will infer E=E+E. Hence, to 
support an announcement E=:, the firm essentially has to announce 
E-e which gives rise to an inference of ~=(E-c)+c=E. With the 
assumption made upon L 1 , this is equivalent to the use of 
employment as a signal. The signalling role of employment 
dictates an inefficiently low level of employment. 
17 
Let us concentrate for a moment on separating equilibria. In 
Chapters 2 and 3, especially, it 1s establishe that the level of 
employment serves as a quantity signal. The role is to elicit the 
relevant information. But as noted in these chapters, this is 
done at a cost. In the two period model of Chapter 2 the firm 
loses some first period profit in order to seveal the truth. In 
/ 
the one period model of Chapter 3 the union sacrifices some 
utility in order to extract the truth. Thus, the economy is 
caught in a "catch-22". If the better informed agent credibly 
could pass on his information to the lesser informed party, a 
welfare gain would arise. What are then the reasons for the fact 
that this information cannot be transmitted? 
Consider the result of Chapter 3 first. The firm is better 
informed compared to the union. Ex-ante the only information in 
addition to common knowledge must be provided by the firm which 
has an incent1ve to misrepresent the truth. Since this is a one-
period model, the firm cannot be punished if caught lying and in 
consequence it is the actual behavior if the firm and the union 
which will have to elecit the relevant information. Thus, the 
economy cannot escape the "catch-22" situation. 
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If we turn attention to the equilibrium"discribed in Chapter 2, 
the situation may look more promising with respect to the 
transfer of information. This is so since this model is a two-
period model. Consider the case when the firm behaves according 
to the realized value of 2. One way that the firm could avoid 
being identified as a E:+e type would be to "open its books" to 
the union. Despite the fact that profit in a real world context 
is less precisely defined than here, this raises another problem. 
If the union were to believe the "books", then the firm could 
just set up another firm. The role of this new firm is to buy the 
products of the producing firm such as to make production look as 
little profitable as possible (according to common knowledge). If 
the union realizes this, then it cannot put any trust into the 
"books". Thus, the quantity signal is still needed. 
A different route to take would be to put union representatives 
on the board of directors. However, if there still is a conflict 
between the strive for profit and reward of labour such a 
solution is subject to the same remarks as above. We can imagine 
only one case in which workers' representativeson the board of 
directors would solve the incentive problem. And this is the case 
of labour-managed firms since in this case there will be no 
conflict between workers and management since they all have the 
same preferences. 
Above the argument supporting underemployment was sketched and 
reference was made to the competitive solution. In all of the 
models presented in the following, a command equilibrium is 
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analysed. Since the models presented in this thesis are perhaps 
best interpreted as models of local bargaining, this may appear 
objectionable. This is so since both the firm and the union may 
enjoy monopoly power. In defence of such an approach based upon 
the notion of a command optimum, note that this, since it rules 
out monopoly effects, gives efficiency the best chance. Thus, 
analysing the command optimum, we ask the question of which kind 
of inefficiencies arises in an otherwise competitive ~conomy 
characterized by asymmetric information. At a more formal level, 
consider the problems analysed here as a problem within the 
theory of incentives 3 ). This theory is concerned with the 
problems faced by a planner4 ) when the objectives of the planner 
are different from those of the individual agents and when the 
actions of the planner depend upon the behavior or information of 
the agents. If we consider the firm and the union as the agents 
of the economy and the planner as society itself, the problems 
addressed in this thesis are readily interpreted as problems 
within the theory of incentives. In such a setting the planner's 
choice of action involves what may be called a double 
maximization: the planner maximizes his own utility~) subject to 
the constraint that once the planner has dictated an incentive 
scheme 6 ), the agents will maximize their own objective functions. 
However, despite these arguments in favour of analysing a command 
equilibrium, we have also analysed the correspondIng 
decentralized equilibrium which allows for monopoly effects. In 
two cases the distinction between a command equilibrium and a 
decentralized equilibrium are important in the sense that 
conclusions change qualitatively7). 
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The current analysis is restricted in its level of generality for 
two reasons. Firstly, the models applied are all partial 
equilibrium models. Secondly, the current analysis is based upon 
the introduction of specific functional forms. 
TABLE 1 . 
Utility Function Production Function 
Chapter 2 wL y = f(L,K) 
Chapter 3 wL+ veL) y = f(L,K) 
Chapter 4 U(wL,L), U12 < 0 Y = f(L,K) 
Chapter 5 wL(1-L) y = L1 I 2 
Chapter 6 wL - aL2 y = (LK) 1 I 2 
Let us comment on Chapters 5 and 6 first. These chapters are 
concerned with policy issues. For this reason extremely simple 
functional forms have been chosen in order to obtain results 
which allow for a reasonably simple policy analysis. Chapters 2, 
3 and 4 are all more general in scope, and it has been possible 
to obtain results with quite general production structures. The 
restrictions on these results are found in the specification of 
the utility function describing the preferences of the union. 
Results with respect to the level of employment are established 
by examination of first order differential equations. Not 
surprisingly, to establish unambiguous results we require a 
reasonably simple structure. This, at least in a first study, 
implies that we have to be fairly selective in the choice of 
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model specification. 
II.b. Summary of Chapters 2-6. 
Chapter 2 considers, as all of the chapters, a bargaining process 
between a firm and a union. The simplest possible bargain is 
imagined, namely that the trade union in a two period 
relationship dictates the second period wage. The firm is 
supposed to sell its product in a fully competitive market. The 
competitive price is common knowledge. The production function is 
defined over the input of labour and capital, or capacity. The 
fi'rm has full knowledge of capacity. It is assumed that the trade 
union is imperfectly informed about capacity in the sense 
described earlier. Thus, the knowledge of the union is described 
as a support [k1 ,ku l and a non vanishing distribution ~(k). This 
situation can be interpreted as the trade union either cannot 
observe the quantity of the capital stock or is poorly informed 
about its quality. The equilibrium described allows for an 
interpretation of a decentralized as well as of a command 
I 
equilibrium. The main result of Chapter 2 is that only separating 
equilibria exist, that is, in equilibrium all relevant 
information is elicited. A second important result is the fact 
that first period employment serves as a signal and that this 
dictates underemployment and, of course, underproduction, 
compared to the case of full information. Since all relevant 
information is elicited during the first period, the second 
period equilibrium is not disturbed relative to the case of 
symmetric information. Thus, the only effect is that first period 
employment is lowered. Hence, this result argues that a welfare 
loss occurs. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first 
part analysis the case of a two-point distribution. The second 
part generalizes this to the case of a continuum of types. 
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The result of Chapter 2 is subject to further considerations. It 
is natural to analyse the implications with respect to the level 
of investment (cf. Grout (1984». This is the subject of Chapter 
4. Also, since the result can be interpreted as if the shadow 
wage of labour exceeds the money wage it is natural to consider 
taxation as the proper policy towards underemployment. This is 
the theme of Chapter 5. However, before we turn to an analysis of 
the equilibrium established in Chapter 2, we consider in Chapter 
3 if we may have a different kind of equilibrium. 
Narrowing down the range of possible firms, that is, in a sense 
letting information be more precise, one perhaps would believe 
that the equilibrium would become more efficient. This is 
analysed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 again analyses a bargaining 
situation. In this model the firm is facing a downward sloping 
demand curve which is subject to shock. The firm is perfectly 
informed as to the realized value of this shock whereas the union 
only knows the process generating the stochastic injection. The 
first part of this chapter argues that in a one-period 
relationship a separating equilibrium is obtained. Two 
propositions are offered; one for the case of a command 
equilibrium and one for the case of equilibrium in a 
decentralized economy. It is shown that the level of supply of 
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labour is inefficiently low in both the command and the 
decentralized equilibrium. The second part of Chapter 3 is 
devoted to dynamic considerations. It is shown that in a dynamic 
setting the separating equilibrium cannot be supported if the 
range of firms is sufficiently narrowed down and if the firm with 
the lowest possible profit is a IIzero-profitll firm. In this case 
a pooling equilibrium obtains8 ). However, in the case of a 
decentralized economy the sequential equilibrium does not cease 
to exist. This is so because the firm with the lowest monopoly 
profit enjoys a profit strictly bounded from below by a number 
greater than zero. 
In a pooling equilibrium different types of agents behave alike. 
This may have important macroeconomic implications and, of 
course, implications for macroeconomic policy. This is the theme 
of Chapter 6. 
Chapter 4 analyses the role of employment and investments when 
the firm enjoys information advantages. Compared to the previous 
chapters, the firm now has to choose not only employment but also 
its level of investments. Two situations are analysed. Firstly, 
one in which a planner dictates the second period wage. Under 
these circumstances none of the two parties enjoy first-mover 
advantages. It is shown that not only is the level of investments 
low compared to a situation of symmetric information, but for any 
level of investment it is underutilized. This result cannot be 
shown in a decentralized economy. It is still the case that 
underemployment occurs, as is to be expected from Chapter 2. 
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However, the effect on investments is ambiguous. The fact that 
employment is lowered has two opposing effects. The value of the 
marginal product of capital is lowered (at least with a neo-
classical production function). This tends to reduce investments. 
On the other hand, since the level of employment is lowered, the 
effect of capital formation upon the wage (through the value of 
the marginal product of labour) becomes less important. This 
tends to increase the level of investments. To show that this 
ambiguity is.not due to the generality of the model, an example 
is offered. Using a Cobb-Douglas production function it is 
confirmed that we can-not expect to obtain an unambiguous result. 
Chapter 5 restates the results of Chapter 2 employing less 
general functional forms but applying a more general outcome of 
the bargaining process, the Nash bargaining solution. It is shown 
that underemployment occurs, unless the firm has all of the 
bargaining strength. Also it is shown that employment decreases 
with union strength. But the focus of this chapter is the 
interpretation of the underemployment result as an externality. 
This points to use of taxes. In this respect the results are 
mixed. The following kind of taxes are considered profit taxes, 
revenue taxes, output taxes and wage taxes. It is argued that 
only wage and output taxation can improve upon the inefficient 
equilibrium. 
The final chapter returns to the case of a pooling equilibrium. 
In the first part it is discussed under which circumstances a 
pooling equilibrium obtains. It is argued that if the two types 
25 
considered are sufficiently alike, the resulting equilibrium is a 
pooling equilibrium. The second part focuses upon the possible 
effects of economic policy as well as of a stochastic injection 
to the economy. Contrary to the preceding chapter, the economic 
policy measures introduced in this chapter can be interpreted as 
traditional fiscal policy. The second part of the chapter is 
divided into three subsections of which the first two consider 
stochastic injections or policy measures which are specific to 
the state of nature. It is seen that there are circumstances in 
which the economy will not respond immediately to either a fully 
anticipated shock or to a known policy intervention. The third 
part is concerned with ideosyncratic shocks or general policy 
intervention (i.e., state independent injections to the economy). 
In particular, these demand changes can be interpreted as 
traditional fiscal policy measures and are followed by 
adjustments in employment and production (both if the pooling 
equilibrium is still supported after the demand change or if the 
equilibrium changes from a pooling to a separating equilibrium), 
like in traditional Keynesian models. However, this ~ffect is not 
immediately related to the traditional Keynesian multiplier story 
since within the current framework this is just the optimal 
response by firms to a publicly known demand increase. 
Finally, note that some of the results presented here point to 
the fact that it is important whether we analyse the consequences 
of asymmetric information in a general equilibrium setting or in 
a setting allowing for monopoly effects. The underemployment 
result of Ch~pter 2 remains valid in both a planned and a 
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decentralized economy, where the planned economy is intended to 
minic a competitive economy. However, this is not so for the 
results of Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3 it was the zero-profit 
condition which generated a pooling equilibrium. In Chapter 4, 
unless monopoly effects were suppressed, it was not possible to 
obtain unambiguous results. Thus care must be taken when 
interpreting the results of an analysis of problems relating to 
asymmetric information. If it is felt that the economy 1s 
characterized by imperfections relative to the competitive 
paradigm so that neither the zero-profit condition nor the zero-
elasticity is fulfilled, then the partial equilibrium presented 
here will be appropriate. Alternatively, but this is outside the 
scope of this thesis and a topic in its own right, the 
consequences of asymmetric information must be analysed in a 
general equilibrium setting, for example a model of monopolistic 
competition. 
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III. Notes. 
1. Strictly speaking these two equilibria concepts are not 
identical. Any equilibrium which is a Sequential Equilibrium 
is also a Perfect Baysian Equilibrium but not vice versa. This 
is so since a Sequential Equilibrium in addition to possessing 
the features of a Perfect Baysian Equilibrium also encompasses 
the idea of a Trembling Hand Equilibrium. 
2. This actually implies that instead of studying a Perfect 
Baysian Equilibrium we study a Continuation Equilibrium. 
3. The following is based upon the extensive survey by Laffont 
and Maskin (1982). 
4. The planner is often thought of as a government or as society 
itself. 
5. In the current setting utility is maximized when efficiency 
obtains in the exchange of income for labour. 
6. In this setting an incentive scheme is triple consisting of 
{~,Ll ,w2 }; that is, given the announcement as to the realized 
value of S, the level of employment in the first period the 
planner dictates the second period wage. 
7. On this, see the summary of the different chapters. 
8. Strictly speaking another, very complicated, equilibrium may 
coexist with the simple pooling equilibria. 
CHAPTER 2 
WAGE DETERMINATION IN A MODEL 
OF SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING 
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I. Introduction. 
In this chapter, a model of wage determination is set forth. The 
principal feature of the model is that the wage is determined as 
the outcome of a bargaining process involving a trade union and a 
firm. Our objective is to analyse the problems, if any, arising, 
when the firm, compared to the trade union, is better informed 
with respect to some exogenous variables determining the outcome 
of the bargaining process. It is assumed that the trade union has 
the opportunity to draw inferences over time about these 
variables conditional upon the actions of the firm. A natural 
setting is one of sequential bargaining. The bargaining strength 
of the parties involved is given exogenously, i.e., it is not 
possible by (strategic) commitments to change the division of the 
surplus arising from the production process. 
To be more specific, assume that the production function is 
defined over labour and capacity. The trade union knows the func-
tional form of the production function. However, its knowledge 
about the capacity is only probabilistic. The firm has perfect 
knowledge about capacity. During a time spell, period 1, the 
union observes for given values of nominal wage and price, the 
actions of the firm. In between the 1st and 2nd period, the trade 
union and the firm negotiate a wage. The revenue of the bargain-
ing to the trade union is partly determined by the beliefs (con-
ditional upon the first period action) about capacity. The stra-
tegic interaction, arising because of different information sets 
between the trade union and the firm, is the concern of this 
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chapter. To facilitate the analysis the following simple outcome 
of the bargaining situation is postulated. After period 1, the 
trade union draws its inferences about capacity and conditional 
upon these, announces the wage which maximizes some postulated 
utility function. This is the simple monopoly union model. Many 
more (and also more complicated) bargaining processes may be 
imagined, but in order to keep the analysis simple, the above 
outcome of the bargaining process is maintained throughout the 
paper. 
The markets for goods are all assumed to be perfectly com-
petitive. Consequently, real income 1s maximized by maximizing 
nominal income. In most of the paper, the utility of the trade 
union is assumed to equal real income. Only specific examples 
(cf. Lemma 1 and 2) consider disutility of work specifically. 
For given wages and prices, firms normally employ up to a level 
of employment for which the value of the marginal product equals 
the going wage rate. The attempted contribution is to analyse 
whether this equilibrium can be sustained, in the framework 
described above. Firstly, the paper analyses what type of 
equilibrium result, i.e., whether a separating or pooling 
equilibrium are obtained. A main result of this chapter is that 
only separating equilibria exist. Given this, it 1s of interest 
to characterize such an equilibrium. A second main result of this 
chapter is that any separating equilibrium involves less 
production and employment (unless the firm has the highest 
capacity), in the first period compared to standard results. 
Thus, the mere presence of a wage bargaining process tends to 
support underemployment. 
31 
The analysis deserves attention for at least two reasons. First-
ly, the labour market is the market which, in its institutional 
settings, varies perhaps mostly from the core assumptions of the 
Walrasian model; i.e., price taking and lack of strategic inter-
actions. Thus, to formulate and analyse explicitly some of the 
strategic considerations which may arise in this market can be 
seen as yet another contribution to the growing literature on 
microfoundations of macroeconomic theory. The result for the 
level of employment tends to support this supposition. 
Secondly, the analysis provided in this paper is related to the 
theory of implicit contracts. The theory of implicit contracts 
under asymmetric information suggest that, only if firms are more 
risk averse than are workers, underemployment results. It does 
seem likely that it is the case that firms are less averse to 
risk than workers are (firms may better diversify their risk). In 
the case of risk neutrality contract theory suggests full employ-
ment. The result obtained in this paper does not rely upon 
assumptions regarding the parties attitude towards risk and yet, 
we obtain underemployment. 
The difference between this approach and that of the literature 
on implicit contracts is that in the current setting, it is the 
trade union who offers a contract (perfectly elastic supply of 
labour at some wage), whereas in the contracts literature, it is 
the firm who is offering the workers a contract (making the 
firm's income a residual)1). 
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Section II analyses the case where the capacity can take on only 
two values. The analytically more exciting case, in which 
capacity is distributed according to a continuous distribution 
function, is analyzed in Section III. A summary is offered in 
Section IV, where the results are related to other results given 
in the literature on trade unions. 
II. A Two-Point Distribution Function. 
This section of the paper analyses the strategic behavior arising 
as a consequence of the bargaining process going on between the 
trade union and the firm, in the case where capacity k takes on 
only two values; ku and k1 , respectively. It is assumed that 
ku>kl where u, respectively 1, refers naturally to upper, 
respectively lower. Also, once capacity is fixed at ku or kl 
(according to a two-point probability distribution), it is 
invariant over the two periods. It Is shown that only separating 
equilibria result, that the k1-type may well be distorted, and 
that the first period produces less than the Walrasian output. 
Contrary to this, a ku-type firm is never distorted and produces, 
in the first period, an amount equal to the Walrasian output. 
The results put forward here partly serve as an illustration of 
the results for the continuous distribution case considered in 
Section III. However, the results of this section are also of 
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interest on their own because they, partly, are contrary to the 
results given in Freixas et ale (1985), where this line of 
reasoning is also used. Contrary to the results obtained in 
Freixas et ale (1985), the current analysis support only separat-
ing equilibria. The reason for this is that in Freixas et ale 
(1985), an absolute lower bound upon the actions of the agents is 
an inherent part of the structure of the economy. 
At times purely technical analysis is carried out. This serves 
only the purpose of supporting the equilibrium. It is therefore 
worthwhile to give a brief account of the following. Central to 
the analysis presented here and in the next section is the idea 
that the higher the value of k is, as perceived by the trade 
union, the higher the second period wage is. An example of 
sufficient technical conditions, for this to be the case, is 
given in Lemma 1 and Lemma 221. These conditions are concerned 
with the properties of the production function and the sufficient 
conditions given here rule out, for example, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. However, an example, following Lemma 1 and 
Lemma 2, shows that also for the Cobb-Douglas production function 
it will be the case that the higher is the perceived value of k, 
the higher is the second period wage, if the disutility of labour 
is given by some convex function. 
I 
Proposition characterizes the equilibrium production. The proof 
of this proposition is instructive as the level of production is 
determined exactly, depending upon type. The proof of this 
proposition rests upon two technical lemmas; Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. 
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These lemmas describe for each type of firm, i.e., k=kl or k=ku' 
the feasible levels of production. Proofs of these lemmas are 
based on the sequential nature of the bargaining process. 
Denote the prior probability of k=k u ' by Pr(k=ku)=u t and in a 
similar way Pr(k=k1 )=l-u t • During the first period, the price and 
wage are p and wt ' respectively. The firm produces according to 
f(l,k), where k=ku or k=k 1 • 1 is the level of employment. The 
trade union knows the functional form f(.,.). Observing actual 
output, as well as actual employment, the trade union knows 
whether production takes place as with capacity 
Let ~2(k,p,W2) be the second period demand for labour. Then the 
following 2 lemmas give some structure to the model. 
Lemma 1. A sufficient condition for the second period wage to 
increase in u2 , the updated probability that k=ku' i.e., 
aw2 /au 2 >o is that 
i) for a given labour demand schedule the maximization of second 
period income by the trade union is solved for a strictly 
positive and finite value of w2 J ) 
Proof: see Appendix. 
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Condition i) of the lemma is quite usual, which means that second 
period income can be maximized, that is, the function giving 
second period income is concave or quasi-concave. Condition ii) 
ensures that the wage claim is actually increasing in k. 
Immediately from this we have, when n 2 F Is second period profit 
to the firm: 
Lemma 2. Conditions i) and 11) of Lemma 1 are sufficient for the 
high capacity firm to have an incentive ·to act as if it is a low 
capacity firm, i.e., an F 2 /au 2 <O. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Lemma 2 offers an insight into the basic characteristic of this 
model. It states that the higher the ex-post probability that a 
firm has k=ku ' the lower the profit received by the firm 
(irrespective of its actual type). In a world with only two types 
of firms, this provides an incentive to the high capacity firm to 
pretend that it is a low capacity firm. That is, a firm with 
realized value k=ku has an incentive to claim that the realized 
value of k equals k1 • The firm is restricted to behave according 
to its claim. If the firm reveals that k=ku' the updated value of 
V 1 ' called U 2 ' is 1. If, on the other hand, the firm claims that 
k=k1 , the updated value of U 2 is u t <l, which according to Lemma 2 
results in higher profit4 ). Note, at this point nothing has been 
said to indicate how a ku-type firm does mimic a k1-type firm. 
This will be discussed shortly. 
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Lemmas 1 and 2 may well be thought to be unduly restrictive with 
respect to assumptions made on f. In particular, the Cobb-Douglas 
production functions are ruled out by assumption i) of the 
lemmas. However, also for the Cobb-Douglas production function 
exhibiting decreasing returns, it is the case that the second 
period profit is decreasing in U2 ' once the disutility of working 
is given by a strictly convex function. Consider 
i = 1,2 a+p < 1 
Profits are5 ) 
Hence, for any given w2 labour demand in period 2 is 
1 
pakP 1-Ci 
= [w ] 
2 
where k takes on one of the two values kl or ku. Assume that the 
trade union maximizes real income less disutility of working. 
Consider the case where the disutI1Ity of working is given by 
b( I) =12, a strictly convex function 6 ). The expected utili ty Is 
gIven by 
Manipulation of first order conditions gives 
1 
2(ap)r.:a = 
a 
From this: 
-2+a 
[ 2+a --r:a 
-r-a W2 
1 
2 (ap)-r:a 
a- ]dw2 = 
Also, second period profit is written as 
Using the Envelope Theorem 
The discussion offered above took as exogenous u 2 ; the ex-post 
probability that k=ku • The aim is to give a fully dynamic 
analysis and, hence, to make U 2 an endogenous variable. 
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Denote actual output in any period by Xl' i=1,2. Observing x1 , 
the trade union indirectly observes the value of k. The value of 
k, inferred by the trade union, or more precisely the value of 
U2' impinges upon the future stream of profits of the firm. 
Hence, the firm may engage in strategic behavior so as to affect 
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V2' Before considering the solution to this problem, some further 
reflections on the strategic behavior is needed. 
Since both the trade union and the firm are active decision 
makers, it is not clear how a ku-type firm mimics a kl -type firm. 
If the firm believes that the trade union, by observing a high 
output, infers that the value of k is low and if, on the other 
hand, the trade union believes that the firm has the above 
beliefs, then an equilibrium, in which firms overproduce, is 
perfectly viable. However, in the following, it is assumed that a 
focal point of the game is that both the trade union and the firm 
associates falling output with a lower value of k. In the next 
section, it is seen that within the current model, the sign of 
the derivatives of the strategies giving first period output and 
second period wage can only be signed pairwise. Alternatively, ku 
can be given the interpretation of an absolute upper bound upon 
production. Thus, if the ku-type firm is to deviate, then it must 
do so by producing less than fl (kU'~l (ku,p,wt ». Hence, only 
"under-production" is the result of strategic behavior. 
To sum up, a situation is considered in which it may be to the 
advantage of a ku-type firm to "under-produce II in order to set 
U 2 =V t • That is, a situation materializes in which the trade union 
observing Xl' obtains no more information than what is contained 
in V t • If the ku -type firm produces fl (ku '~1 (ku ,p,wt ), then 
u 2 =1. Denote the wage claim put forward and accepted for the 
second period by w2 • This is the 50-called monopoly union model 
(see Nickel and Andrews (1982». The union unilaterally 
determines the wage and it is left to the firm to decide the 
level of employment. 
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To be more precise, consider the following two-period game. 
During the first period, the firm chooses to produce as if it is 
a low capacity firm, irrespective of its type. Prices and wages 
are assumed to be given. In between the first and the second 
period, the trade union puts forward a wage claim, w2 , which is 
taken as the exogenous wage ruling in the second period. The 
price is unchanged. In order to put forward an optimal wage 
claim, the trade union faced with an output corresponding to a 
low capacity firm has to decide upon the ex-post probability 
U 2 (X 1 ), a function of xl(k,l)=fl(kl,~(kl'P,Wt», where xt (.,.) 
denotes actual production and ~t denotes first period labour 
demand. In this case u2 (·)=u t • On the other hand, the trade union 
may be confronted wi th an output Xl (k, 1)= fl (ku ,~t (ku ,p,wt ». In 
this case u2=1. 
In the following, only a subset of the Perfect Baysian 
Equilibrium (PEE) is considered. For anyone equilibria to be a 
PEE it is required (cf. Freixas et ale (1985», given any first 
period wage, that: 
P. 1 l( F 2 
P • 2 w 2 = W ( f 1 (k, ~ 1 (k, p , w 1 » i s a ma xi m i z e r for 
E [ w 2 • ~ ( k , p , W 2 ) 1f t (k, ~ t (ku ,p, WI) ) ] 
P.3 11 = CPl (k,p,w1 ) is a maximizer for 
given 12 = CP2(k,p,w2 ) 
1t f t 
P . 4 w 1 i 5 a rna xi m i z e r 0 f E [ w 1 • ~ 1 (k, p , W 1 ) ] + 
E [ w 2 • ~ 2 (k, p , w 2 ) I f 1 (k, ~ 1 (ku ,p, W 1 ) ) ] 
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BC U 2 the up-dated probability of k=ku is Bayes-consistent with 
the prior probabili ty U 1 and fl (k'~t (k,p,w 1 ». 
The above conditions are common and are nothing but a kind of 
"dynamic rationality" constraints. Conditions P.1-P.4 state that 
each party, given what is going to come and what has been 
passing, at any given point in time has to choose optimally. 
Finally, the condition BC requires that the forecast of what is 
going to come is consistent with current and past actions. 
The equilibrium described by P.1-P.3 and BC and any wt is called 
a continuation equilibrium. Thus, continuation equilibrium is 
induced by a PBE and a specific first period wage. 
Proof. Consider Xl (k1 ,1»f1 (k1 '~1 (k1 ,p,wt » where af/ak>O. Hence, 
from the higher output it is inferred that the value of k is 
higher than what it actually is, i.e., U 2 is higher than what it 
would be if Xl (k1 ,l)~fl (k1 ,CPt (k1 ,p,wt ). This reduces second 
period profit and nothing is gained in first period profit. 
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Q.E.D. 
Wh e the r x t (k t ,~t (k 1 ,p, W t ) ) = f t (k t '~1 (k t ,p, WI» 0 r 
x t (k t ,~t (k1 ,p,wt » <ft (k1 ,~t (k1 ,p,wt » is resolved in the proof of 
Proposition 1. 
Proof. By assumption 3f/3k>O. Using Lemma 3: x t (k 1 ,l)~ 
f t (k1 ,~t (k1 ,p,w» <ft (ku '~t (ku ,p,w». Now if a ku type firm plays 
anything else but xt (k1 ,1), it is identified as a ku -type firm 
and, hence, profits are maximized choosing f t (ku '~1 (ku ,p,w». The 
only al ternative is to choose to play x t (k 1 ,l). 
Q.E.D. 
Lemmas 3 and 4 restrict the strategies to be employed by the firm 
in the continuation equilibrium. In Proposition 1, the character-
istics, the existence and uniqueness of a continuation equilib-
rium are considered. Only one type of continuation equilibrium is 
viable. The equilibrium is unique. 
Proposition 1 considers three types of equilibria. In a pooling 
equilibrium, the two different firms produce the same output in 
the first period. In a semi-separating equilibrium, the ku-type 
firm randomizes between f t (ku ,ell t (ku ,p,wt » and xt (k 1 ,1), whereas 
a k1-type firm always produces xt (k1 ,1). Finally, in a separating 
equilibrium, the ku-type firm always produces f t (ku '~t (ku,p,wt ». 
The kl -type firm produces xt (k1 ,1 )~ft (k1 ,~t (k1 ,p,w t ». The proof 
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is based upon the sequential nature of the game, the fact that 
deviations from the simple static solution to the profit maxi-
mization problem is costly, and finally, the fact that a trade 
union observing ft(ku,(~tku,p,wt»' adjusts its belief according 
to u 2 =1. If production is xt (k1 ,1), no information relative to u l 
is obtained and consequently U 2 =U 1 . 
Proposition 1. For af/ak>O, the only continuation equilibrium 
possible is a separating equilibrium, where a ku-type firm plays 
fl (ku ,c1>1 (ku ,p,w» and a kl -type firm plays Xl (k1 ,l)~ 
f1 (k1 ,c1>1 (k1 ,p,w». 
Proof. Consider the conditions for either a pooling or a semi-
separating equilibrium to exist. It must be so that for the 
k1-type firm it is optimal to play some !1 (k1 ,1) which the 
ku-type firm also chooses to produce, at least probabilistically. 
If both types choose the same output, then u 2 =u t and, hence, the 
second period wage faced by a ku-type firm, respectively k1-type 
firm, is lower, respectively higher, than if a separating 
equilibrium obtains. Now, if !1 (k1 ,1) is optimal to a k1-type 
firm, then on(k1 '!1)/ax1 is of second order smallness7' and 
consequently by deviating and playing x1<!t(k1 ,1) the k1-type 
firm may identify itself as a k1-type firm (here we use the 
assumption af/ak>O). Therefore, in the second period, this 
increases profits by a factor of first order smallness through 
the wage claim. Hence, whatever the decision of the ku-type firm 
the k1-type firm always chooses to produce slightly below the 
ku-type firm. Anticipating this, the ku-type firm always produces 
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fl (ku'~1 (ku ,p,w». Why is this so? The reason is that, whatever 
the ku-type firm produces, the k1-type firm will chose to deviate 
due to the argument above. Thus, no matter what the costs the 
ku-type firm imposes upon itself, it is always identified as a 
ku-type firm, and thus the second period gain is zero. 
Whether the k1-type firm produces exactly fl (k1 '~l (k 1 ,p,w1 » or 
!1 (k1 , l) <f1 (k1 ,~t (k1 ,P,Wl ), depends upon the incentive for a 
ku - t Y P e fir m top rod u c e f 1 (k 1 '~l (k 1 ,p, W 1 ) ). 1ft h e cos t 0 f 
producing fl (k1 ,~t (k1 ,p,w1 » to a ku -type firm is small relative 
to the potential gain in second period profi t Xl (k 1 ,l) < 
f 1 (k 1 ,~ 1 (k1 , P, wt ) ), otherwi se the kl - type produces 
f 1 (k1 , ~ 1 (k1 , p, WI) ) • 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1, established that only separating equilibria exist. 
The central idea is that the ku-type firm always produces 
f1 (ku '~1 (ku ,p,w» and the kl -firm ~t (k, l)~ f t (k1 '~l (k 1 ,p,w» in 
the incentive compatible solution. 
The situation which is formally described in Proposition 1 can be 
given two interpretations. Firstly, the situation imagined can be 
that a union is facing one of many firms not able to identify 
which one. Thus, the firm must (possibly) deviate in order to 
allow the union to make the correct inference (otherwise the firm 
will meet a higher wage claim in the second period). 
Alternatively, there may be only one firm but the characteristic 
of this firm is unknown to the union. Again the firm, in order to 
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avoid excessive wage claim, needs to separate itself out from the 
other type. Which one of these interpretations are given is 
immaterial to the formal argument. 
These results are a manifestation of the fact that signals are 
costly to send and the fact that the model operates over two 
consecutive ~ime periods. Since the model operates over more than 
one period, it is possible due to the argument in the proof of 
the proposition for a k1-type firm to separate itself out. And it 
is indeed, at the margin, always profitable to do so. If the 
model had only one period, the trade union would have to choose a 
wage based upon the mere announcements as to what type of firm it 
faces. If the anouncements are free to make, then of course a 
type ku-firm always announces k1 • Thus, in this setting (with 
non-binding contracts) it is crucial that the model is one of two 
periods. 
The next section considers the continuous distribution case and 
it will be quite clear how considerations, based on the 
sequential nature of the game, may be used to characterize the 
differential equation giving the strategy of a typical firm. 
III. The Continuous Distribution Case. 
Consider now the case in which a continuum of firms exists. As 
before, firms are parameterized by capacity. Capacity is 
distributed according to $(k), with support [k1,ku ]. It is shown 
that given some regularity conditions only separating equilibria 
exist, and that the model predicts a unique separating equilib-
rium. Having only separating equilibria, the second period 
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welfare loss due to strategic behavior becomes zero. However, as 
the firms have to fulfil the incentive compatibility constraints, 
put upon this model, there will be a welfare loss in the first 
period. 
The formal structure of the analysis is similar to that of 
Milgrom and Roberts «1980) and (1982» and based upon the idea 
of sequential equilibria (Kreps and Wilson (1982), Freixas et ale 
(1985». However, the results obtained here are somewhat stronger 
than those offered in, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1980) 
and (1982». It is possible to strengthen the results due to 
analysis by Mailath (1987). 
The following exposition is rather involved and it is useful here 
to give a brief summary of this section. Three main results will 
be established. The most important is Proposition 3 and Theorem 
1 • 
Proposition 3 states that the equilibrium strategy is a 
separating strategy, i.e., different firms behave differently 
during the first period. Furthermore, the separating strategy is 
unique, as is shown in Theorem 1. These are central results. Also 
are Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and Lemma 6. Firstly, these 
results acco~nt for the fact that, even though the equilibrium 
/ 
strategy is separating, a welfare loss occurs as the first period 
production is lower than the first best production. Secondly, 
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these taken together form a rationale for the 'assumptions' 
regarding the sign of the derivative of the strategies. These 
assumptions are important in the argument that first period 
production is less than the first best. Finally, Proposition 4 
and Proposition 5 give, respectively, second order conditions and 
identification of the unique solution. 
In addition, Lemma 5 gives, quite trivially, the second period 
strategy. Theorem 2 is not important to the analysis in its own 
right, but it does facilitate a deeper understanding of the main 
result of Proposition 3. 
III.a. The Game and Its Solution. 
Before concentrating upon results, the game is described 
formally. Consider the firm. During the first period a firm of a 
given type decides upon an output, knowing that this decision 
affects the wage claim, and, hence, profits in the second period. 
Formally, the mapping tl from R+ to R+U{O}, describes production 
in the first period: Xl=tl (k). Production is subject to some 
technical constraints xl =f(k,l). The trade union responds to Xl 
demanding some wage given by the strategy s: w2=s(x t ), where s is 
a mapping from R+U{O} to R+U{O}. Finally, the firm responds to tl 
and s by producing X2=t 2 (X l ,w2 ), hence, t2 is a mapping from 
R+U{O}xR+U{O} to R.U{O}. 
The set of optimal strategies t2*' s*, tl* must satisfy where a 
bar denotes a conjecture: 
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These conditions are similar to P.1-P.3 and Be of Section II. 
They are, however, stated somewhat more formally in terms of 
strategies here. This exposition brings out the problems of 
signing the derivatives of t1 and s. Clearly, any equilibrium 
satisfying the above conditions is a PBE. Picking out one 
(conditional upon a given first period wage), results in a con-
tinuation equilibrium. 
III.b. Characterization of Equilibrium Strategies 
In this section, some results are proven which concerns the 
derivatives of the equilibrium strategies. It is argued that 
at 2 */aw2 <o, as*/ax1 >o and dt1*/dk>O. Furthermore, the strategy 
t1* is differentiable given some rather unrestrictive regularity 
conditions. 
starting in the second period, it is easily seen that ~2 is 
nothing but the ordinary demand for labour. Thus, the following 
lemma is immediate. 
Lemma 5. The higher the second period wage is, the lower the 
output is in the second period, i.e., 
a t* 
2 < 0 
aW2 
The higher the capacity is, the higher the second period output 
is for any given wage w2 , i.e., 
a t* 2 
al{ > 0 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Although it is easy to characterize the equilibrium strategies 
t 2 , it turns out to be considerably more complicated to offer 
results concerning tl and s. 
" 
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Let us focus, therefore, upon a restricted class of strategies, 
those which are strictly monotonic and continuous. This is not so 
much of a restriction as it, perhaps, appears to be. The reason 
is that it can be shown that if SI>O, then tl 1>0 and tl is con-
tinuous. Given that tl 1>0 and tl continuous then SI>O and s is 
continuous. Recent results, due to Mailath (1987)8), are heavily 
used. 
The following proposition gives the sign of the derivative of s. 
Proposition 2. If the strategy tl is strictly increasing in k, 
then the strategy s is strictly increasing in the first period 
production, hence, 
Proof~ See Appendix. 
The proof of Proposition 2 relies upon the existence of 
differentiable strategies t 1 ; this is fortunately not unduly 
restrictive as will be seen shortly. 
Write the payoff to the firm as 
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Denote by k*, the inferred value of k, that is, tt- 1 (x t ). Write 
( 1) as 
For some separating strategy, assume that strict incentive 
compatibility is fulfilled. 
(3) 
Some regularity conditions on the payoff function are needed. Two 
follow from the earlier discussion. Clearly from (2) 
(R 1 ) 
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(R2) 
Condition (R1) follows immediately from (2) by partial differen-
tiation, with respect to k*. What is stated in (R1) is that, 
ceteris paribus, an increase in the value of k, as perceived by 
the trade union, decreases second period profit. This is quite 
natural in this model, as a higher perceived value of k results, 
in a higher second period wage. This decreases profits. 
Consider condition (R2). This condition requires that for a fixed 
value of k* (and in consequence w2 ) the marginal profit of output 
is increasing in k. This is the case, for example, for the Cobb-
Douglas production function. This condition is, in essence, a 
ranking condition. Assume that at a certain value of k, the 
marginal profit starts to decrease, with increases in k, call 
this value k. Hence, for k<k output increases as k increases, as 
output (given k*) is found equaling the marginal profit of out-
put to zero. For k>k, output decreases with increases in k. Thus, 
for a fixed value of k* different firms at best cannot be ranked 
and at worst may behave similarly. Such a situation is very 
irregular and is ruled out. 
Furthermore, assume 
The (strategic) optimization problem faced by the firm is 
(R3) 
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obviously quite complex. Consequently, it is not possible a 
priori, to exclude the case that the solution to the first order 
conditions actually yield a minimum rather than a maximum. Also 
corner solutions cannot be excluded. Restricting attention to 
strategies s~tisfying (R3) ensures an interior solution. The 
restriction put upon the strategy t l , in order to make the payoff 
function quasi concave, is discussed in Proposition 4. 
Finally, define 
Xt is the set of relevant signals and defined relative to the 
worst point estimate (to the firm). This is clearly ku' as this 
results in the higest second period wage. Since X1 €R+u{O}, Xl is 
bounded from below, at zero. Consider a firm wanting to deviate, 
in order to be identified as k-~k, where of course 
(k-~k)€[kl ,kul. If this is possible to achieve with a finite 
production, then of course Xl is also bounded from above. Alter-
natively, if any firm k can be defined as k-~k only by letting 
Xl~9), then the first period loss is approaching ~ and con-
sequently no deviation is profitable. Thus, in conclusion: 
X1 is bounded (R4) 
As an alternative to this regularity condition, a more 
complicated but also more general version, can be offered (see 
Mailath (1987), Section 4): 
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(R4' ) 
where T is positive. 
This condition ensures that p, the payoff function, cannot 
asymptote any constant function of Xl (the actual output), as x t 
approach either (-~) or (+~). Taken together (R3) and (R4') 
implies that Xl is bounded tO ). 
The following proposition gives some structure to the equilib-
rium. 
Proposition 3. The strategy giving first period output, as a 
function of capacity, i.e., t l , is a continuous differentiable 
strategy. Assume that the strategy used by the trade union, s, 
is strictly increasing, then tl Is also strictly increasing. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
This result is considerably stronger than those obtained in 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), where a similar analysis of a 
different problem was carried out. The existence of any 
equilibria, other than separating equilibria, has been ruled out 
using two as~umptions. Firstly, the assumption 5 1 >0, a quite 
reasonable assumption. 
The second assumption needed is (R4). In the present setting Xl 
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is bounded, as argued in the proof of Proposition 3. The idea of 
the argument is based upon the sequentiality of the game which 
guarantees an upper bound upon xt . Assumption (R3) gives a lower 
bound. To support a case where a fully separating equilibrium 
does not exist it would have to be the case that several firms 
would want to produce the same level of output, for example zero, 
or at the lowest level conceivable (see Chapter 3 on this). 
Figure 1 (see next page) 
An alternative to assumption (R4) was provided by (R4'). 
Assumption (R41) and (R3) together ensure that x t is bounded and 
in this case the set of admissable solutions is R. Consequently, 
no solution hits the boundary of this set. 
Finally, the following result is easily established. 
Lemma 6. For tl continuous and t1 1 >0, s is continuous. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Now, for SI>O then tt is differentiable and, hence, continuous 
and also tt 1 >0 (Proposi tion 3). On the other hand for tl '>0 then 
SI>O (Proposition 2). Finally for tt' continuous s is continuous. 
This does rationalize the assumptions made, at least to some 
degree. 
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Figure 1 
k 
kl ku 
Example of a fully separating strategy. 
t, (k) 
k 
kl 
Example of a "not-fully" separating strategy. 
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III.c. Uniqueness. 
This subsection of the analysis is concerned with the uniqueness 
of the separating equilibrium. Not surprisingly uniqueness is 
established by an initial value condition, since in essence such 
a condition serves as a boundary value for the differential 
equation giving tl (for an introduction see Boyce and Diprima 
(1977». The uniqueness result is offered in Theorem 1. Unique-
ness of the equilibrium is closely related to the property of 
PJ/P2. The reason for this is that -P3/P2 gives the slope of the 
isoprofit locus in the (k,x 1 ) space. Theorem 2 establishes that 
P~/P2 is decreasing in k for k* in the domain of tt (k). This 
result demonstrates graphically the result of Theorem 1. 
/ 
Let k be any arbitrary inferred value of k within the range of 
feasible signals. Then Theorem 1 reads: 
Theorem 1. If tl* satisfies the incentive compatibility con-
straint and the initial value condition is valid, then 
assuming that P2(.'.'.) is finite any other strategy tl doing so 
is identical to tl*' i.e., tl* is unique. 
Proof. In Mailath (1987) it is proved that if 
when kw is the worst point estimate to the firm and f(·) the 
Walrasian output, and if 
then the solution to 
P2(·'·'·) 
= 
- P3 ( • , • , • ) 
is unique if I P2 (.,.,.) I is bounded. 
Since P2(.'.'.) is assumed to be finite, P2(.'.'.) is clearly 
bounded. 
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Furthermore, since the payoff function is continuous and (R1)-
(R4) apply, we use Theorem 1 of Mailath (1987) to establish that 
P2 ( • , • , • ) 
= 
- P3 ( • , • , • ) 
solves (3). 
Q.E.D. 
Hence, if it can be shown that a solution exists, then it is 
unique. The unique solution will be identified in Proposition 5. 
Before considering the existence problem, the following illustra-
tive result deserves attention. 
Theorem 2. Assume that the incentive compatibility constraint is 
satisfied. Then11 ) 
(4) 
is strictly decreasing in k for k in the domain of tt .0 
Proof. Using Theorem 3 of Mailath (1987) and the fact that P2<O 
(as t1 is a strictly increasing continuous function which by 
assumption satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint). 
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Q.E.D. 
The property which has been shown to be valid, with respect to 
(4), is known as the single crossing property. This property 
arises naturally in some cases (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976» 
or it may be assumed directly (Riley (1979». Understanding of 
the separating equilibrium is enhanced if we focus on this 
property. Consider the isoprofit locus of some firm k', say, 
... 
in the (k,x1 ) space. The slope of the isoprofit locus is 
dk - _ .2 > 0 ... I P 
~ dR=O,k' - P2 
for P3 >0, which is a reasonable assumption here 1 2). Now, consider 
the slope of the isoprofit curve of some other firm k' '>k'; from 
Theorem 2 the slope increases. This is depicted in Figure 2 (next 
page). Clearly for t1 to be a separating strategy, the agent kl 
must prefer (k
' 
,t1 (k l » to (k',t1 (k l I» and vice versa. Such con-
ditions are clearly satisfied if the single crossing property is 
valid. 
k 
k 
u 
k
" 
k' 
Figure 2 
Isoprofit locus, 
firm k' , 
Isoprofit locus, 
firm k' 
~~----------~----~----------~ x, 
t,(k ' ) t1(k") 
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To expand on the issue of the single crossing property return to 
the example given in Section II. Since tl 1>0 then for any signal 
k* the second period wage is found to be (p except for p(.,.,.) 
denotes a price): 
1-a a 1 ~ 
2-a 2-a 2-Clk T:a w* = 2 a p * 2 
Hence, the payoff to a firm with capacity k, signalling a 
capacity k*, can be written as (after a few manipulations) 
p (k, k* ,x 1 ) 
For this example, it is easily verified that both (R1) and (R2) 
are valid. The slope along any isoprofit locus is found to be 
dk* 
CI'X1 1t=i,k=k=-
/ 
Consider the slope of the isoprofit locus for two values of 
_.@. 1-a 
w k ax a 
= sign[ 1 1 - p.x) 
a 
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It is not possible to sign the right hand side. However, by 
Theorem 2 the slope is decreasing. Referring back to Figure 2, it 
is easily established that if this is the case, then tt is indeed 
an increasing function of k. On the other hand, assume tl to be 
decreasing, then a graphical argument easily establishes a 
contradiction of Theorem 2. Hence, the existence of a monotone 
strategy and the sign of its derivative is intimately related to 
the preferences of the agents, as described by the isoprofit 
loci. 
III.d. Existence 
Turning to the existence proof or rather the necessary conditions 
for existence, let us consider in more detail the solutions to 
the optimization problems faced by the agents. The optimal 
strategy of the trade union solves 
Hence, s*(x1 ) satisfies 
= 0 
The function s*(x1 ) is defined by 
Noting that w2 =s* (x1 ) then yl=(S* I/t- 11 ) is found to be 
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yl = 
The numerator is positive by assumption ii) of Lemma 1 and Lemma 
2. Assuming second order conditions to be satisfied for the 
maximization problem facing the trade union, the denomin~tor is 
negative. Consequently, yl>O. 
As a consequence, the firm solves its optimization problem by 
choosing X 1 =t 1 *(k), such that 
Max F 1t 1(k,x 1) + n~(k,y(tl-1(X1») 
x1 
The first order condition to this problem reads 
01t F F dt* -1 01t 2 dy (6) aX 1 + aw OK dX 1 = 
0 
2 
Thus, write 
yl 
(7) t10 = 0 
Equation (7) is a differential equation in tl I. As it stands, 
this equation has a family of solutions which is characterized by 
a boundary condition. However, only one solution is viable, the 
one for which t 1 *(ku )= f*(ku ). By f*(·) is denoted the true 
Walrasian output corresponding to the capacity in question. 
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The equilibrium is described by some tt satisfying (7) and by the 
initial value condition implied by sequentia1ity. As on 2 F /ow2 <0 
and both yl>O and t1 1>0, then on t F /ox1 >0. Hence, in the 
equilibrium dictated by (7), the firm deviates from the simple 
competitive solution (which is given by ontf/oxt=O). Less is 
produced in the first period in equilibrium compared to the 
competitive equilibrium. This may at first sight seem 
counterintuitive. The reason, of course, is that as tt ~ is 
strictly monotonic, the wage set in the second period will not be 
different from the one set under symmetric information, i.e., 
when the union perfectly well knows the type of the firm. Why 
then should the firm engage in an activity when apparently the 
I 
only result is a loss of profits. 
Consider the possibility that the firm chooses its first period 
output according to dn 1F /dx1=0; this strategy we have denoted 
f*(k). If the firm is assumed to pursue this strategy as an 
equilibrium strategy, then upon deviating to f~ (k)-c, the trade 
union (incorrectly) infers that capacity is f- 1 (f* (k)-c), and 
accordingly the wage set, in the second period, is lower than it 
would otherwise be by the order of c. However, the cost of 
deviating from f*(k) is of the order £2 since antF/ox=O at the 
point of deviation. Or to put it differently, the strategy f* 
does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints laid 
down in the structure of the model. Thus, the following claim has 
been substantiated. 
Claim. Any solution to the bargaining problem involves under-
employment, except for k=ku. 
To ensure the existence of a pair of equilibrium strategies 
(t 1 * ,s*), as given in (7) and (5), the following Proposition 4 
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is offered. Once tl* is a separating strategy SA, as defined by 
(5), is optimal against tl* in so far as it has been assumed that 
second order conditions are satisfied. The main concern of 
Proposition 4 is to give conditions upon tl such that the payoff 
function is quasiconcave in the relevant interval for Xl. If this 
is so, then tl as given in (7) is optimal against s~ as given by 
(5). Thus, the result of proposition 4 may take the place of the 
regularity condition (R3). The reason for offering this result, 
not just assuming that second order conditions are satisfied for 
the optimization problem of the firm, is that this optimization 
problem is rather complex as Xl enters both 1t F 1 and 
Proposition 4. Let tl satisfy (7) and s satisfy (5). Then (t l ,s) 
is an equilibrium strategy if for some capacity zE[k 1 ,ku 1 playing 
the capacity k it is true that 
F ow F. ow a~2(z,y(k» a~2(k,y(k» 
aW2 aW2 tl(z) > inf yl(z){------F~.--4~----F----4----} 
a~1(k,k) o1t 1(z,k) 
aX 1 aX 1 
kE[O,IC] 
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Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 4 gives conditions upon t1 which ensure that the 
equilibrium strategies, discussed earlier in this paper, exist. 
In particular, for equilibrium strategies satisfying the 
inequality constraint of Proposition 4, the regularity condition 
(R3) which may be thought of as somewhat artificial is fulfilled. 
Hence, so far it has been established that strategies exist that 
satisfy strict incentive compatibility. The unique strategy 
satisfying the differential Equation (7) is identified in the 
next proposition. 
Proposition 5. Let k=a(x 1 ) solve the differential equation 
a'=f(x t ,0') where 
(8) d(x,O') 
0' equals the solution to the problem (3) and is unique given a 
boundary condition. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5 narrows down the family of solutions identified in 
Proposition 4, to only one solution curve characterized by 
xt*(ku ,1). Hence, existence is established, as well as a unique 
solution is identified. 
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IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter a simple version of the monopoly-union model is 
used to analyse if it is the case that a competitive firm 
bargaining with a trade union over wage deviates from the static 
first best with respect to output of goods and input of labour. 
Two results were produced. In an environment where information is 
asymmetric, in the sense that only the firm knows the true value 
of the marginal product of labour, all firms except the one at 
lithe top" deviated downwards in the first period. Thus, under-
employment arise out of the bargaining process. As the equilib-
rium shown to exist is a separating equilibrium, second period 
production and employment is not disturbed compared to the 
situation under full information. Hence, in this sense, the 
strategic behavior unambiguously lowers welfare. 
Secondly, the results suggest that an inefficient level of 
employment in the form of underemployment may result from labour 
market contracts, even if the agents involved are risk-neutral. 
This goes contrary to the results found in the implicit contracts 
literature. Hopefully, this issue will be explored at length 
later. Finally, note that the analysis presented can be taken to 
represent a model of first mover disadvantages (Gal-Or (1987». 
As such, the analysis is also related to some of the industrial 
organization models. Although the attention is focused directly 
upon the relationship between a trade union and a firm, the 
current paper is not very similar in scope to other papers 
discussing this relationship (for a survey see Calmfors (1985». 
This is because we study directly the consequences for the 
restriction on the strategies, if these are to be incentive 
compatible. The result of this paper is of primary interest, in 
the context of economies characterized by large trade unions, 
where the wage is set by local offices of the trade union and 
firms in a bargaining context. Thus, the negotiation process is 
firm specific. 
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We took as given the value of k. One interpretation is to assume 
that k is composed of some investment K and a quality parameter, 
e. Thus, k=K+e. In such a framework K may be known precisely and 
e is interpretated as a random variable. This random variable is 
then observed by the firm after deciding upon K, but known only 
probabilistically to the union. This interpretation, perhaps, 
allows for an extension of this (short-run) model into a long run 
model of employment, wages and investment along the lines of 
Grout «1985) and (1984». 
I 
/ 
v. Notes. 
1. This is why the assumption of risk aversion is needed. The 
first-best can be implemented of the risk-neutral agent has 
the private information by making his income a residual 
claim. 
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2. A full characterization involves signing third order 
derivatives. In general, this is not possible within standard 
assumption. 
3. This is not the case, if the production function is of the 
Cobb-Douglas type, for example. Here w2 =O maximizes second 
period income. 
4. At this point, it may well be suggested that it is relevant 
to discuss the case that trade unions ask for some kind of 
profit sharing. This possibility is excluded for two reasons. 
Firstly, this is not as common as the simple employer-
employee relationship. Secondly, unless it is assumed that 
the concept of profit in reality is strictly well defined and 
observable to the trade union this raises a problem on its 
own. 
5. Capital cost is fixed. 
6. Unless we introduce b(I)=12 or some other strictly convex 
function, we find that the optimal wage claim is w2 =O. 
Alternatively, introduce some upper limit upon 1, e.g. 1 max. 
Then 1 max determines the wage. 
7. This is nothing but the Envelope Theorem. 
8. However, at this point it must be acknowledged that the 
equilibrium set of strategies suffers from a basic non-
robustness. One can show that if SI<O, then tt 1<0 and vice 
versa. This, of course, gives results exactly opposite to 
what is obtained in the following. However, it seems very 
natural in this setting to consider s' >0 and tl I >0 as the 
focal points of the game and consequently rule out the 
possi bil i ties that d I <0 and tl 1<0. 
9. Actually, this goes contrary to the Signs of s· and tl I, 
however, this argument is designed only to show that Xl is 
bounded. 
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10. The regularity condition (R4 1 ) thus is needed in the case of 
the range of types increasing indefinitely (ku-~). 
11. By P3 is meant (ap(k,k,x1 »/ax1 • 
12. The firm would choose to expand output for P3>O, thus the 
region in which P3<O is not realized. 
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VI. Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. For any given price p and announced wage w2 , 
the firm maximizes profits. Hence, demand for labour is a derived 
demand. This is realized by the trade union and taken into 
account when earnings are maximized 
max pof(1,k) - w2 0 l 
1 
First and second order conditions are 
(A. 1 ) 
(A.2 ) 
of Par(1,k) - w2 = 0 
02 
:-S-(l,k) < 0 
01 
Equation (A.1) defines (implicitly) a labour demand function 
(in the, following the subscript 2 is dropped from ~2 ) 
(A. 3) 
Substitute (A.3) into (A.1) 
(A.4) 
From (A.4) 
(A. 5) = 1 < 0 7f Pa? 
From (A.4) 
(A.6) 
a2 f 
a~ aKaT a1{=-rr 
a? 
> 0 
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Now, consider the maximization problem faced by the trade union 
First and second order condition reads 
Foe 
I 
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soc 
The second order condition is assumed to be satisfied, i.e., for 
all values of k 
From the first order condition 
[ A] 
-[s.o.c.] 
where 
A gives the value of 
a a w 2~ 2 ( • , • , • ) ( ) 
Using assumption ii) of Lemma 1 stating that ~(.,.,.)+ 
(W2(a~(.,.,.)/aw2)) is an increasing function of k, it is clear 
that A>O. 
Hence, 
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/ 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Show that 
as 
Write the second period profit as 
Using the Envelope Theorem 
as p. (af/al)-w2=O is the ordinary first order condition for the 
optimal level of employment. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider 
The first order condition prescribes a labour demand function of 
the form ~2(W2,k). Hence, production t2*=f(~2(w2,k),k). Thus, 
a t* 2 
aW2 
af c5~2(.'.) 
= ~ < 0 
o J. 2 aW2 
and 
a t* 2 
aK = 
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af 
IT2 Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Labour demand is given by ~2(W2 ,k). 
Assume that for some w2 W2~2(W2 ,k) is maximized, thus first and 
second order conditions are satisfied. Assume tt 1>0. Thus any 
observed Xl reveals the correct value of k. Consequently, w2 as 
some function of k, y(k) is given by 
= 0 
Hence, 
From the first order condition 
Hence, 
Y I _ 
Using assumption 11) Lemma 1 and assuming that second order 
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conditions are satisfied it is concluded that SI>O. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3. To show that t1 is a continuous differ-
entiable strategy use Theorem 2 of Mailath (1987) which states 
that if an appropriate initial value condition is satisfied, then 
the strategy is continuous. Note that 
and 
This initial value condition is implied by sequentiality. Note 
that t1 (k)~f*(k) where f* denotes the competitive solution. 
Suppose that t1 ([k l ,ku])->[O,f*(ku )] is one-to-one incentive 
compatible and that t 1 (ku )=f*(ku ). If the firm deviates from 
t1 (ku) to f*(ku ) in the first period, he increases first period 
profits. If, furthermore, some kc[k l ,ku 1 exists so that k is 
inferred from f*(ku )' then the wage claim will be lower than it 
would if it was known that k=ku. Hence, second period profits 
increase. However, if f*(ku )=t1 ([k l ,kul), the union behaves 
according to ~(k) and the support [k1 ,ku]. Hence, the following 
maximization problem is solved. 
The first order condition is 
This defines a function giving the wage claim as 
which is certainly less than the maximum wage ever faced by any 
firm: W2max=y(ku). Hence, in conclusion kw=ku ' so the initial 
value condition is satisfied. 
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To prove that t1 1>0 note that P13>O (this in effect is due to the 
assumption that SI>O). 
Proof of Lemma 6. Assume that s is discontinuous (Figure A.1) 
Figure A.1 (see next page) 
Hence, for £->0 
X1 -> x1 
w2 -> 
-L w2 
w2 -> 
=L w2 
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Figure A.1 
Demand in the second period is given by ~2(W2 ,k) which is con-
tinuous in both arguments. For any given k some value w2 exists 
which maximizes W2~2(W2 ,k). This function w2 =y(k) is also con-
tinuous. 
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Define G(k1 ,k2 )=y(k1 )~2 (y(k1 ) ,k1 )-y(k2 )~2 (y(k2 ) ,k2 ). Clearly from 
the continuity of ~2 and y 
For tl 1>0 
(A.a) 
We know that lim G = o. However, as lim_s(x t ) = W2L and 
lim s(x t ) = W2L, from (A.a) lim G(k1 ,k2 ) :F 0 which is a contra-
diction, hence, s is continuous. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4. s as given in (5) is optimal against tt' 
hence, it is left to prove that tt satisfying (7) is optimal 
against s. / 
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For any given value of k, the firm will never consider producing 
more than f*(k), the competitive output. Also an absolute lower 
bound is obtained in tl (0), hence, tt (O)~tt (k)~f· (k). We have 
to show that the optimization problem is quasiconcave on 
[t 1 (0), tl (R». Then the first order condi tion (11) is sufficient 
for local optimality. Since any outcome of the strategy tt 
belongs to [t 1 (O),f(ku )]' this also ensures global optimality. 
Let the expected value of the profit of a firm with capacity z 
playing k be nF{z,k) and let ORF/OX t be evaluated at (z,k). 
The differential equation (7) is written 
~1t (z,f- 1(t,(k») _ 0 
u x 1 
Consider x1 =f(k). 
The strategy now is that we prove that if any other signal than 
is chosen, then the firm prefers to return to the original 
signal. 
Let us first give an expression for anF/ax t 
F an (z,k) 
aX 1 
Now consider 
That is, we examine the first order condition if we change the 
signal from k to K. 
We have 
Consider K>k then 
Hence, 
F ... 
a1t 1{z,k) 
a x 1 
t1 (z) > inf y' 
F ... 
31t 2 (z,y{k» 
aW2 
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Hence, onF /3k for k>R. Thus, the firm never chooses a signal R<k. 
Alternatively, for R<k. 
Hence, for 
F an: 1(z,k) 
< 0 aX 1 
F ... 
an: 2 (z,y(k» 
aW2 F :0 
alt 1(z,k) 
a x 1 
Thus, oltF/ok<O. This ensures optimality 
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Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5. If a solution to (8) exists, Proposition 
4 ensures that a is identical to the tl identified in that 
proposition and, hence, t 1 =a- 1 solves (3). 
Let f(x t ,a) be continuous in Xl and differentiable in a. From a 
theorem in the theory of differential equations (Pontryagin 
(1962», there exists some maximal value Xl· such that 
(A.9) 
such that (12) is satisfied on [O,x l *]. In our case we actually 
know the value of XI*' it is nothing but xl-=f*(ku ); the initial 
value condition following from sequentiality. 
81 
Consider the case where X1* is finite (this is obviously the case 
in our problem). We have that as xt -(x1 * )=>a--~, hence, 
Thus, range of d; the solution to the differential equation 
includes [k1 ,ku 1 and dl>O is clealy seen from the figure and also 
follows from (12). Thus, t 1 =a- 1 exists, is unique and solves 
( 1 1 ) • 
CHAPTER 3 
WAGE DETERMINATION AND POOLING 
EQUILIBRIA IN A UNIONIZED ECONOMY 
83 
I. Introduction 
Recently much effort has been directed at the question of wage 
formation in unionized economies 1 ) There are good reasons for 
this. In some countries, in particular the Scandinavian and some 
western European countries, the union participation rate is very 
high indeed (Calmfors 1989) and the traditional Walrasian assump-
tion is far from reasonable. Furthermore, from a macroeconomic 
point of view it is unfortunate that dominant lines of thought 
have failed to incorporate obvious characteristics of modern 
economies. 
Hitherto, efforts have been directed in principally two 
directions. One is the study of microeconomic behavior of trade 
unions (see Oswald (1985». Primarily two competing models are on 
the scene, the monopoly-union model, in which it is assumed that 
the trade union dictates the wage unilaterally, and the efficient 
bargaining model where efficiency may prevail if for example the 
parties bargain over wage but the employment decision is left to 
the firm (Oswald (1985». The second major concern is the macro-
economic implication of the existence of trade unions, or to be 
more precise the interaction between policy measures and wage 
formation. These problems are typically formulated as a game and 
the aim is to identify the causes of unemployment in economies 
with centralized wage setting (see for example Driffil (1986». 
The approach of this chapter falls mainly within the last of 
these two lines of research but is, however, somewhat different. 
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With respect to macroeconomic dynamics it is of great interest to 
analyse the effects exclusively due to the fact that a bargaining 
process take place under asymmetric information. In these 
circumstances the level of output and employment may serve as a 
signalling device. In otherwise static models the resultant 
equilibrium may be inefficient in the sense that output and 
employment deviate from the simple static solutions. One such 
case was analysed in Chapter 2. It was established that a welfare 
loss occur. However, the equilibrium obtained there possessed 
some salient features, given that information is asymmetric. In 
particular, different firms behave differently, i.e. the 
equilibrium is separating. In the current chapter the possibility 
of obtaining pooling equilibria is discussed. 
We discuss wage determination in a model of sequential 
equilibrium. An ill-informed planner or auctioneer attempts to 
set a wage which clears the market. Before the start of the first 
period the wage for this period is fixed. Based upon this wage 
the firm reacts by choosing an equilibrium level of employment. 
Prices on goods are assumed to be exogenous. Depending upon 
observation of the first period level of employment and prior 
knowledge the planner dictates the wage ruling in the second 
period. We impose the following restrictions upon the behavior of 
the firm. The firm recognizes the fact that any first period 
choice of labour and output is used by the planner in order to 
dictate the second period wage. Hence, the firm may deviate from 
its normal first best behavior. Assume that the firm may claim 
that the level of demand is, say, lower than what is actually the 
85 
case. To behave consistently the firm has to adjust employment to 
a level corresponding to the announced level of demand. Assume, 
furthermore, that after the end of the first period the price is 
observed. Hence, also output and input of capital, which we 
assume to be unobserved, have to adjust to the level of demand 
ruling. From this the planner draws inferences about demand and 
dictates a second period wage. 
During the second period the firm is restricted to choose a level 
of employment consistent with the second period wage and the 
postulated level of demand. Otherwise workers have the right to 
default and are assumed to do so. However, the price is no longer 
any restriction since it is revealed to the planner and the 
workers only after the second period when the game has ended. It 
is shown, under the circumstances postulated in this paper, that 
a planning equilibrium cannot be a fully revealing equilibrium. 
Furthermore, if we want to restrict ourselves to "nice" 
equilibria, we end up with a pooling equilibrium. This is of 
potential interest to macroeconomic dynamics and will be investi-
gated in a less complicated setting in Chapter 6. 
It is, however, also shown that if the idea of a planning 
equilibrium }s given .up and replaced by a decentralized economy, 
then due to monopoly profits only a separating equilibrium 
exists. 
Before proceeding to the analysis it is worthwhile to discuss the 
circumstances which are favourable to pooling equilibria. In 
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models encompassing some dynamics it is natural to use the idea 
of sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982)). If the 
transmission of information is costly, for example by deviation 
from an otherwise first best situation, a separating equilibrium 
will normally result. An exception to this is that the set of 
possible signals are bounded (see Mailath (1988)). An alternative 
to this is to narrow down the range of types so that no matter 
what action is observed by the less informed part this action 
contains virtually no information (Laffont and Tirole (1986)). 
This is the approach taken in this paper. 
In the next section the model is set forth and a static analysis 
is given. Next, in Section III the dynamic case is analysed and 
concluding remarks are found in Section IV. Proofs are given in 
an appendix. 
II. One Period Analysis 
11.1 The Model 2 ) 
Demand is given stochastically by 
(1) p = eD(y) 
where eE[~,e] and fl<O, fl 1)0. Production takes place according 
to a commonly known production function defined over employment 
and capital stock. In the following, we assume capital stock to 
be invariant. 
(2) y = F(L,K) 
Labour is supplied according to the following separable utility 
function 
(3) U = u(wL) + u(L) 
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We may prefer to interpret (3) as representing the utility of 
any individual worker and hence, require that the equilibrium 
reflects, under uncertainty, the degree of risk aversion as 
introduced in (3). Alternatively, and to give the competitive 
solution its best chance L in (3) can be thought of as composed 
by n identical workers, and if n is large (approaching infinity) 
argue that the wage has to equal expected marginal disutility of 
labour (cf. Arrow & Lind (1970». Conclusions are given for both 
of these interpretations. 
II.2. The Solution under Symmetric Information 
As a reference consider first the solution under the assumption 
that e is known by both parties. We consider the decentralized 
economy first and as a special case the planned economy. 
Equilibrium requires 
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(5) dD( y) y = dy U1YT 
Using (4) and assuming that central costs of capital are 
fixed and, furthermore, assuming that second order conditions are 
satisfied 
Now, consider the optimization problem of the union 
Max u(w~(~» + u(~(i» 
w 
The first order condition is 
(7) ul('){\II(') + ~I{.)} +.!. UI(.)",I(.) = 0 e e 
In equilibrium we have 
(8) dw Qe = -
Assuming that (7) actually is an optimum, we have 
(9) a { u I ( • ) {,I, ( .) + ~ \II I ( . )} + u I ( . ) 1. ~ I ( . )} < 0 aw ~ e e 
Thus, 
(10) Sign [~] = Slgn[fe. {u l (.){",(.) + i $(')} + Vl(.)~ ~I(.)}] 
We show the following 
Lemma 1: If the indifference curve defined from U=u(wL)+u(L) in 
the (L-w) space is characterized by aL/aw>O and a 2 L/Jw 2 <O, then 
( 1 1) u I ( .) + U I I ( • ) wL > 0 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Figure 1 (see next page) 
Now we can show 
Lemma 2: If aL/aw>o and a 2 L/aw2 <o, then 
( 12) dw > 0 ae 
Proof: See Appendix. 
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Equation (12) contains the basic idea behind the dynamic 
analysis. In a continuing relationship between two parties 
bargaining over wage, (12) taken together with the assumption of 
uncertainty offers an incentive on the part of one of the 
parties, the firm, to make an attempt to persuade its opponent, 
the planner that the value of e is lower than what is actually 
the case. Alternatively, consider the firm faced with some 
eE[~,e]. This firm announces some a, perhaps the true one, to the 
trade union. However, if such an announcement is costless, the 
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Figure 1 
w 
aL 
aw > 0 
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trade union cannot put any thrust in it. The reason, of course, 
is found in ~12) saying that wages are increasing in 8. Thus, the 
I 
firm, if signalling cost is zero, announces e. This has to be 
recognized in any solution of the dynamic case. This idea is 
similar to those found in the planning literature (e.g. Freixas, 
Guesnerie, Larront (1984) and the literature on implicit 
contracts (e.g. Hart & Holmstrom (1987». Before we consider the 
one period equilibrium under asymmetric information, let us 
briefly concern ourselves with the agents attitude towards risk. 
However, let us first see that our results are qualitatively 
unchanged for a competitive or planning economy. The planned 
economy is characterized by the fact that the planner dictates 
all prices that is to say dD(y)/dy=O. Thus, in this case the 
solution is characterized by (compare with (4) 
Also, labour demand is given by (compare with (6» 
~ 1 < 0 
Equilibrium in the labour market requires 
(7
'
) u'(·)w + u'(·) = 0 
Finally, also in a Walrasian equilibrium 
( 12 I ) dw > 0 Qe 
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Thus, if the economy consists of firms, workers and a planner 
(implementing a command equilibrium), then, unless the planner is 
just as well informed as the firm, the same problem arises as in 
a free economy. 
11.3. Risk Considerations 
Since the utility function of the union is concave, they will, in 
general, hedge against risk in the wage claim put forward. In the 
following we analyse pairs of the wage and level of employment, 
enforcing a fully revealing equilibrium. However, let us here 
just assume that the planner or trade union (depending upon 
whether we study a command equilibrium or a decentralized 
equilibrium) put forward a wage claim not contingent upon the 
realization of employment. 
Assume that total labour supply is made up of the labour supply 
of n identical individuals. 
/ 
If n is large (in principle as n approaches infinity), using an 
argument due to Arrow and Lind (1970), the planner optimizes by 
choosing the wage so as to equate the expected marginal utility 
of labour to the expected marginal disutility of labour, i.e. 
(1:3) S:u'(')Wg(e)de = -S:\J'(·)g(e)de 
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The idea behind (13) is as follows. Even though the decisions 
made by the trade union have to reflect the preferences of union 
members, it can be the case that the union should ignore the 
attitude towards risk as given in (3). This will be the case if 
it is assumed that total income is distributed (evenly) among 
union members. The reason is that for a large number of members 
the income and associated risk for any member is insignificant 
compared to total income (Arrow and Lind (1970) pp. 373-374). In 
such circumstances the cost of risk-bearing to each individual 
approaches zero as the number of members approach infinity (this 
is the result of Section II of Arrow and Lind (1970)). Consider 
the static optimization problem. The role of the planner, 
accordingly, is to choose a wage which clears the market. This 
is also the wage which obtains overall economic efficiency. Best 
of all, of course, would be the case where the chosen wage equals 
the marginal disutility of labour. Having chosen this particular 
wage the equilibrium conditions on the factor market implies 
production efficiency and in addition equilibrium as well as 
efficiency on the goods market. However, when e is unknown, or 
rather known only probabilistically, the planner acts according 
to (14) or in general according to the utility function given in 
(3) • 
II.4. The Solution under Asymmetric Information 
Now, consider the situation arising under asymmetric information. 
Consider the structure of the model. As noted in the introduction 
the equilibrium is separating for the one period version of the 
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model. Thus, the uncertainty with respect to 9 is resolved in the 
solution to be found. However, even though e is revealed to the 
union, it is the case that at the time when the wage is dictated 
by the trade union e is known only probabilistically. Since the 
utility function given in (3) is concave, reflecting risk 
aversion, the union - in a planning equilibrium - has to maximize 
by choosing L appropriately 
(14) E(U) = E(u(wL» + E(u(L» 
The wage, w, is dictated by the planner, Ld is given by 
lP I < 0 
respectively, 
~ I < 0 
The parameter e belongs to the support [~,e] and is distributed 
according to dG=g where g(.) is strictly bounded from below at 
zero. 
Given any wage claim the firm chooses some labour input. The 
first propositi considers the restrictions upon the strategy 
choosing labour input. 
Proposition 1. For any given wage w, for 1*(9) to be imp1ement-
able l*(e) is a fully revealing strategy where 31*/38 ) 0 and 
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hence, differentiable almost everywhere. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The idea of the proof is simple. The argument given is that for 
l*(e) to be implementab1e it must be preferred to some other 
strategy, in particular the strategy 1*(alla)3), i.e., n(l*(e»> 
n(l*(alle». The restrictions on the form of the profit function 
as well as the assumptions made with respect to the information 
set ensures the result. 
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In Proposition 1 only the sign of 3l*/aa is given. Note that 
Proposition 1 allows for the static first best level of labour 
demand. This is not surprising considering the structure of the 
model. Given that the trade union have decided upon some wage 
according to (13) or (14), the firm is a residual claimant and 
the firm behaves according to the first best. 
Proposition 1 does not offer a full characterization of the one 
period or static equilibrium since we are concerned here with 
pairs of {w,L} supporting fully revealing equilibria. To obtain 
such a characterization the labour supply must be recovered for 
all values of eE[!.8). The labour supply is derived given the 
restriction that the trade union recognizes the incentive on the 
part of the firm to misrepresent 9. To be more precise; labour 
supply is some functional relationship between wand Land e. 
This relationship is decided upon prior to any exchange of wage 
for labour. Thus, in announcing a the firm may misrepresent e in 
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order to obtain a more favourable wage. The labour supply 
function is restricted to enforce the firm to reveal 8 truth-
fully. The labour supply function is characterized in Proposition 
2 and Corollary 1. Let the wage dictated by the planner be given 
as a function of profits: T(n). 
Proposition 2. The supply of labour implicit in the planning 
equilibrium is given by the equation 
u'(·)T(n) + u l (.) = (Z(a) - Z(e»(D'y+D)YL 
Z(a) - Z(a) > 0 V a ~ a 
where Z(·) is an increasing function (described in the Appendix). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Corollary 1: For 8=8 the first best solution is realized. 
The above result need a few comments. The term T(n) which gives 
the wage which is contingent upon profits since a change in 
"profits opportunities" changes the behavior of the firm. The 
term on the right hand side is due to the incentive compatibility 
restrictions added to the problem. 
Corollary 1 is known in the literature as the "no distortion at 
the topll result. Intuitively we have proven the following. 
Consider a firm faced with 8=6. This firm can do no better than 
/ 
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play L*(s)=L*(9) because L*(9) is played by the firm facing the 
worst wage claim. Such a firm can only do worse choosing some 
L*(e) indicating that the realized value of e>o. On the other 
hand, choosing some L*(e) indicating e<e the firm is not believed 
and it will still face the maximum wage. 
From Proposition 2 
Claim 1. For e<e the wage Is less than the marginal disutillty of 
L*(s). 
This result may easily be illustrated (cf. Figure 2). 
Figure 2 (see next page) 
In essence this result is due to the fact that any firm s<s is 
confronted with a labour supply scheme that support the announce-
ment s. This labour supply schedule is given in Proposition 2 and 
lies below the one for the case of symmetric information. This 
result reflects the cost to workers of obtaining full 
information. 
Furthermore, since labour demand is undisturbed and labour supply 
is lowered, the level of employment is inefficiently low. This 
result is akin to some of the results obtained in the literature 
on contracts under asymmetric information (cf. Hart & Homstrom 
(1987» although the current results point towards underemploy-
ment as opposed to overemployment. 
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Figure 2 
labour supply 
Incentive compatible 
labour supply 
Equilibrium wage 
Marginal disutility of work 
w 
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At this point perhaps some comments on the result obtained so far 
are needed. Given that the wage is determined according to (14) 
why is it not the case that firms hire the Walrasian level of 
employment? The explanation of this apparantly counterintuitive 
result is found in the structure of the economy envisaged in the 
analysis. For the wage given by (14) all the labour that is 
needed will be supplied, with one caveat however. That is, 
workers will only enter into a relationship with firms if they 
learn the true value of 9. This imposes some costs to the 
economy. These costs are described by the relationship between 
the level of employment and wage and a, as given in Proposition 2 
and Corollary 1. 
The institutional setting characterizing the economy analysed 
perhaps seem somewhat artificial. For this at least two apologies 
can be made. Firstly, one of the main points to be illustrated in 
this paper is that even if the simple static equilibrium in a 
planned economy is a separating one, it is the case that in a 
dynamic setting pooling equilibria occur. Thus, the analysis of 
the current section serves as a reference to later results. 
Secondly, if it is accepted that a conflict of interest exists in 
the labour market, it seems to be reasonable to accept only 
incentive compatible solutions, i.e. solutions which truthfully 
reflect the parameter 8. 
In the proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 use was made of the 
formulation given in (13), that is, risk aversion on part of the 
workers is ignored. This is not a restriction if adopting the 
100 
following assumption. 
Assumption: G(e) is strictly increasing. 
This assumption gives separation its best chance. It is not a 
restriction since the aim is to illustrate that despite the fact 
that separation is the outcome in the static case this is not so 
when the model is phrased in a dynamic context. 
Proposition 3: Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 remain valid using 
(14) instead of (13). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The result of Proposition 3 can be shown to be valid also for the 
case of a decentralized economy, that is, the union now takes 
into consideration the effect of L upon w. 
Corollary 2: The results of Proposition 3 remain valid in the 
decentralized economy. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Let us summarize the findings before the dynamic model is con-
sidered. We take the command optimum as a benchmark since this 
gives the first best solution the best chance of surviving. 
Under certainty the planner dictates a wage which ensures 
efficiency. In the corresponding decentralized economy 
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inefficiencies occur. However, these arise because of first mover 
advantages. Introducing uncertainty, the results are modified. In 
a command equilibrium the labour supply schedule is based upon 
expectations with respect to the realization of demand. Such a 
labour supply schedule ensures that the firm truthfully reveal 
the realized value of at but does not, in general, ensure 
economic efficiency. This result is also valid in a 
decentralized economy. In the case of what we may term a 
"static countinuing relationship", i.e. where only incentive 
compatible choices may be made, the well known "no distortion" at 
the top result was established. Hence, for 8=9 the wage set by 
agency support efficiency in production. For 8<9 this is no 
longer the case. Any incentive compatible solution Is a 
separating equilibrium, that is, the labour input chosen by the 
firm reveals the realized value of a. But employment is 
inefficiently low. 
III. Dynamic Analysis 
Proposition 1 identified the sign of al*/aw. Proposition 2 and 
Corollary 1 together with labour demand characterized the level 
of employment. The previous analysis was confined to one period 
only. The aim of the currrent section is to extend the model to 
two periods. This allow for a study of the determination of the 
inference of the union with respect to a. 
Define normal profit as 
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(15) nN = py - wL - rK - R 
where R is economic rent. In the standard neo-classical world 
economic rent arises due to, for example, differences in the 
quality of land. We allow for monopoly rent in Section 111.2, and 
we will see that this changes the results dramatically. 
We proceed by characterizing the solution to the dynamic pro-
gramming problem faced by the firm and the agency. In particular 
an equilibrium is described by wt (e t ), w2 (e 2 ) where Wi (9,) t i = 
1,2 is the wage dictated by the agency in the first and second 
period, respectively. 91 , i = 1,2 denotes the value of e as 
inferred by the agency, and obviously in the first period this 
is based only on prior knowledge. The value of 92 may either 
equal the true value of at this is the case in a separating 
equilibrium, or may be based upon prior knowledge. This 1s the 
case 1n a pooling equilibrium. To complete the description of the 
equilibrium add the vector (L1 ,Xl)' (L2 .X2)' 1=1.2. L1 describes 
the decision of the firm with respect to the level of employment, 
and Xi the decision whether to stay in the market or not (Xt 
takes the value 0 or 1). 
Only ferfect ~aysian ~quilibria (PBE) are considered. This 
equilibrium concept captures the idea of dynamic programming and 
its features are described by P1) to P4) in addition to B). 
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P2) w2 (·) is optimal given 82 
... 
P3) Ll ,Xl max n 1 + ~n2 given w1 (.) and w2 (·) where'" denotes a 
conjectured value. 
B) e is derived from the support [~,e], distribution function, 
P3) and Ll using Bayes' rule. 
In the following attention is focused upon continuation equilib-
ria: a set of strategies satisfying P1), P2), P3) and B) given 
any strategy w1 (.). 
III.1. Command Equilibrium 
In our world with only one (representative) firm, the standard 
Walras factor market equilibrium conditions are 
w = eD(F(L,K) )FL (. ,. ) 
r = eD(F(L,K) )FK(· ,. ) 
Assuming that the production function is of the CRS type, these 
conditions result in R=O. However, if p is unknown, as is the 
case here, and due to be inferred by some imperfectly informed 
agency, then in a repeated relationship (here two periods) the 
/ 
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firm has an incentive to misrepresent the value of the parameter 
e in order to be confronted with a second period wage which is 
lower than the wage which obtains if e Is revealed. In order to 
misrepresent the value of e the firm may have to deviate from the 
static first best solution. As a matter of fact this was the case 
also in the static analysis. What is shown here is that in the 
dynamic repeated relationship with small uncertainty pooling 
equilibria are a robust feature of the model. 
The following result is obtained (cf. Laffont and Tirole (1986». 
Proposition 4. For any wt (such that Xt=l) there exists no fully 
separating continuation equilibrium. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
The intuition behind the argument, given rigorously in the proof, 
is the following (Laffont and Tirole (1986». As the agent in a 
separating equilibrium obtains a second period profit of zero, he 
can do no better than maximize his first period profit. Take this 
to be an equilibrium. Any deviation results in a second order 
loss of profit. But because the planner is now convinced wrongly 
that e has taken on a value e(e more favourable to the firm, the 
firm will enjoy a first order increase in profits. This is so for 
all firms except the one facing e=~. Thus, it is to be expected 
that for e in the neighborhood of ~ a pooling equilibrium results 
in which L*(e) is played irrespective of type. 
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To be a bit more precise. Consider a situation where a firm faced 
with a realized value says e deviates slightly from 1*(s). Thus, 
L*(e-de)<L*(e). If this were to be a separating equilibrium, the 
planner would, erroneously, infer a value of s-de. The loss in 
profits is of order E2. In the second period the firm faces a 
wage w(e-de)<w(e). The price of capital is exogenous and given by 
r. The optimal factor input combination respects FL/FK=w/r. And 
furthermore, in order to behave consistently the firm chooses to 
equate wee-de) to the value of marginal product of labour 
evaluated at the price for the realization (e-de). Thus, we have 
(with a little abuse of notation w(e-de)L(e-de)=(e-ds)D(s-de)· 
FLo(e-de)l(e-de). Similary for the input of capital. Of course, 
for any output on the market the demand function must be 
respected. Hence, second period profit is 
~2 = eD(F(L(e-de),K(e-de»)F(L(s-de),K(e-de» 
- (e-de)D(F(L(e-de),K(e-de»)FL(L(S-de),K(e-de» 
- (e-de)D(F(L(e-de),K(e-de»)FK(L(e-de),K(e-de» 
= deD(F(L(8-de),K(e-de»)F(L(e-de),K(e-de» 
which is of order de, strictly larger than the loss which was of 
order (de)2). Obviously, if it is not possible to deviate 
downwards (the bottom) then de=O. Hence, for e€B(~,E) pooling 
equilibrium obtains. 
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Proposition 4 does not exclude the possibility that over some 
range of the support [B,e] there may exist separating equilibria. 
It does, however, exclude the possibility that over the whole 
range [!,e] the continuation equilibrium may be separating. The 
reason why we do not obtain a fully separating equilibrium which 
will be the case in most circumstances (Kreps and Cho (1987» is 
the fact that playing a strategy which fully reveals the value of 
B results in a payoff of zero in the second period. This makes it 
profitable to deviate. If all firms, i.e. firms faced with 
different values of B, were to deviate this could perhaps restore 
the separating equilibrium. This is not so in our analysis. 
Consider a firm of type ~, the new lowest support for B. This 
firm realizes a super normal profit of 0 and in consequence a 
profit of O. Thus, this firm will never deviate during the first 
period. We have then established an absolute lower bound upon 
the level of employment. Hence, any firm with 8~~n cannot deviate 
to a level of employment below the one just established. 
/ 
We may now give a more precise characterization of the equilib-
rium. An equilibrium is said to exhibit infinite reswitching 
(Laffont and Tirole (1986» if for some eo and 8 t there exists an 
infinite ordered sequence in [~,e], call ,this {9k}k~N4) ,such that 
it is optimal to play Bo for a realization B2k , and it is optimal 
to play Bl for B2k+1 for all k. An equilibrium is said to exhibit 
pooling over a large scale (1-c) (Laffont and Tirole (1986» if 
for some value 9 and 91 <9 2 , we have (9 2 -9 1 )/(e-~»(1-~) and it 
is an optimal strategy for 9 1 and 9 2 to play 9. 
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Consider now three types of equilibria. The simplest is the full 
pooling equilibrium. Note that the full pooling equilibrium is a 
subcase of an almost full pooling equilibrium (i.e. c=O). The 
second and third type of equilibria are the almost full pooling 
equilibrium and the infinite reswitching equilibrium. If there is 
to be found an equilibrium offering the government higher utility 
than the full pooling equilibrium, then this equilibrium either 
has almost full pooling 2! infinite reswitching and much pooling. 
Consider for a fixed value of 9 a sequence of economies with 
lower bound ~n and the (truncated) density function 
f1(e)=f1(e)/[1-Fn(~n)] defined on [~n,e]. That is, if the initial 
range [~,e] is large, the result of Proposition 5 is valid only 
for the narrower range [9 ,~]. 
-n 
Proposition 5. Consider any given first period wage inducing a 
separating equilibrium in the one period game. For this wage and 
any £>0 there "exists some 9 <9 such that for all n for which 
c 
n£{nl~n)a£} any equilibrium dominating the full pooling 
equilibrium involves either 
or 
i) (1-£) of the firms hires L 
ii) has some firms exhibitini infinite reswitching and 
the rest pooling over a large scale. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
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This result is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 (see next page) 
It is unfortunate that two types of equilibria occur. Following 
the arguments given in Laffont and Tirole (1986), it is reason-
able to postulate that the full pooling equilibrium is preferred 
to its complex contender. The basic idea behind their argument is 
that since one of the features of the equilibrium is to elicit 
information, the simple equilibrium should be preferred. To 
extract information in the case of an infinite reswitching 
equilibrium requires an enormous amount of knowledge and 
sophistication on the part of the lesser informed party. For the 
agency to implement a strategy supporting infinite reswitching 
requires an enormous amount of knowledge of the game, in 
particular with respect to the description of uncertainty. A 
unique imployment target is, in contrast, more robust to mistakes 
in the description of the game. 
If it is assumed that the agency is allowed to use only simple 
rules, then of course he will choose a pooling equilibrium. 
111.2. Decentralized Equilibrium 
Perhaps the strongest feature of the pooling equilibrium analysed 
in Section 111.2 is the fact that it arises naturally (after 
narrowing down the range of types). Or put differently even for 
the initial range of types the fully separating equilibrium could 
Figure 3 
L 
L 
e !n e 
Incentive compatible 
solution 
e 
Example of equilibrium i) of Prop. 5. 
L 
Example of equilibrium 11) of Prop. 5. 
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be excluded. Normally the sequential nature of the economy in 
addition to a second period payoff strictly greater than zero 
will support a fully separating equilibrium (in general, see Cho 
and Kreps (1987), for a similar analysis, see Chapter 2). In 
this section we will argue why a pooling equilibrium cannot be 
supported in a decentralized economy. 
Since in this case the firm take advantages of its monopoly 
power, the factor market equilibrium conditions are~) 
w = e(D'(· )P(· ,.) + D(.»PL(· ,.) 
Thus, for any given wage second period profits are 
1t = e D ( . ) F ( . , .) - e ( D I ( • ) F ( . , .) + D ( . ) ) ( LF L ( . , .) + KF K ( . , . ) ) 
= eD(· )P(·,·) - e(D'(· )F(· ,.) + D(· »F(· ,.) 
2 
= - eD'(·)F (.,.) > 0 
In consequence, for any given second period wage rate all firms 
will realize a super normal profit strictly bounded from below at 
zero. This, of course, is also so for the firm of type e=~. 
Hence, if such a firm during the first period behaves as if e=~, 
it wi1 be identified as a firm of type e=~+de. This carries with 
it a loss of second period profits of the order of de. However, 
III 
assuming that playing e=~ is optimal in the first period, the 
cost to the firm of behaving as if e=8-de is of the order of 
(de)2. But in doing so, the firm Is identified as a e=~ type, 
contrary to a e=~+de type. The overall win is da-(da)2=(1-da)de 
>0. Consequently, once the firm of type e=~ stands to make a 
profit during the second period, it is not possible to establish 
a lower bound upon the range of signals where this lower bound 
dictates "no deviation from the first best". For this reason 
neither the argument given together with Proposition 4 nor the 
formal proof carries through here. The situation arising here is 
analysed thoroughly in the preceding chapter, where the existence 
of fully separating equlibria is established by an argument based 
on the sequentiality of the economy. Naturally, if for some 
reason the super normal profit of some firm, an' is 0, then the 
analysis of the last section applies. 
IV. Summary 
This essay has reconsidered the simple neoclassical analyses of 
(partial) equilibrium on a single market and the adjoining factor 
markets. Normally we find that efficiency obtains and that factor 
rewards equal the value of marginal product with respect to the 
relevant factor. Also, the standard analysis results in a 
separating equilibrium. 
In what has been termed a static continuing relationship the 
equilibrium is for any given wages still separating. However, for 
all values ee[!,e] except e=6 the equilibrium is inefficient as 
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w>VMPL(e), that is the level of employment, is not as high as it 
would otherwise be in a first best world. 
In a dynamic continuing relationship, at least for small uncer-
tainty, things are even worse. The only simple equilibrium which 
can be obtained is a pooling equilibrium. This pooling equilib-
rium has all firms playing L(e n ). Hence, inefficiency, in par-
ticular including underemployment, results in both periods. 
The findings suggest that when the assumption of perfect and sym-
metric information are relaxed to one of probabilistic and asym-
metric information the usual neo-classical findings have to be 
modified. And this is 50, not because of any monopolistic 
elements or assumptions of risk aversion (cf. Equation (14» but 
only because strategic considerations result from the relaxed 
assumption with respect to information. As a matter of fact, 
monopoly elements tend to restore a fully separating equilibrium. 
Secondly, once the firm is no longer a residual claimant (as is 
normally the case in the contracts literature) we obtain strong 
inefficiency even though none of the agents are risk averse. 
We may point to at least two interesting aspects of this analysis 
which deserves to be the subject of further considerations. The 
result of the analysis may have consequences for the relevant 
policy consideration. In particular, introducing employment taxes 
or subsidies may prove to make deviation sufficiently costly to 
avoid the existence of the equilibrium described in Proposition 4 
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and 5. Also, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to 
deal with changes in between periods of the parameter 8 if, for 
example, a firm with a value e attemts to mimic a firm faced with 
~ and e suddenly decreases, it has only become easier to obtain a 
full pooling equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium is maintained. 
If, however, 8 suddenly increases, it may prove too expensive to 
maintain the pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium 
results. As a consequence, at least in our model, the wage, 
price, and production increase. Hence, we obtain a theory of 
downward stickiness in prices as well as quantities. We hope to 
analyse this in subsequent papers. 
/ 
v. Notes 
1. See for example Scandinavian Journal of Economics 87.2. 
2. In Chapter 4 a model of the following form is discussed 
p = ail 
-p = 
y = f(L,k) 
J...y = f(AL,Ak) 
U = U(wL,L) 
With respect to wage and employment in equilibrium similar 
results obtain. 
114 
3. By this we mean to behave as if a l is realized when the truth 
is that a is realized. 
4. N denotes positive integers. 
5. Clearly, if in a decentralized economy we assume that p=aD(Y) 
is exogenous to the firm, we return to the case of Section 
111.2. However, here we analyse the case in which p=aD(y) is 
endogenous. This is partly because our specification may 
appear to be at variance with P=aD(y) exogenous and partly 
for completeness. 
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VI. Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
We analyse 
U = u(wL) + u(L) 
We have for U=O and dL/dw>O 
u'Ldw + (u1w + u')dL = 0 => 
dL 
= Ow 
u'L 
> 0 
We require the indifference curve to be concave and the lias good 
as" set is convex, that is, we assume a2 L/3w 2 <O. 
=> 
Now, 
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[ 1 ] 2 { U 1,lt I.!. + u I I ,It (,It + ~It I ) ) ( u I W + u I) _ (UiW + U i ) ~ a ~ ~ a~ 
w 
U 1 ~ ( (u I + U 1 1 w{ ~ + n4J I }) + U I -tV 1 ) } 
a e 
From the first order condition (7), and assuming that 
(u 1 +W,,",u I I ) > 0 / 
- [u 1 ~ ( (u 1 + W,,", u 1 I) + U 1 1 w2~ + u 1 I ~ )] > 0 
w W 
which is not possible for UI+U~UI 1>0. Hence, UI+W~UI 1<0. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
We have UI+~WUI 1<0. Examine the optimization problem of the 
union. 
U = u(wL) + \J(L) 
F.O.C. 
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(A. 1 ) 
Note since 
W 
u l (.) > 0, vl(.),,,,I(.) > 0: \l.,(') + ~I(.) < 0 
Define 
Thus, 
in equilibrium 
Assume that second order condition is satisfied 
~w {ul('){lJ>(.) + ~ lPl(.)} + v l (.)} lPl(.)} < 0 
Rewri te (A.1) 
(A.2) 1 u I ( • ) { lJ> ( • ) (1 + ElJ>, w ) + V I ( • ) 9'P I = 0 
Using (A.1) 
a {ul(.){lJ>(.) + ~ lPl(.)} + v'(')..!.lP'(.)}dw + 
aw i e e 
dw 
as = 
Evaluate S.D.C. 
k {U ' (·){$(·) + ~ $'(.)} + u l (.)} ",I(.)} 
~~ {u'(·){",c·) +: ",I(.)} + u l (. )i-lPl(.)} 
U I ( • ) {2.1 $ I + w 1 '" I '} + u' , ( . ) {'" + W '" I } 2 + 
e ~ a 
Vi (.) 1 ",II} + Vii (. )(1 ",,)2 < 0 ~ e =) 
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( A • 3 ) ( ~ ) 2 [ u ' (2$ 'e + W$' ') + u' , ($ e + w",') 2 + u' '" " + u' I $ , 2 ] < 0 
Now evaluate 
u ' {\II' - ;. - ~, - ~" w } + U I I {W$ I (_ ~)} { $ ( .) + ~'" I } 
e e~T e ~ e~ e 
+ v' {-~ \II' - .1 $' ,~} + v' I $ I { - w } 1. $' ( .) = e~ e e~ ~ e 
- ~ {u I { 2\11 I + ~ \II I '} + u' I W'" I {$ + ~ ",'} + e~ e e 
W 
- :3 {u I { 2\11 I e + w\II I '} + u' I w-p I {-p e + w'" I} + 
e 
u l {! \II' + $"} + U I '-p12} 
W 
Assume aw/ae<O, thus, 
Hence, 
{ U I { 2$ e + W$ I I} + U I 1 W\jJ I { $ e + W\jJ I} + 
U I I W\jJ I {\jJ e + WlP I} > 
- { U 1 { 2$ I e + WlP II} + U 1 {!!. \jJ 1 + \jJ II} + u I 1 lP I 2 } 
W 
Using (A.3) 
(A.5) - {u 1 { 2\jJ 1 e + W\jJ I I} + U 1 \jJ I I + u I I \jJ I 2} > U 1 I {$ e + w,,", 1 } 2 
Using (A.5) in (A.4) 
U I I W\jJ I {\jJ e + W,,", I} > U I I { \jJ e + w~ I } 2 - U I ~ '" I = > 
W 
U 1 I {$ e + w\jJ I } {wllJ 1 - llJ e - w\jJ I} > -U I! llJ 1 
- ull{$e + w\jJl}llJe > - Ul~ \jJ1 
Using (A. 1 ) 
119 
120 
- u" {",e + W",'} llle > - u I! '" I = > W 
- u" {'" e + w",'} III > (- u I! '" I) = > W W 
- u" {'" e + w",'} III > u I {'" e + W'" I} = > / W 
- U I I lllw < U I = > 
u' + u" lJ'w > 0 
which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 
We have 
1t = eD(y)y - wI 
where 
Thus, 
Assume that e>e'. If Id=lJ'(w/e) is to be implementable, then 
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and 
Consequently, 
(A.6) 
(A.7) 
Combining (A.6) and (A.7), we have 
> 
(e-e I ){D(F("'(~) ,k) )F("'(~) ,k)} > 
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(e-e I ){D(F(\JJ(~,) ,k) )F("'(~,) ,k)} => 
Let us consider the function H=D(F(~(w/e),k»F(",(w/e),k). We have 
3H d1" = (DI(·,·)F(·,·) + D(·,.»Fl (·,·) > 0 
Thus, ~(w/s»~(w/s), and hence, ~I<O since S>SI. 
If 0 < e < e - e < T where T is finite, then the function l*(s) 
is of bounded variation. This taken together with 3l*(e)/3e > 0 
ensures that ",(w/e) is differentiable almost everywhere (Taylor 
(1973) Section 9.1). 
Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 
We have (Proposition 1 and Equation (7» that labour demand is 
given by the following almost everywhere differentiable equation: 
(A.8) $(!) w 
In the current case the trade union seeks to maximize 
U = u(wL) + u(L) 
by the appropriate choice of L. It is known that the labour 
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demand follows (A.8). Hence, for a given K a particular choice of 
w results in a level of employment given by (A.8). Once wand L 
have been determined the value of n is given. The trade union 
takes these subsequent actions into consideration when choosing 
w. 
Consider a point of differentiability of the profit function: 
n = p.y - wL - rk 
Maximizing with respect to L 
dn at = e(D'y + D)YL - w = 0 
Differentiating with respect to e 
dn 
= Qe D·y + (e(D'y + D)YL - W)~ 
Hence, 
dn 
= Qe D·y 
The planner dictates some wage, taking into consideration the 
subsequent actions of the firm and the union as well as the 
incentive on part of the firm to misrepresent the truth. Thus, 
The optimisation problem of the union can now be considered as a 
124 
control problem in L. Note that once L is chosen, W is given. 
The choice of L affect w as well as total profits. Thus, 
the trade union faces a feed back from the firm with respect to 
labour demand in its choice of L (and thus, implicitly w). The 
above problem is written sligthly different to make clear that it 
is a control problem (see Kamien and Schwartz (1981) Chapter 15). 
s.t. 
Max u(T(n)L) + u(L) 
n = Dy a 
The Hamiltonian function H is 
(A.9 ) H = u(T(nL) + u(L) + y(a)D·y 
First order conditions are 
(A.10) dL (u l (. )T(n) + u I (L) + yea) (Diy + D)YL)aw = 0 
(A.11) 
We have (from nn=i = py-wL-rk) that 
aT -1 
a:n=--r; 
Hence, from (A.11). 
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(A.12) -u'(·) + Ye = 0 whe re u' ( .) > 0 
Let the solution to (A.12) be 
(A.13) yea) = Z(e) + constant 
where Z'(e)=u'(e»O. 
Combining (A.13) and (A.l0) 
(A.14) U'(·)T'(1t) + u'(·) = - (Z(e) - constant)(D'y + D)YL 
Since the worst point estimate is e=e, we have: constant = -Zeal. 
Hence, 
(A.15) u'(·)T(1t) + u'(·) = (Z(a) - Z(e»(D'y + D)YL 
Figure A.1 (see next page) 
Since Z' (. )=u'(· »0, we have Zfe)-Zee) as illustrated by Figure 
A.1. Also, using the first order condition of the equilibrium of 
the firm (cf. Equation (4», we have (D'y+e»O. 
Thus, underemployment occurs. 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
The maximization problem of the union, now reflecting the 
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Figure A.1 
z (e) 
-- - ----~ --~ 
e 
e e 
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attitude towards risk, reads 
max S:(U(WL) + u(L»dGCe)de 
L ,-
where w=T(n) is given by (A.8) and the restrictions are as in the 
proof of Proposition 2. 
The Hamiltonian is 
H = (u(T(n}L) + u(L}}dg~e} + y(e}Dy 
First order conditions are 
(A.16) 
(A.17) 
Thus, 
Hence, 
(u ' ( 0 ) T (n) + u' ( 0 ) ) dg~ e} + y (e ) (D 'y + D) y L = 0 
u'(o)LdTn dG(e} + Ye Dy = 0 On e de 
= u' ( 0 ) dG (e ) Ye de 
Let the solution be 
(A.18) y(e) = Z(e) + constant Ze = u' dg~e) > 0 
Combining (A.18) and (A.16) 
{ u I ( • ) T (1t) + u I ( • ) ; Ox~g (a) = 
- (Z(a) + constant)(D'y + D)YL 
Thus, constant = - Z(a) 
Hence, the solution is 
{u
'
(·)T(1t) + ul(·)}g(e) = 
(Diy + D)YL(Z(e) - Z(a» 
Proof of Corollary 2 
The maximization problem, now reflecting the attitude towards 
risk, reads 
max S:(U(wL) + v(L»dG(a)de 
where L is given by (A.8) and the restrictions are as in the 
proof of Proposition 2. 
The Hamiltonian is 
H = (u(T(n,L)L) + u(L»d~!e) + y(e)y 
First order conditions are 
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(A. 16) (u I ( • ) ( T (1t ,L) + T L ( . ) L) + u I ( • ) ) dg~ a) + y (e ) (D I Y + D) Y L 
Thus, 
Hence, 
-u I ( • ) dG (a) + Y
a 
= 0 da 
= U I ( • ) dO (e ) 
Ya de 
Let the solution be 
(A.18) yea) = Z(a) + constant Za = u l dg!a) > 0 
Combining (A.18) and (A.16) 
- (Z(a) + constant)(D'y + D)YL 
Thus, constant = - Z(a) 
Hence, the solution is 
{u'(·){T(lt,L) + TL(·)L} + ul(·)}g(e) = 
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(Diy + D)YL(Z(e) - Z(e» 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
L*(e) is increasing of bounded variation and hence, it is a dif-
ferentiable strategy. 
Consider e > e*. In a separating equilibrium if e is drawn from 
[~,e] labour input and wage is some function of e: (L(e),w(e». 
If e ' was drawn, we would have (L(e'),w(e'». In a separating 
equilibrium n~(e) = n~(el} = 0, i=1,2 that is profits in both 
periods are zero. 
Now if in a separating equilibrium e deviates to play 6 ' and was 
believed as it would (erroneously) be, it would be faced with a 
wage w(e')<w(6) and hence, the firm is able to obtain super-
normal rent SRN2(elle)=(e-e')D(p(L(e'),K(e'»F(L(e'),K(e'»>O in 
the second period. That is n2(eI16»n~(e). On the other hand, if 
some firm facing e' deviates to play e, we have n2(eI61)<n~(e). 
For a continuation equilibrium to be fully revealing: 
Analogously 
Thus, we have 
/ 
As 1* and hence, nand SNR2 are differentiable 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
As 11m 
de->O 
SNR(l*(e-de» = 11m SNR(l*(e+de» = 0 
de->O 
(i) and (ii) contradict the continuity of 1*(8). 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
The full pooling equilibrium scheme must satisfy 
~ J:(U(WL(e,w),L(e,w»g(e)de = 0 
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where l(e,w) as in the text. This results in some wage W(~,8) 
or if we narrow down the range of the support to [~n,e] the wage 
is w(en,e). 
112 = U(w(e,s)l(e,w(e,e),l(e,w(e,e» -
where e £ [~n,8]. We have, trivally, from continuity 
1 im 112 = 0 
e ->8 
_n 
Similarly, consider some wage w = ~(l*(e». The first period 
distortion to the union by enforcing some strategy 1*(e) is 
Also here we have 
11m A 1 = 0 
!n ->e 
Hence, for ~n -> e the first period distortion to the union 
relative to a full information and full pooling scheme tends to 
zero. Hence, if we can show that the distortion remains finite 
for continuation equilibria not satisfying i) and ii), we have 
finished since then only equilibria satisfying i) or ii) may 
dominate a full pooling equilibrium. 
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Consider some first period wage wand two distinct values of 1: 
10 and 11 • Both of these strategies are assumed to belong to the 
equilibrium path for some n. Let 9 1 , i=0,1, be the supremum of 
types 8 for which firms participate (i.e., those firms for which 
Xl=1 (cf. the text» 
8 1 = sup{aln(l!(a» ~ n( ) I Xi = 1} 
Clearly, 
For 8 1 ) eo and hence, 1 (a 1 ) > 1 (8 0 ) we have 
We have 
and 
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;' 
Combining these two expressions (cf. the proof Proposition 1) we 
have 
o > (a O - a 1 )D(F(K(a 1) ,L(a 1» )F(K(a 2 ) ,L(a 1» + 
(A.19) D(F(K(a 1) ,L(a 1» )F(K(a 1) ,L(a 1» -
Now consider a sequence of economies (On a ,an 1 ) ,1 (an 0),1 (an 1», 
that is a sequence of realizations of 0 and their supremum. We 
will show that in the limit l(a n0 ) and 1(On 1 ) are "far" apart. 
If (A.19) is to be satisfied in the limit, a necessary condItion 
is 
(A.20) 
or 
D(F(K(a 1) ,L(a 1» )F(K(o 1) ,L(o 1» -
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for 8nO~e and 8nl~e. Thus, (A.20) since it is at variance with 
(A.14) impl ies that only one of 1 (en 0) and 1 (en 1) can belong to 
the equilibrium path. 
A prerequisite for the equilibrium we study now is that it 
dominates the full pooling equilibrium. Hence, the distortion to 
the union relative to the employment target must converge to 
zero. That is, only a negligible number of firms can deviate from 
this employment target. What is said in (A.20) is that for a 
given n there exists for some n a value en and a set of 
employment targets Ln (since (A.20) is only comparing two types) 
such that the corresponding suprema to all employment targets is 
8n (8 1 n and 8 2 n both converge to 8n ), and that these employment 
targets are chosen by (1-£) of firms. Since all employment 
targets have the same supremum there is at least one employment 
level which is optimal to firms sufficiently far apart. 
Finally, consider the case where the equilibrium does not exhibit 
infinite reswitching. Then for l(e o ) ,l(e t )£Ln ,lCe l ) is strictly 
preferred to 1(8 0 ) in some interval (8 n ,e 1 ) and en cannot be a 
supremum for.lCs o ). Hence, there exists only one employment level 
in Ln and the equilibrium is, upto £, a full pooling equilibrium. 
CHAPTER 4 
WAGE SETTING. INVESTMENT AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
/ 
137 
I. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the role of employment and investment as a 
signal when the information structure of the economy is 
asymmetric. We analyse a situation in which the equilibrium wage 
rate is assumed to be dictated by a planner who attempts to clear 
the market. The planner dictates a wage scheme regulating the 
exchange of wages for employment between a firm and its workers. 
The wage scheme is restricted to elicit all relevant information. 
Thus, it is contingent upon some parameter (or a sufficient 
statistic for this parameter), characterizing the economy. Here 
it is assumed for convenience that this parameter is the price, 
and the price is known probabilistically by the planner and the 
workers, but precisely by the firm. Thus, the decision of the 
planner is subject to uncertainty, and consequently, the wage 
dictated by the planner is based upon the price (or a sufficient 
statistic) as announced by the firm. Any wage suggested by the 
planner must be incentive compatible, that is, this wage jointly 
with observable variables must ensure that the firm reveals the 
true price. Or to phrase it differently: workers will accept for 
a given wage a level of labour supply only if this amount of 
labour exchanged ensures that they are "not fooled". 
As a further exercise, the economy is analysed but without 
assuming the presence of a planner. 
Such an exercise allows for market imperfections due to 
monopolistic behavior on the part of the two agents. This may be 
the more realistic case to consider in the case of a firm 
specific bargain. 
The role of employment and investments, in this model, is to 
support the announcement made by the firm with respect to the 
price, thus, supporting the contract agreed upon. 
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The result of the particular institutional framework analysed in 
the present setting indicates inefficiencies. A command 
equilibrium possesses two characteristics. Once the level of 
investment is decided upon, the contract results in underemploy-
ment relative to the outcome under perfect (and symmetric) 
information. Secondly, the level of investments is les5 than what 
is the case under symmetric information. These results are only 
partly true in a decentralized economy. Employment is still 
inefficiently low compared to the situation under symmetric 
information. However, the effect upon capital is no longer 
unambiguous. Thus, even qualitatively, there is not an 
equivalence between the command optimum and a free market 
economy. 
As an alternative interpretation, this chapter can be thought of 
as modelling the role of investment as a signal when the 
equilibrium wage rate is the result of an explicit or implicit 
bargain between workers and their employers. (This is essentially 
Section IV). The value of the bargain is subject to some 
stochastic shock, which is known only by the firm. Thus, compared 
to other models of investment and wage formation (e.g., the 
139 
Weitzman share model), some further incentive compatibility con-
straints are added to the problem. The results presented here, 
thus, modify the positive conclusions reached in the share model. 
This is just one reason why we should concern ourselves with the 
issue of this paragraph. 
The topics presented in this paper are interesting for several 
other reasons. The labour market appears to be the market which 
diverges most from the Walrasian assumption of exogenous 
prices and lack of strategic behavior. Thus, an analysis of the 
possible process determining wages and its impact upon the level 
of investment is appropriate in the attempt to understand modern 
economic issues, including the idea of a microfoundation for 
macroeconomics. 
Furthermore, this chapter supplements several papers on related 
issues. Grout (1984) shows that in the absence of binding 
contracts, a Nash bargaining solution to the wage determination 
problem supports lower levels of investment. However, for a given 
level of investment, input of labour and the share of profits are 
unchanged. The results obtained here modify these results. 
Finally, the results of this analysis can be compared with those 
of Azariadis (1983) and Grossman & Hart (1983) who show that 
implicit contracts under asymmetric information result in 
underemployment in adverse states of nature. Contrary to this 
Chari (1983) and Green & Kahn (1983) obtain high employment in 
favourable states of nature. D1fferences in results are due to 
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differences in the specification of the preference structure. 
This issue will be discussed further in the conclusion. At any 
rate, there is agreement that under asymmetric information the 
level of employment diverges from the Walrasian level. The 
analysis presented here can be seen as an extension of the above 
papers, since the level of investments is introduced into the 
model as a signalling device. 
II. The Model 
This section specifies and discusses the model. Furthermore, an 
alternative interpretation of the results to come is given. This 
interpretation consider the problem as a problem of implementing 
a contract. Thus, the form of this contract is discussed 
informally. In particular, attention is drawn to the fact that 
the contract used in the analysis is what Is termed self-
enforcing. This implies that the specific contractual agreement 
envisaged here can be thought of as an implicit contract as well. 
A firm can sell at some given price all of its output. This price 
is subject to some shock, i.e., 
( 2 • 1 ) P = eP 
P normalized to 1 
dG = g(e»o V e 
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The shock is distributed according to g(.) which is non-vanishing 
everywhere, with a support [a 1 ,au]' au >a 1 and by assumption 
Jeg(a).da=1. Denote by n F , nu ' and 0P' the information set of 
the firm, the trade union and the planner, respectively . It is 
assumed of={a,g(· ),[a 1 ,au]} and Q1= {g(. ),{a l ,e u ]} i=u,p; that 
is, the firm knows the realized value of a, whereas the union and 
the planner only know the form g(.) and the support [a 1 ,au]. The 
fact that op=nU~OF accounts for the incentive compability 
restrictions added to the optimization problem. 
Let y be output and Land K inputs of labour and capital. The 
production function, F(.,.), exhibits constant returns to 
scal e 1 ), thus, 
(2.2) { y = F(L,K) 
'hy = F('hL,'hK) 'hER. 
Combining (2.1) and (2.2) the profit function is 
(2.3) n = aF(L,K) - wL - rK 
The model is closed assuming that (2.3) possesses an optimum, for 
example assuming that wand r are increasing in L, respectively 
K. 
We will now offer an interpretation in terms of implementing a 
contract. Consider the following scenario: let the trade union 2 ) 
have some objective function (to be specified shortly). The firm 
announces some value of a, call this a, and decides upon a level 
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of investment. Assuming that, once used in production, the 
investment deteriorates completely, the stock of capital equals 
investment. Investment takes place in the first period. This is 
also the period in which the planner has to implement the self-
enforcing contract (note that due to this, it is irrelevant 
whether the contract is binding or not). Given the announcement 
e and the stock of capital, which is affected by the contract, 
the planner seeks to implement a contract which clears the 
market and elicits all information. The planner does so by 
dictating a wage. The restriction on the planner is that the 
contract must be self-enforcing or incentive compatible. 
The assumption made here with respect to OF and 0u=op complicates 
the decisions of the firm as well as that of the planner. Assume 
that the firm knows the utility function of the trade union and, 
thus, the objective of the planner. Hence, the firm can reproduce 
the optimal decision of the planner. Thus, if the firm moves 
first, the choice of K and e is based upon knowledge of sub-
sequent actions. These subsequent actions are the decision with 
respect to the wage and the decision, given a and K, and in 
period 2, with respect to labour demand. If the planner moves 
first, the opposite is of course true. The basic idea of the 
model is that once the firm has announced a, the planner suggests 
a contract, hence the planner moves first. Thus, it is clear 
that any first mover advantage to the firm (since the wage 
depends upon the stock of capital) cannot be realized, since the 
planner aims at efficiency. The incentive compatibility 
restrictions are, in essence, that the contract has to be 
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acceptable to the trade union. 
At this point, a short digression is necessary. Assume that the 
game is played between the firm and the trade union. In this 
case, the wage dictated by the trade union would depend upon K. 
Thus, even if the value of e, drawn according to g(.) and 
[8 1 ,e u ]' was known to both parties, i.e., 0u=OF' the level of 
investment would differ from the Walrasian level. This is so 
because the firm would enjoy the classical Stackelberg leader 
position. This issue will be discussed in Section IV. 
Let the utility function have positive but decreasing marginal 
utility of income and a negative and decreasing marginal utility 
of labour supply. Furthermore, assume that the cross derivative 
is negative, that is, the marginal utility of income is decreas-
ing as more labour is supplied (an example is given in Note 3). 
This may, perhaps, find some justification in the consumption 
theory suggested by Becker (e.g., Becker (1971), Chapter 3). 
(2.4) U = U[wL,L] 
The planner has to decide upon a wage such that ld(.) is equal 
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to Is (.). This problem is subject to two restrictions. The level 
of employment 1s given by maximization of the profit, once K is 
fixed. Secondly, only a wage which forces the firm to reveal 
truthfully the realized value of e is accepted by the union (and 
thus by the planner). That is, the contract has to support an 
announcement 9=e. 
It is now possible to discuss the contractual arrangement which 
we envisage in more detail but at a rather informal level. For 
any given choice of K and announcement e the contract specifies 
the wage and the labour demand. 
(2.5) 
Note, the contract C is defined over a, not e. This implies that 
the firm has the possibility of making an announcement e~e. 
The specification of C is important because even though the firm 
is a residual claimant with respect to e once the wage Is fixed 
the firm is not a residual claimant with respect to the 
anouncement e made in the first period meaning that it may be to 
the advantage of the firm to make some announcement e~e. Why is 
this so? Consider the contract C·, with an announcement e=e4-~), 
i.e., for some reason the announced value equals the true value. 
If this situation is optimal to the firm, the resultant wage is 
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w*(e). Consider an announcement e=el~e for which it is the case 
that w*(al)<w*(a) and a l close to e61 • Deviating from the 
announcement 9=9 to 9=9 1 , the firm suffers a loss since the level 
of employment must correspond to the annoucement a l • However, as 
by assumption 9=e is first best this loss is of order c 2 • The 
gain, on the other hand, is of order c, since w*(al)(w*(a). 
Hence, the overall gain is (1-c)c>O. Consequently, announcing 8=a 
is not an incentive compatible solution. However, note also that 
a contract C* and 8=9 1 , although preferred by the firm to C* and 
8=a is not time consistent (or self-enforceable), since the firm 
in the second period would like to deviate from Id(w,K,9 1 ) to 
Id'(w,K,e). Both of these problems will be dealt with by an 
appropriate design of C, given in (2.5). 
Consider the restrictions to be put on ld by the restriction to 
incentive compatible contracts. Clearly this is interesting since 
any restriction to be put on ld may account for deviations from 
the Walrasian outcome. Since the incentive compatibility re-
strictions on the firm are that they behave according to their 
announcement 1 ) l(a'le)=l(e'la'),w(e'le)= w(elle') and vice versa 
and that they announce truthfully the realized value of a, the 
following lemma is easily establishedS ). 
Lemma 1: If ld is to be incentive compatible then 3I d /3e>O. 
Proof: (The proof proceeds as the proof of Proposition 1 in 
Chapter 3 and a sketch suffices). 
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The idea of the proof is simple. Pick out any two e and a l with, 
say, a>a l • If ld is to satisfy incentive compatibility, then 
n(ala»n(a1Ia) and n(e1Ie»n(alel). Using this, the results 
follow. 
Lemma 1 allows for many demand functions, including the Walrasian 
/ 
demand function. It is not surprising that Lemma 1 1s unrestric-
tive. The lemma is concerned with the second period decisions of 
the firm and in this period the firm is a residual claimant, 
since only non-binding contracts are considered. Consequently, 
the firm has no incentive to misrepresent the value of 8. As a 
matter of fact, for a time consistent, incentive compatible 
contract the labour demand is the Walrasian labour demand. Thus, 
if a deviation from the Walrasian level of employment is the 
result of the contract (2.5), then -this 1s because the wage 
deviates from the Walrasian wage. The reason, as it emerged from 
the discussion of the design of the contract, Is that the trade 
union accepts only a wage which is different from that under 
symmetric information because the trade union, in accepting a 
contract, must ensure that for the contract accepted, the firm 
will truthfully reveal the realized value of a. Observing that 
the firm, in the first period, is not yet a residual claimant, it 
is not surprising that the Walrasian solution is infeasible. 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the model, consider the con-
tract (2.5) and the decision of the planner. Strictly speaking, 
the planner suggests a supply schedule for labour and not a 
perfectly elastic supply of labour at some wage rate. Thus, the 
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model is apparently in disagreement with the monopoly union 
model. However, for a time consistent and incentive compatible 
contract the perception of the trade union and the planner with 
respect to ld is correct. Thus, once the planner has decided upon 
a supply schedule which is acceptable to the trade union, the 
equilibrium employment rate is implicitly determined. Hence, the 
contract (2.5) could as well be replaced with 
(2.5") C ~ - d - -= {(K,e) ,w,l (w,K,e)} 
where w solves Is (w,K,e)=ld(w,K,e). 
III. Wages, Employment and Investment 
In this section a command-like equilibrium is analysed. The 
following, perhaps somewhat restrictive, story may justify this. 
We consider an economy made up of a great number of firms all of 
which are alike. The firms are subject to some stochastic 
injection known exclusively by themselves and only probabili-
stically by the two other agents in this economy, the planner and 
the union (representative worker). In such an economy the role of 
the planner is to dictate a wage which clears the market and 
which elicits all relevant information. Alternatively, proceeding 
from Section II we can think of the planner as announcing a 
contract specifying the wage and the labour demand contingent 
/ 
upon the firm's announcement of the "value" of the stochastic 
injection and the level of investments they choose. The contract 
is restricted to support a truth telling behavior of the firms. 
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This section argues that the economy is inefficient in the sense 
that investment is less than under symmetric information and is 
underutilized. This is so despite the fact that the inter-
pretation given just above is extremely favourable to attaining 
efficiency. An alternative interpretation is that this model 
describes union-specific bargaining. An analysis of this is 
deferred until the next section. 
Let us first, however, as a reference analyse the case of 
symmetric investment. 
111.1. Wages, Employment and Investment with Symmetric Informa-
tion. 
This section of the paper analyses, in the case of symmetric 
information, the demand and supply decisions with respect to 
labour of the firm and the trade union, respectively, and the 
action of the planner. This is a prelude and reference to the 
analysis for the case of asymmetric information. 
Consider the demand for labour. For a time-consistent contract 
the optimal demand for labour is 
<:3.1) 
Clearly (3.1) is nothing but the Walrasian demand for labour. 
Assuming that the value of the marginal product of labour is 
decreasing in L and increasing in K then ld is given by9) 
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Ld = g(e,K,w) 
If information is symmetric, then the planner faces, with 
certainty, a labour demand schedule as given in (3.2). Con-
sequently the planner chooses a level of employment by dictating 
a wage which equates the marginal disutllity of working to the 
marginal utility of working (for a formal exposition see Appendix 
(A.I». 
Hence, equilibrium in the labour market possesses the character-
istic that the wage set equates the marginal disutility of labour 
to its marginal utility. 
Let the solution to (3.3) be h(·) defined implicitly by (3.3). 
(3.3') LS = hew) 
In Appendix (A.I) it is argued that the solution to (3.2) and 
(3.3') can be written as 
w = Ol*{K,e) 
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Hence, profit is written as 
n(K,e) = eF[g(e,K,w*(K,e»,K] - w*(K,e)g(e,K,w*(K,8»-r o K 
Since the wage is dictated in period 1 by the planner, the wage 
is parametric to the firm, w*(K,8)=~*(K,8). Consequently, the 
first order condition is 
(3.6) 8FK[g(8,K,w*(K,8»,K] = r 
Hence, the value marginal product of K is equalled to r. Thus, 
the Walrasian solution with respect to K is obtained. 
III.2. Wages, Employment and Investment with Asymmetric Informa-
tion. 
/ 
We now consider the case in which the planner will have to make 
its decisions contingent upon the announcement e made by the firm 
and the observable level of capital. The role of the planner is 
to decide on some wage w(K,e), so that given this wage the 
announcement made by the firm can be trusted, i.e., 8=8. ~o 
obtain a time consistent, incentive compatible solution the 
planner in deciding upon w(K,e) needs to take into consideration 
the subsequent actions of the firm. 
Note again that for a time consistent, incentive compatible 
solution to obtain the labour demand is given by 
(3.7) 
Now, consider the effect on profits, n, of a change in e, once 
K has been decided upon. 
Using (3.7) 
d 
= (FL(L,K) - w)~ ae 
lIe = P(L,K) 
+ F(L,K) 
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Consequently, when the planner or auctioneer announce some wage 
scheme, this wage scheme and the subsequent actions of the firm 
and the union must have two characteristics: firstly, the markets 
must be cleared and secondly, the specific information possessed 
by the firm must be elicited. Thus, note in particular that the 
planner must take into account the relationship described by 
(3.8). Equation (3.8) describes the value to the firm of lying 
and being believed: If the firm announces a-de when the actual 
value is e, the firm makes an extra profit of the order Yde. 
The following proposition i5 proved in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1. In a planning equilibrium with asymmetric 
information the equilibrium wage, T(Y), satisfies 
K > 0 
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except for e=e u in which case 
Since the second order condition dictates 02U/OW2<O, we have 
that the wage is such that the marginal disutility of labour is 
less than the marginal utility. Thus, the supply of employment is 
inefficiently low (see Figure 1, see next page). 
Let the solution to (3.9) and (3.7) be denoted wlO) (this is also 
derived formally in Appendix (A.II». 
(3.10) w = w(K,e) 
Comparing (3.7), (3.9) to (3.3) it is clear that (this is 
actually also proved in the proof of Proposition 1). 
w(K,e) > w*(K,e) 
Turning attention to the choice of the stock of capital write 
profits as 
(3.11) ~(K,e) = eF(g(e,K,w(K,e»,K) - w(K,e)g(e,K,w(K,e»-r·K 
Since the wage is dictated before K 1s chosen, the first order 
K 
/ 
Figure 1 
U1{T(y,L) + LdT dY} dY dL 
Incentive compatible solution 
Case a < a 
u 
U
1
{T(y,L) + LdT dT} 
dY aL 
Case a = a 
u 
solution 
T(Y,L) 
T(Y,L) 
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condition is 
(3.12) FK[g(e,K,w(K,e),K) = r 
Comparing (3.12) to (3.6) we have 
Proposition 2. A planning equilibrium under asymmetric 
information involves less investment and for a given level of 
investment less employment. 
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The mechanism behind Proposition 2 is that since employment is 
used as a signal, asymmetric information lowers the level of 
employment. Thus, the value of the marginal product of capital 1s 
lowered. This in turn is followed by less investments. 
IV. A Game Played between the Firm and the Union 
In this section we analyse the implication of firm specific 
bargaining. The interaction between the firm and the union is 
direct and no longer through a planner. Thus, we consider an 
economy in which a local trade union is linked to a specific 
firm. The interpretation here may be that the union may face one 
of many firms not being able to tell precisely which one. An 
alternative interpretation and perhaps more realistic is that the 
union is not as well informed as the firm with respect to some 
value affecting the profitability of the firm. It may be that 
this interpretation does not seem to be much at variance with the 
one given in the previous section. However, once attention is 
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focused upon a firm specific bargaining problem, the assumption 
of a planner cannot reasonably be sustained. This allows the two 
parties, the firm, and the union to exploit first mover 
advantages. An implication of this is that the presence of 
asymmetric information may (with the kind of bargaining process 
assumed here) actually support a higher level of investments. 
This contrasts with the findings of Grout (1984). 
Let us consider first the situation arising under symmetric 
information. 
Consider the decision with respect to employment. We have 
Consequently, the labour demand is given by 
Ld = g(e,K,w) 
g < 0 
w 
Since the trade union will use its monopoly power, we find the 
following maximization problem 
Max U(wg(e,K,w), g(e,K,w» 
w 
s.t. ~ = F(L,K) - wL - rK 
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'Ita = F(L,K) 
The first order condition is 
Let the solution of this first order condition be w=~~ (K,e) 
(opposed to w*(K,a), see (3.4». 
Since we do not know the sign of gwK and gwe' it is not possible 
to see if the sign of wK' we is unambiguous. 
Denote the solution by ~*(e,K). Thus, profits are 
'It = eF[g{a ,K,w* (e ,K» ,K] - w* (e ,K)g(e ,K,~· (e ,K) - rK 
First order conditions (dictating the choice of K) are 
Using eFL(K,L)=~*, this reduces to 
The sign of wK is unknown, hence, it is not possible to see 
if R*~K*, that is, if the stock of capital in a decentralized 
equilibrium is greater than or less than that in a command 
optimum. 
Focusing on the case of asymmetric information, we offer the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3. Assuming that second order conditions are 
satisfied: When monopoly effects are present, employment is 
lIinefficientlyll low under asymmetric information. 
Proof: See Appendix (A.III). 
I 
l,'f 
The intuition behind this result is given in Milgrom & Roberts 
(1982). Suppose that the firm announced its true value and was 
believed. Would this be an optimum? Clearly no, since if the firm 
is beleived to be telling the truth, it could deviate (at a cost 
of E2 since it is at its static oiptimum) and announce at value 
slightly lower than the one actually realized. This would imply 
an increase in profits of the order of c through a low wage 
claim. Thus, the total gain is C(1-E»O. This effect is 
recognized by the union and in order to pre-emt an inference 
dictating an excessively high wage, the firm deviates downward 
(see also Chapter 1). 
Consider the effect upon investment: clearly since employment 
falls so will the value of the marginal product of capital. This 
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tends to reduce the level of investment. However, in this 
setting, as opposed to that of earlier section, additional 
effects are present. One effect present is the direct effect 
upon the wage claim of the choice of investment, cf. ~K and ~K. 
It is a priori not possible to decide upon the relationship 
between these two variables. Also present is an effect upon the 
sensitivity of labour demand of the wage to be set (cf. gK(~*) 
and gK(~». Again it is not a priori possible to decide on the 
relationship between these effects since they depend upon the 
third derivative of the production function. 
We can, however, offer the following result. Let w(~) denote the 
optimal wage claim under asymmetric information (derived in the 
proof of Proposition 3). 
Proposition 4. A sufficient condition for investments to be lower 
compared to a situation under symmetric information is: 
Proof: See Appendix (A.IV). 
The result is readily explained. Since, in equilibrium the level 
of employment is lower than compared to the situation under 
symmetric information, the value of the marginal product (FK) is 
lowered, say FKo shifts down to FK1 due to the fall in the level 
of employment. This is the effect identified in the previous 
section. However, a change in the value of K has also other 
indirect effects. There is an effect upon the wage bill, since 
the wage changes. This effect is given by 
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Before we comment on this effect, let us briefly discuss the 
effect upon employment due to the effect upon the wage. Profits 
are changed since the level of employment is changed. 
on 1 
a~ K 
= (eFL(·) - w)~ a~ 
But this is 0 since it is nothing but the first order condition 
for the choice of employment. Hence, the effects upon profits 
apart from the direct effect (eFK(·)-r) are restricted to ~Kg(·). 
We have argued that the marginal value of an additional unit of 
capital is given by eFKl as opposed to aFKo. What about costs? 
The marginal cost of acquisition of one more unit of capital is 
Since gw<O, and since 00)00*, we find that g(w)<g(~~). This effect 
tends to reduce the marginal cost of capital. The functions 
~*(e,K) and w(e,K) are two different functions and as such it is 
not possible to compare their curvature. Hence, we would not 
know whether wK(e,K»wK*(e,K) or w(e,K)<w~(e,K). Thus, it is in 
general not possible to say whether the cost of acquiring capital 
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increases or decreases with the introduction of asymmetric 
information. The effects discussed are illustrated in Figure 2 
I (see next page). In consequence, we consider a specific example. 
Let the production function be given as 
Assume that the utility function is of the following simple form 
u = wL - 1/2 L2 
In Appendix (A.V) this example is solved for the case of 
symmetric as well as asymmetric information. It is found that the 
marginal benefit of one additional unit of capital is given by 
a a 
MB(K)SI = e(1-a)(ae(1+a»~K-~ 
a a 
MB(K)ASI = e(1-a)(a[e(1+a) - (e-e)])~K-~ 
The marginal cost of acquisition of capital is 
a 
MC(K)SI = r + a(a9(1+a»~(1-a)~ K2- a ~-a 
a 
MC(K)ASI = r + a(a[e(1+a) - (e-e)])~(1-a)~=~ K2-a 
101 
Fiqure 2 
Meo 
I----~~----~------ K 
I 
Me' > Meo K K 
Meo 
K 
Me' K 
Me1 K 
Me' < Meo 
I 
but Me' > Me' K K K K 
Me' --------~~~~------- K 
I 
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Hence, we see first of all that in this example MC(K)Asl <MC(K)sl . 
The presence of asymmetries in the information sets of the two 
parties actually decreases the marginal cost of capital. 
Secondly, it is clear the MB(K)SI>MB(K)ASI. The last of these two 
results confirm our earlier general results. The first of the 
results seems to suggest that ambiguity in the general setting 
arises because two opposing effects are at work. The ambiguity 
does not arise because the specification is too general to allow 
conclusions to be drawn. Hence, it may well be the case that the 
presence of asymmetric information sets actually increases the 
level of capital. This in turn may increase employment. However, 
note that for a given level of capital underemployment will still 
occur. 
The result that under asymmetric information a bargaining process 
(in the extreme form introduced here) may actually increase the 
level of investments (capital) contrasts with the finding of 
Grout (1984). Results are not directly comparable, however. In 
Grout (1984) a situation is analysed in which a firm realizes 
that upon an irreversible investment decision the union may 
exploit the different threat point (compared to that of no 
investment). It is shown that investment without binding con-
tracts decreases investment compared to the case of binding con-
tracts. Informational aspects are not considered in Grout (1984) 
and further comparisons are outside the scope of this paper. 
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v. Conclusion 
This paper is concerned with the formation of wages and the sub-
sequent decisions on employment and investment. Not surprisingly, 
if the economy is characterized by perfect and symmetric informa-
tion, a social planner may, by dictating a proper wage, induce a 
contract which results in a wage, level of employment and invest-
ment which equal that obtained in a competitive economy. 
However, under uncertainty and asymmetric information this result 
is no longer valid. If the value of the price of goods is known 
perfectly by the firm, but only probabilistically by the planner 
and the union, only incentive compatible contracts will be 
accepted by the union. In such circumstances, the planner cannot 
enforce a result which equals that of a competitive economy. 
Wages, respectively employment will be higher, respectively lower 
compared to an economy with perfect and symmetric information. 
Also investment will be lower. These results are modified in the 
case of a decentralized economy. Employment is still 
inefficiently low. However, investments may well increase 
compared to the case of symmetric information. 
Grout (1984) also obtains results similar to the ones we present 
for the case of a command equilibrium. In Grout (1984), wages and 
input levels, as well as profits, are determined as the outcome 
of a Nash bargain. In the absence of binding contracts, the wage 
and the level of employment must be consistent with potential 
bargains made after the purchase of capital. GIven that the union 
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has any power at all (an apparently reasonable assumption), 
inputs are not employed efficiently. The reason for this result 
is that the real price of capital increases beyond the simple 
price of capital, since the firm has to add to the cost price the 
spillover effect upon the total wage bill. However, note that 
the results obtained here in the case of a decentralized economy 
our results contrast those of Grout (1984), at least partially, 
since investments may increase. 
In this chapter, such spill-over effects (externalities) have 
been ruled out. The result obtained here is due only to strategic 
considerations. Note also that the discussion of whether 
contracts are binding or not is immaterial, since the contracts 
set forth in this paper are self-enforceable. 
It has been argued here that underemployment is the outcome of a 
contractual agreement between the firm and the union. Thus, the 
work presented here is close to that of the implicit contracts 
literature (for a survey see Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983». 
In Azariadis (1983) and Grossman and Hart (1983), underemployment 
is the rule, whereas in Chari (1983) and Green and Kahn (1983), 
overemployment is the rule. However, to obtain underemployment in 
this class of models, it is noteworthy that firms have to be more 
risk averse at the margin than workers are. In the present 
setting, 
no assumptions were made with respect to the degree of risk 
aversion of the two parties. In addition, the current paper also 
analyses the implication with respect to the level of 
investments. Thus, it can be seen as an extension of models of 
implicit contracts. An obvious extension of the current work 
would be to incorporate the idea of insurance against loss of 
income, which is the central idea of the implicit contracts 
literature. 
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VI. Notes. 
1. This is of importance only in Section IV and is not used in 
the current section. 
2. In this section, the phrase IItrade union ll and IIworker" is 
used freely since planner is introduced. 
3. For example, let the utility function be of the Cobb-Douglas 
a 1 +a a -1 1 -a type U=(wL) (L) · Hence, U12=a(a-1)(wL) (L) <0. 
4. By * is denoted the value resulting under symmetric 
information. 
5. Note l*d = Id. 
6. ele:B(e,c). 
7. By l(Slls) is meant 8=a l and the realized value is a, etc. 
8. Note the Lemma is not concerned with time consistency. 
9. Insert g(e,K,w) into (3.1); ge' gK' gw are obtained 
immediately. 
10. Insert w(K,e) into (3.9) and (3.7) and using second order 
conditions the derivatives of wK and we are obtained. 
IOf 
VII. Appendix 
A.1. Derivation of the Command Equilibrium 
Consider a situation where we look at an economy consisting of 
only three players: a producer (and thus demander of labour), a 
consumer (and supplier of labour), and an auctioneer or planner. 
These are endowed with the following pay-off functions: 
n = eF(L,K) - wL - rK 
U = U(wL,L) 
W(O) = 0, W(x) < 0, Vx ~ 0 
The planner chooses first, dictating w, the wage. The remaining 
players act subsequently. Thus, the planner in choosing w has to 
take into consideration the behavior of these players. 
Solving for the behvior of the producer, we have 
Ld = g(e,K,w) 
where (see note 9) ge>O gK<O and gw<O. This is Equation (3.2) in 
the text, which describes the behavior of the demanders of 
labour. 
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Solving for the behavior of the producers, we have 
where we assume that h'{w»O. This is Equation (3.3) in the text 
describing the behavior of the suppliers of labour. Now t the 
planner faces the following problem 
Max - ~(g(e,K,w) - h{w»2 
w 
We find the first order condition 
- [g(e,K,w) - h(w)][gw - hw] = 0 
Since gw-hw<O this requires that the equilibrium wage satisfies 
gee ,K,w) - hew) 
I 
From this we have the solution 
w = w* (K, e ) 
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A.II. Proof of Proposition 
The proof of this proposition proceeds as in the derivation of 
the command equilibrium. Thus, three agents are considered: the 
demander of labour, the supplier of labour, and the planner. 
Since the firm has to choose the level of employment, once the 
wage is set and a capital stock is decided upon it is trivial 
that the demand for labour is described by: 
Ld = ( K ) g 8, ,W 
The planner maximizes a utility function taking into 
consideration the subsequent actions of the agents. We assume 
that the union for a given wage (dictated by the planner) will 
accept only levels of employment that support truthful revelation 
of 8. Now let the wage dictated by the planner be T=T(Y)8. The 
fact that the planner has to dictate a wage scheme (T(Y» and not 
just a wage is that the resolution of the game must elicit all 
information and the firm has an incentive to lie (cf. 3.8), an 
effect which must be reflected in the planner1s choice of lithe 
wage II • 
Thus, let us focus upon the choice of labour supply. For a given 
wage scheme, the maximization problem of the T=T(Y) union can be 
written as 
(A.P.2) Max U(T(Y)L,L) 
L 
l[ = Y e 
T(Y) captures the fact that for some given profit level, 
eF(L,K)-wL-rK, L is chosen according to the standard condition 
w=eFL(L,K» and, thus, is a function of total production. 
The Hamiltonian, written in terms of L, for (A.P.2) is 
(A. 1 ) H = U(T(Y)L,L) + y(e)Y 
The first order conditions are found to be 
(A. 2) 
(A. 3) 
U Lg~ BY l[ = 0 1 cSl[ e 
Clearly (A.2), (A.3) reduce to 
(A.4) 
(A. 5) 
Using n:PY-wL-rK and noting that w=T(Y,L), it is seen that 
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o - PdY - L·dT => 
6T P 
= 
"IT L 
Also 6~ = P6Y => 
6Y 1 
6n = P 
Using this, jA.4) and (A.5) reduce to 
(A.6 ) 
(A.7) 
Let the solution to (A.7) be 
yea) = Z(a) + constant 
Thus, the first order condition reduces to 
6T 5Y 6Y U1{T(Y) + LKY XL} + U2 = (-Z(a) - constant)Kr; 
The worst point estimate to the firm is a = au, thus, in this 
case the first best solution obtains (see Mailath (1988). 
That is, for B=Bu we have Ut {·}+U2 =O. This is the boundary 
condition dictating "constant". Hence, "constant = -Z(au)lI. 
Thus, we have 
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(A.a) 
Since Z(·) is an increasing function (Z' (. )=y' (. )=U1 (.) >0), this 
concludes the proof. 
Q.E.D. 
Let us, however, formally show that the wage is higher and the 
level of employment lower compared to the case of symmetric 
information. (This is only shown loosely in the text). 
Since Z' (9»0, the right hand side is for 9¢e u strictly bounded 
from below at zero and, hence, 
In consequence for any given scheme T(Y), the amount of labour 
supplied is, ceteris paribus, lower. Let the solution to (A.8) be 
Thus, since all information is elicited, it remains for the 
planner to maximize w=-(1/2)(Ld_LS)2. 
The first order condition is 
- [g(e,K,w) - n(w,e)][g - n] = 0 
w w 
, 
/ 
This reduces to 
g(e,K,w) = n(w,e) 
Since n(w,e)<h(w,e), the equilibrium wage is higher and the 
level of employment lower compared to the case of symmetric 
information. 
A.III. Proof of Proposition 3 
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This proof proceeds different from the predecessor. The reason 
being that only two agents are involved here: the demander of 
labour and the supplier of labour. The union now has to dictate 
the wage. Thus, a monopoly effect is introduced. 
Consider w to be some function of Y and L: w=T(Y,L). Thus, w can 
be interpretated as a control variable, whereas Y and L are state 
variables. Thus, the maximization problem of the union can be 
written as 
(A.P.2) Max U(T(Y,L)L,L) 
w 
n = Y e 
T(Y,L) captures the fact that for some given profit level 
F(L,K)-wL-rK), L is chosen according the standard condition 
FL(L,K»=w. 
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The Hamiltonian, written in terms of L, for (A.P.2) is 
(A.9 ) H = U(T(Y,L)L,L) + y(a)Y 
The first order conditions are found to be 
(A.10) dL LBT BY dL + LBT dL} + U2 dL + (e)BY dL U1{T(Y,L)aw + BY KI; Ow 5L Ow Ow y 6L Ow = 
(A.11) dL LBT BY dL + BT dL dL 5Y dL U1{T(Y,L)ae + BY KI; as Iii as} + U2 as + y(e)n; as 
+ '(e)Y + U L~ BY y 1 On lta = 0 
Clearly (A.10), (A.11) reduce to 
(A.12) U1{T(Y,L) + L6T 6Y + L6i} + U + y(a)~ = 0 6Y 6L B 2 O.lJ 
(A.13) , BT BY y (e)Y + U1L[Y on ne = 0 
Using nEpY-wL-rK it is easily seen that 6T/oY=p/L and 5Y/Bn=1/p. 
Thus, (A.12) and (A.13) reduce to 
(A.14) 
(A.15) yl (e) - U1 = 0 
Let the solution to (A.15) be 
y{e) = Z(a) + constant 
0 
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Thus, the first order condition reduces to 
U1{T(Y,L) + L~ ~ + it} + U2 = (-Z(a) + constant)~ 
The worst point estimate to the firm is a = au, thus, in this 
case the first best solution obtain (see Mailath (1988». Hence, 
"constant = -Z(au)". 
Thus, we have 
(A.16) 
Since the left hand side is declining in L to satisfy second 
order conditions, we see that as Z(e u )-(Z(a)(6Y/6L»>O, the 
amount of labour employed decreases under asymmetric information. 
Q.E.D. 
/ 
A.IV. Proof of Proposition 4 
Using the first order condition of the labour market, we have to 
compare, for the case of symmetric and asymmetric information, 
respectively: 
where ~)~*. Since FK*(·»FK (·), all K, a sufficient condition for 
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K to decrease in the presence of asymmetric information is that 
~K * g(. ) <~K * g(. ), when ~K denotes ow/oK. 
A.V. Solution of example 
We have 
(A.1?) U = wL - 1/2 L2 
n = ey - wI - rK 
Using (A.16), we have that (A.14) simplifies to 
(A.18) y' (e) = 
Hence, 
(A.19) y(e) = e 
a-1 1-a Y In equilibrium w=aeL K = as t. Thus, 
(A.20) T(y,L) = ae t 
Using (A.17), (A.19), and (A.20) in (A.15), the general first 
order condition 
ea i + L(~)(tI) - L = (a-e)a t 
This reduces to 
1 
(A.21) L = (a[e(1+a) - (e_e)]K1-a)~ 
Thus, in equilibrium 
a-1 
(A.22) w = a(a[e(1+a) - (a_e)]K1-a)~K1-a 
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In the case of symmetric information, these two conditions reduce 
to 
L 
(A.21 I) L = (ae(1+a)K1-a)~ 
a-1 
(A.22 1 ) W = a(ae(1+a)K1-a)~K1-a 
The profit of the firm is given by 
n = 
where Land ware given by (A.21)-(A.22) in the case of 
asymmetric information and by (A.21 1 )-(A.22 1 ) if information is 
symmetric. Using this, the result in the text is easily found. 
CHAPTER 5 
WAGE BARGAINING IN SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM. 
DEVIATIONS FROM THE FIRST BEST AND WELFARE IMPROVING TAXES 
/ 
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I. Introduction. 
In economies characterized by wage determination by bargaining it 
is of interest to analyse the consequences of the incentive 
comnpatibility constraints arising due to asymmetric information. 
This we did in a predecessor Chapter 2 to the current chapter. 
The wage is determined as the outcome of some bargaining process 
involving a trade union and a firm. Attention is focused upon the 
problems arising if the firm compared to the trade union is 
better informed with respect to some exogenous variable partly 
responsible for the outcome of the bargaining process. The 
bargaining strength of the two parties involved is assumed to be 
given exogenously, and at the same time it is assumed that the 
trade union has the opportunity to draw inferences over time 
about the variable conditioning the outcome of the bargaining. 
Inferences are conditional on past actions as well as common 
prior knowledge. Within the two period model the natural 
equilibrium to look for is a sequential equilibrium. Hence, 
actions by the firm taken in the first period are used by the 
trade union to draw inferences about the unknown variable and are 
thus reflected in the outcome of the bargain and consequently in 
second period profits. This is realized by the firm and taken 
into account when deciding upon first period actions. 
In Chapter 2 the bargaining process was taken to be very simple. 
The trade union simply announces the wage which is to rule in the 
second period. Given this wage firms adjust input of labour until 
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equality between the marginal product of labour and the wage is 
reached. This is the by now well-known monopoly union model. 
In an environment characterized by asymmetric information in the 
sense that only the firm knows the true value of the marginal 
product of labour it was shown in Chapter 2 that the incentive 
compatibility constraints enforces inefficiency. Within the first 
period all firms except the one at lithe top" deviates downward in 
the separating equilibrium, i.e., different types of firms 
(values of marginal product of labour) choose different actions 
(level of labour input) and consequently the trade union 
correctly identifies the firm. Naturally, the second period 
production and employment are undisturbed compared to the 
situation under full information. However, due to the first 
period deviation the overall level of welfare is lowered 
compared to an economy characterized by full information. 
The assumption that the labour market can be described as simply 
as is done in the monopoly union model is objectionable in so far 
as this description simply does not agree with common practice 
in a process of centralized wage setting (Nickel & Andrews 
(1983». Also, the assumption turns out to be restrictive. This 
is, perhaps, not unexpected. The incentive to deviate from the 
first best during the first period does, at least partly, depend 
upon the gain from doing so. Intuitively, the larger the gain the 
stronger the incentive to deviate. And the monopoly union model, 
as it is so favourable to the trade union, presumably provides a 
strong incentive for deviation. Implicitly, the monopoly union 
model involves a bargaining strength of 1 on the part of the 
union. It is to be expected that as the bargaining strength of 
the trade union falls the incentive to deviate falls and the 
deviation becomes smaller, in the limit approaching zero. 
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The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of this issue. 
Also of interest is the possibilities of introducing welfare 
improving taxes. We report some positive results on this issue. 
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In Section 2 the model is presented and some preliminary results 
are offered. Section 3 deals with a precise characterization of 
the optimal strategy and some properties of this strategy. In 
section 4 the issue of taxation is analysed. Conclusions are 
given in Section 5. 
II. The Model 
The economy considered here consi~ts of a range of different 
firms, each firm tied up to a trade union. Each firm produces 
according to y = [1 but differs with respect to the evaluation of 
the output. This value we denote p, which is distributed 
according to f(p) with support [Pl 'Pul. This is the only way in 
which firms differ. 
The wage faced by any firm 1s wt during the first period. That 
is, whatever is the type of the firm, it will face the same wage. 
This is not necessarily so in the second period. If the 
equilibrium is a separating one, then different firms will face 
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different wages. This construction can be interpretated 
literally, that is, there exists a whole range of firms indexed 
by the price. Alternatively, the situations is one in which there 
is only one firm, but its type is unknown to the union (on this 
see Milgrom and Roberts (1982». 
It is assumed that the trade union's prior belief about the type 
of firm with which it is faced is also given by the distribution 
f(p) and support [Pi 'Pu 1• Second period beliefs are the updated 
first period beliefs. 
Consider now the following scenario. The range of firms are 
faced, in the first period, with the common wage wt • This wage is 
left unexplained in this context but may be, for example, the 
wage which maximized the expected value of the bargain (to be 
defined later). After the end of the first period, but before the 
start of the second the trade union and the firm become involved 
in a bargaining process determining the wage which is to rule in 
the second period. Once agreement 1s reached, it is assumed to be 
binding for both parties. It is assumed that the bargaining 
process maximizes the expected value of the bargain conditional 
upon prior knowledge as well as the information revealed by the 
firm during the first period. That is, any decision taken by the 
firm during the first period does, perhaps only probabilistical-
ly, reflect the value of p, which is before period 1 known only 
according to f(p) and [Pl'Pu 1 to the trade union. Consequently, 
insofar as the value of p is reflected in the outcome of the 
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bargaining process, any first period decision influences the 
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profits obtained by the firm in the second period. 
Before the sequential equilibrium under imperfect information is 
analysed let us consider the equilibrium under perfect 
information. A firm producing a product of some value pE[Pl ,Pul 
maximizes overall profits. Hence, 
The wage rates w1 and w2 are taken to be exogenous variables. 
Hence, the first order conditions read 
( 1 ) i = 1,2 
Consequently, the·Walras' output in the two periods is given by 
i = 1,2 
Let us now turn attention to the dynamic equilibrium. The 
interest of this paper is in separating strategies only. This 
turns out to be unrestrictive given the structure analysed here. 
Let us assume that the strategy t maps R. into R.U{O} prescribing 
for some value of pE{Pl 'Pu} a value of y, hence, t(p)=Yt' Given 
that the equilibrium we are looking for is a separating 
equilibrium it is known that t is strictly monotonic 1 ). Hence, 
for any output, y, belonging to the range of possible outputs, 
r[t[Pl ,Pull, the trade union infers the value of p correctly. At 
this point note that even if the equilibrium strategy is 
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separating and, consequently, the strategic behavior does no~ 
result in a level of profit in the second period different from 
that under perfect information, the optimal strategy can still 
dictate deviations from the first best solution. The reason for 
this is that the first best is not incentive compatible. The 
argument has been given in Chapter in the General Introduction 
as well as in more detail in Chapter 2 and we refer the reader to 
those paragraphs. 
In order to proceed we need to determine the sign of tl. Assume 
that the firm chooses the strategy t(p)=y where t is a separating 
strategy, that is, t- 1 {y)=p. The wage ruling in the second period 
is determined by a bargaining process. Here we take the bargain 
to be defined over the welfare of the union and profits. The 
welfare of the union is given by: 
This function may be justified by again referring to the 
consumption theory of Becker (cf. Becker (1971)). Consider a 
competitive solution. Clearly with the above specification of the 
utility function we find that the supply of labour for any given 
wage is: 15 =1/2. Using (9) we have Id=p2/(4wt 2). Assume now that 
employment is demand determined, hence output is by Yt=p/(2w1 ). 
This first best output for the first period should be contrasted 
to production under asymmetric information {see (14). 
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Profits are given as 
p[l 
It is assumed that in the case of no agreement each party obtains 
a level of utility equal to zero. Thus, the value of the bargain 
is 
(3 ) 
The parameter ~(1-~) gives the bargaining strength of the union 
(firm) and is dependent for example upon the time preference of 
the two parties (see (Binmore, Rubinstein, Wolinsky (1986)). Note 
at this point that the expression Q assumes that the threat point 
of both parties is zero. Thus, interpretation of the case p-O 
must be carried out with great care. The exclusion of threat 
points different from zero is the price for obtaining a (nearly) 
explicit solution. 
Differentiating with respect to w2 , the agreed upon wage is 
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In the current framework we consider w2 to be given by some 
strategy, call this s, which maps R+U{O} into R+U{O}. Hence, we 
write 
Clearly, we have 
Lemma 1: The wage resulting in the second period is an increasing 
function of first period production if first period production is 
increasing in the value of the good produced by the firm, i.e., 
in p, by the firm. 
Also we have 
Lemma 2: If the strategy prescribing the first period output is 
strictly incentive compatible, then it is also continuous and 
differentiable. Furthermore, if the strategy dictating the wage 
ruling in the second period is increasing in first period output, 
then the strategy t is strictly increasing. 
Before we proceed to the proof of this lemma let us introduce 
some terminology. By a strictly incentive compatible strategy is 
meant a strategy t(p)=y which fully reveals the value of 
pE[Pl'Pu 1 to the trade union. In the proof it is necessary to be 
concerned with the payoff function to the firm. Denote this by 
n(p,p,y) where p denotes the value of p as it is inferred by the 
trade union. We have 
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n(p,t- 1 (y) ,y) = n(p,p,y) 
Hence, 
We easily establish 
This is so since 
(R2) n 13 
(R2) following immediately from differentiating n(p,p,y). 
We can proceed to the proof of this lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 2: See Appendix. 
III. The Equilibrium 
We are now in a position to consider the characterization of the 
optimal strategy t(p)=y. The firm maximizes overall profits 
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taking into consideration that the wage ruling in the second 
period is given by (4). Total profits comprise of first and 
second period profits. First period profits are given simply by 
p.y-w1y 2. Now, second period profits are 
Since Y2 is chosen so as to maximize n 2 , we have Y2=p/(2w2 ). 
Using the expression for w2 we have 
Hence, we obtain 
2 
= ~(t-1(Y)G(~»-1 
Consequently, total profits are 
The first order condition is 
(5) 
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Note that (t- 1 (y»2=p2, y=t and (1/t ' (p»=(dp/dt). Thus, (5) 
reduces to 
) -1 1 (6) (p-2w1t dt + ~ ~dp = 0 
Thus, the optimal strategy is given by the non-exact differential 
Equation (6). In general, non-exact differential equations are 
extremely difficult to solve but in this case an integrating 
factor is easily seen to be (see Boyce & Diprima (1977» 
J..L = exp -4 G(~)t 
Thus, multiplying Equation (6) by J..L an exact differential 
equation is obtained and such equations have implicit solutions. 
We have 
(7) exp -4 G(p)t (p-2w 1t)dt + exp-4 G(p)t ~ ~ dp = 0 
Consider the solution to this differential equation which is 
given by ~(p,t)=O where ~ is to be determined. The constant c is 
to be determined by some initial value conditions. From Equation 
(7) and the theory of exact differential equations we have 
~p = exp-4 G(p)t (-t) nrtr 
I , 
Consequently ~(p,t) is given by 
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From this we find 
(9) ~t = exp-4 G(~)t p + h'(t) 
But also from Equation (7) and the theory of exact differential 
equations we have 
Combining (9) and (10) 
Integrating by parts 
Combining Equations (8) and (11) the solution to the differential 
Equation (6) is given by a set of (p,t,c) where c is determined 
by initial value conditions 
(12) exp-4G(~)t [-t rrrtr p + ~Wl ~ (t + t ~)l = c 
Referring to Lemma 2 of the previous section, t Is increasing in 
p. Furthermore, from the proof of this lemma t(pu) = Pu/2wl. 
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Hence, the constant which identifies the unique solution (on this 
see Mailath (1987) and Chapter 2 for an application) is given by 
exp {-4G{f3){pu/2wt»[-1 1 1 P1 u 1 1 c = 4' rrm Pu + "2" w 1tmfT{-rw- + 4" rrm)] 
Hence, the unique solution is given by 
1 
= ~ exp 
Rewriting (13) slightly we have 
( 14) - 2e 1 + t = 
Pu 4G{P) (t - 2w:") 
1 1 1 
4" W1--nTi3) 
The term on the left hand side would equal 0 under perfect 
information (compare with t=p/2wt which is the solution under 
symmetric information). However, the term on the right hand side 
is bounded from above at O. From this we have: 
Proposition 
For any value of pC[Pt 'Pul except Pu' the corresponding 
production is lower than it is under perfect information. 
In addition to Proposition 1 a A comparative static result for 
dt/df3 can be obtained. Using (14) it is seen that 
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p 
( 1 5 ) d t G I (13) (1 4G ( 13 )( t -~ ) - 1 
Oif = 4G2(~) - exp 1)· 
P 4G(P)(t-~ ) p 
{1 - exp 1 ) + 4G(~)(t-2~ )} 
1 
Thus, the sign of dt/d~ depends upon the sign of 
P 4G(P)(t-~ ) Pu 
{1 - exp 1 ) + 4G(P) (t-"2W7)} 
1 
Consider equivalently the function 1-exp~+x, where 
x=4G(P)(t-(Pu/2wt »<0. Thus, it is clear that l-expx+x<O. Hence, 
I in conclusion dt/d~<O, that is, output is increasing as p, the 
bargaining strength of the trade union is decreasing. We state 
this as 
Proposition 2 
Output is decreasing in the bargaining strength of the union. 
Consider now the welfare loss. This is written as 
where y* is the competitive output (p/2wt ). 
Using Proposition 2 we state the following lemma 
Lemma 1 
dt(p,~) f(p)dp > 0 d~ 
Thus, as ~ is increased, the welfare loss of the economy, as 
measured by the deviation from the first best output, is 
increased. 
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In the next section we consider the possibilities for introducing 
welfare improving taxes. 
IV. Welfare Improving Taxes 
We established in the last section that during the first period 
any firm except the one at the top deviates from its first best. 
In this section, our aim is to analyse whether it is the case 
that simple tax schedules can be designed, which restore the 
first best solution. We propose four taxes: a profit tax, a 
revenue tax, an output tax, and finally a wage tax. It is to be 
expected that we can suggest simple linear output taxation as 
well as revenue taxation. Such tax rules change the shape of the 
profit function. A simple linear profit tax on the contrary does 
not change the shape of the profit function and thus, we expect 
that in this case non-linear taxes are needed. This is also the 
case for wage taxation, unless the second period wage is taxed 
away so that the union simply does not care about the result. 
194 
Obviously, for a planner to introduce a tax scheme, some 
information is required. At this point, we may adhere to one of 
two assumptions. It can be assumed that the taxing authority know 
the realized value of the price from the beginning of the game. 
Thus, taxes can be based upon this knowledge. However, we have no 
reason to assume that the taxing authority has the same 
information as the firm. And if it did, why not just pass on this 
information to the union? Furthermore, taxes which are based upon 
prior knowledge as well as updated beliefs, must be expected to 
raise even greater problems since this presumably strengthens the 
incentive to deviate. If such taxes are to be introduced, they 
must be designed so as to punish the firm for produclng anything 
different from the inferred first best output. This issue will 
not be addressed here but a (safe) conjecture will be that this 
necessarily require marginal tax rates higher than 100%. Thus, in 
the current context, in the case of firms we will be looking for 
taxes which can be based on parameters and endogenous values 
which can be observed. This restriction does not apply for 
taxation of wage or income in the second period since in a 
separating equilibrium the government knows the price after the 
first period. 
On this basis and given the exclusion of tax schemes with 
marginal taxes above 100%, we conclude that a non-linear income 
tax will do the job. This tax scheme is based on knowledge of ~ 
and T. The other tax schemes considered are found unacceptable 
either because they require knowledge of the price or because 
they involve marginal tax rates above 100%. 
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IV.1. Profit Taxation 
Consider the linear profit taxation scheme ~.~. In this case, as 
labour demand is unaltered compared to the situation without 
taxation, the value of the bargaining is 
The first order condition to this optimization problem is 
identical to that with no taxation. Thus, a simple linear profit 
tax does not change the behavior of the agents. 
Let us consider the simple non-linear profit tax ~·n. In this 
case the first order condition of the static problem reads 2l 
(16) (~ - w)(1 - 2~(pfl - wI)) = 0 
Let the solution to (16) be 12 =lP(w2 ,p). If \lJ(w2 ,p) is the optimal 
choice, then second period profits are 
Thus, the value of the bargain is given by 
where p=t- 1 (y) and n 2 as given above. Assume that the solution to 
this problem is W2=~(Y'~) with ~l>O. 
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Hence, the firm faces the following payoff 
where 
Thus, first order conditions are 
Thus, for t=p/2wt to be a solution, we require 
Thus, presumably, only very complicated taxation schemes exist. 
The schemes depend upon p, the value of which the firm has 
to communicate to the taxing authority. This on its own may 
change the structure of the problem faced by the firm, unless the 
taxing authority has full knowledge of the value of p. 
IV.2. Revenue Taxation 
With respect to a revenue taxation scheme it is reasonable to 
expect that a simple linear scheme will do the job. The reason, 
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of course, is that for a given price, revenue taxation, if the 
tax rate is negative, will increase the value of the marginal 
product of labour for any level of employment. Thus, the negative 
effects of increased employment upon second period profits can be 
neutralized by an appropriate revenue tax rate. 
If revenue is taxed with a rate of ~, labour demand is given by 
and profits by 
Thus, the value of the bargaining is 
which is written as 
where p=t-t (y). The first order condition to this problem is 
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This reduces to 
The payoff to the firm is given by 
Thus, the solution is given by the differential equation 
If t=p/2w1 is to be a solution, we easily find 
It is a problem that the tax scheme introduced here depends upon 
p. However, if we allow such a tax scheme, then the tax rate 
implement the first best solution. 
Alternatively, assume that separate tax rates are in use for each 
period. Not surprisingly, one concludes that a first period tax, 
~l=O, and a second period tax, ~2=1, implement the first best 
solution. 
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Thus, if we allow a tax scheme as given implicitly here, the 
first best solution can be implemented. It 15 disturbing, 
however, that the choice of a tax rate applicable to both periods 
~ depends upon p. Only if the agency enforcing the taxation 
scheme has the same information as the firm, it is possible to 
choose ~ as above. 
IV.3. Output Taxation 
Introducing output taxation at a rate ~, we find that profits and 
labour demand, respectively, are given by (p-~)2/4w and 
((p-~)/2W)2, respectively. Hence, the value of the bargain is 
First order condition are 
Thus, the second period wage is seen to be 
Consequently, the payoff to the firm is given by 
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The solution t satisfies 
For t=p/2wt to be a solution, we find 
We conclude that a simple subsidy of output, depending only upon 
Wi and ~, enforces a solution identical to the first best 
solution. Note that this tax cherne is introduced without 
difficulty as the choice of ~ is not dependent upon p. 
IV.4. Wage Taxation 
/ 
Consider now wage taxation which in principle also can take the 
form of a subsidy. The utility function of the trade union now 
reads u=wl(1-~)(1-l). The expression for profit as well as labour 
demand is unchanged. Hence, the value of the bargain is 
The first order condition to this problem 1s 
This condition is identical to the one for the case without 
taxation. 
Consider now the tax scheme 
T(wl) = ~(wl)2 
Thus, the bargaining problem is 
max Q 
w 
This reduces to 
max 0 
w 
The first order conditions 
2 442 ~(- P + ~ + ~~)~ -
4w2 16;4 ~ 4W2 2 2 
2 4 4 2 (1-~)(~ -~ - ~ ~) ~ = 0 4W2 ~2 ~ ~ 2 2 
This reduces to 
This again is written 
I 
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At this point, note that if taxes can be designed so as to make 
w2 independent of p, then the first best solution can be 
implemented. Let W2* be the optimal wage from (17). Rewriting and 
differentiating we find 
Hence, 
1 1 +2J3 
f..l = -w ~ 
ensures that the choice made by the firm In this period leaves 
the second period profit undisturbed. 
Hence, using this tax rate the trade union asks for a wage which 
results in the first best solution. The idea is that any 
excessive wage claim is IItaxed ll very hard and thus even if it is 
accepted by the firm, the final result is not very beneficial to 
the union. 
The tax scheme found here is appealing because of its simplicity: 
it does not depend upon p. Hence, introducing this tax scheme, we 
do not add the incentive problems in the sense that a further 
need to signal the value of p (from the firm to the taxing 
authority) arises. 
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Let us therefore offer some further remarks on this tax scheme 
which actually turns out to be a subsidy_ First of all, it must 
be noted that since no explicit threat point is contained in n 
(the value of the bargain), it makes no sense to analyse the 
consequences of ~~O. 
What is the virtue of this tax scheme? If we consider an increase 
in the wage rate, it is seen that this increase is taxed in the 
sense that the subsidy decreases. We have 
T = 
It is seen that the increase in the wage decreases T - the 
subsidy - dramatically since 1/w decreases, but also since 12 
decreases. This effect is designed so that it dominates the 
positive effect (through wI) of increasing the wage rate and thus 
makes the union ask for the IIright" wage. 
v. Conclusion 
Centralized wage determination in economies characteri~ed by 
differential information does, in general, result in deviations 
from the first best. The aim of this paper was to analyse the 
importance of bargaining strength. One prior was confirmed. If 
the trade union has no bargaining power at all, the (strategic) 
behavior of the firm coincides with the first best. If the 
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bargaining strength of the trade union is strictly bounded from 
below at zero, the (strategic) behavior of the firm involved 
deviations from the first best. In the present case the firms 
produce less compared to production under perfect information. 
Also the output (dictated by the strategy) is decreasing in p, 
the bargaining strength of the trade uniori. 
With respect to welfare improving taxes, the results were mixed. 
It is possible to introduce simple taxes in the case of output 
taxation and wage taxation. However, taxing revenue as well as 
profit creates problems as the tax scheme is dependent upon p, 
the value known only (precisely) by the firm. In these cases it 
must be assumed that p is known by the agency imposing the tax 
scheme or the tax scheme creates incentive compatibility 
constraints on its own. 
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VI. Notes 
1. Us i ng (I V . 1 ) 
where dp/dt = 1/tl(~). Use that y=t and t- 1 (y)=~. Then we 
arrive at 
2. The profit accruing to the firm during the second period is 
for a given wage given by 
First order conditions are seen to be 
(~-W2)(1-~(pf12-W212» -
~(pJ12-W212)(~-W2) = 0 =) 
(~-W2)(1-2~(PJ12-W212» = 0 
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VII. Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 2 
By assumption the strategy is one-to-one and incentive 
compatible. The worst point estimate to be held by the union is 
Pw=Pu • This follows from the sequentiality of the game played 
between the union and the firm (for details, see Chapter 2, 
Proof of Proposition 3). Since n 2 <O, using Theorem 2 of Mailath 
( 1987) 
where f*(Pu ) is the Walrasian output, since u 1J >O, again using 
Mailath (Theorem 2, 1987), then 
t I > ° 
Since tl>O, t is also continuous and differentiable. 
CHAPTER 6 
POOLING EQUILIBRIA AND MULTIPLIERS 
/ 
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I. Introduction. 
An important theme in Keynesian economic theory is that of a 
price and wage mechanism fundamentally different from the one 
underlying the Arrow-Debreu economy. In particular, following a 
shock adjustments take place at least partly and in some models 
exclusively in quantitites as opposed to prices. An example of 
this is the simple multiplier in the naive IS-LM model. Once the 
assumptions of price and wage rigidity are abandoned, the 
Keynesian conclusions are no longer valid. And perhaps worse, 
research focusing on Keynesian economic theory using models 
pertaining to the neoclassical school seems to indicate that the 
central results obtained in Keynesian theory are embraced in 
these neoclassical models. This is the so-called neoclassical 
synthesis. Hence, it seems as though there is no conceptual 
difference between neoclassical and Keynesian models. 
However, due to the works of Clower (1965) and Leijonhufud (1968) 
a different approach was taken. The classical assumption of an 
instantaneous price adjustment is abandoned in favour of an 
assumption of fixed prices (Hicks (1965)). In the short run 
prices are completely invariable whereas they may adjust to 
demand shocks in the longer run. The allocation in this short run 
can be achieved by a rationing mechanism (see, e.g., Dreze 
(1975), Grandmont (1977)). This is the basic thrust of the 
temporary equilibrium concept. Such models produce Keynesian 
results but are firmly based on agents optimizing behavior. As 
such this line of thought provides a foundation for macro-
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economics. However, left unexplained is the crucial question of 
price formation. The formation of prices are not explained and 
consequently it is impossible within the confinement of temporary 
equilibrium models to explain the rigidity of prices. The aim of 
this chapter is to explore the possibility of establishing 
existence of pooling equilibria and analyse the resulting 
dynamics. 
In a paper analysing the ratchet effect, Laffont and Tirole 
(1986) show that if a model is characterized by small para~eter 
uncertainty, then it may well be relevant to focus attention upon 
pooling equilibria, that is, equilibria where agents charac-
terized by some stochastic parameter take the same action 
irrespective of the realized value of this parameter. In the 
analysis due to Laffont and Tirole (1986) there was assumed to be 
a continuum of types. Less favourable to the existence of a full 
pooling equilibria is the case of only a finite number of types. 
Such a situation is analysed by Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole 
(1985) and it is established that for some parameter 
configurations, a pooling equilibrium may obtain. Central to the 
existence of a pooling equilibrium in both the discrete and the 
continuous case, is the fact that there is one type of agent who 
will always realize a second period payoff of zero. Such an 
agent has no incentive to deviate in the first period to improve 
the second period payoff. 
This idea was used in Chapter 3 where the neo-classical partial 
equilibrium of the goods and adjoining factor market was 
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reconsidered. The idea of the analysis is as follows. In a 
repeated relationship lasting for two periods, bargaining over 
wage takes place. The value of marginal product of labour is 
known only probabilistically by the agency but with certainty by 
the firm. In particular it is assumed that the agency may dictate 
the wage it would like to rule in the second period of the 
relationship. It is then left to the firm to dictate the level of 
employment. This level of employment has to correspond to the 
level of the value of marginal product of labour as announced in 
the first period, otherwise workers may default and quit working. 
However, workers are unable to verify the value of the marginal 
product of labour during this period. This model can be seen as a 
version of the monopoly union model. Obviously, whatever the 
objective of/the agency the decision made by the agency is, under 
uncertainty, not independent of the first period actions taken by 
the firm. Consequently, any first period decision made by the 
firm is taken with the knowledge that any private information 
revealed by this decision will be used later by the agency. 
Assuming that the firm during the first period behaves 
competitively and that the agency attempts to equate the marginal 
disutility of labour to the value of the marginal product of 
labour through the wage, we studied the resulting type of 
equilibrium. In Chapter 3 for the case of a continuum of agents, 
we found that for small uncertainty the only simple 1 ) equilibrium 
which was possible was a full pooling equilibrium. We suggested 
that the existence of pooling equilibria would have interesting 
implications for price and wage dynamics. As such pooling 
equilibria can provide for a foundation of macroeconomics. An 
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analysis of this hypothesis is the scope of this chapter. In 
particular, we focus attention on the possibility of multiplier 
effects. In order to keep the analysis simple, we adhere to the 
case of only two types (see Freixas, Guesnerie and Tlrole 
(1985». This does not seem to entail any restriction apart from 
the one that very complex equilibria are ruled out 21 • The 
condition of small uncertainty for a full pooling equilibrium to 
exist arises naturally. We return to this with a few remarks in 
the conclusion. In the next section we set forth the model and 
discuss the types of equilibria which may arise. In Section III 
we offer some comments on the implication with respect to the 
dynamic resulting from a pooling equilibrium. Finally, concluding 
comments are given in Section IV. 
II. The Model. 
We concentrate upon a continuing relationship between a firm and 
an agency. These two parties are related through some process in 
which the agency, in between the periods defining the continuing 
relationship, dictates some wage. The wage dictated is based on 
some utility function. The reason that the agency interferes in 
between periods is due to the fact that over time the agency, by 
observing the actions of firm, may update the priors upon which 
the initial wage was set. In particular we assume that there are 
three periods T1 , T2 and TJ • Periods Tl and T2 define the first 
period of the relationship. During this period factor 
renumeration is taken as some exogenous variable. In particular, 
the wage may be thought of as a result of some labour market 
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agreement and for this reason it is not unreasonable to take wage 
as an exogenous variable. During this first period demand 
conditions may well change. The change occurs in between periods 
Tl and T2 • After period T2 and before period T3 , the wage is 
renegotiated. This structure may be justified referring to 
institutional facts, for example the tradition that agreements 
are made for some time and typically do not reflect changes in, 
say, market demand (such contracts are in practice inoperable). 
Alternatively, if it is costly to monitor the market all time, it 
may be optimal to agree upon a wage in anticipation of what will 
happen in the relevant period and then after a certain time 
period agree upon another wage taking into account the experience 
gained in previous time periods. 
The economy is described by the following set of equations 
(1) p=f(y)+9 
(2) y=JI[k 
(3) 
Consider now the workings of the economy. Before period Tt t e is 
drawn according to some known probability distribution and is 
then unchanged over all of the three time periods. We consider a 
two point distribution described by the obejctive and subjective 
probabilities Pr(9=9 t )=v t and Pr(9=9 2 )=1-v 1 and 01 >° 2 • Before 
date Tl an agency interferes to dictate a wage which will rule In 
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periods Tl and T2 • This wage is based on the agency"s knowledge 
of the structure of the economy as well as knowledge of vt ' 9 t 
and 9 2 • We assume that the agency attempts to dictate a wage such 
I 
as to equate the wage to the expected marginal disutility of 
labour. This is strictly speaking not in accordance with (3) but 
assuming that the resulting 1 is divided upon many workers, this 
ensures economic efficiency at very little cost (in terms of 
risk, cf. Arrow & Lind (1970); see also the discussion in 
Chapter 3.) 
Given a wage ruling in the first period the firm chooses a set of 
actions of which only a subset is observed by the agency. The 
actions taken by the firm and observed by the agency are used by 
the agency to dictate the wage ruling in the subsequent period 
TJ • In particular, assume that wage and labour input are observed 
during the period by the agency whereas input of capital as well 
as output remains unobserved in period Tl and T2 • The price 
ruling in period 1, respectively period 2 is observed by the end 
of these periods. Hence, we have assumed that any agent may react 
to a price only in a subsequent period. Hence, when the firm 
chooses labour input and price, it does take into account the 
affect this will have upon subsequent periods' profit. Before we 
describe the resulting sequential equilibrium in detail, let us 
offer some insight into the basic incentive mechanism 
characterizing this model. If the wage in period TJ is set 
according to some probability derived from VI' we call this 
revised (ex-post) probability v2 , we have in a pooling 
equilibrium: 
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Proposition 
Proof: see Appendix. 
The idea of proof rests upon two ideas, and is simple. The higher 
is v2 the higher is the expected value of marginal product of 
labour and this is reflected in the wage claim. Once the wage is 
dictated,the supply of labour is given as perfectly elastic until 
some limit 1{w) is reached. In particular the total wage bill 
will be less than what obtains if v2 =1. In particular, for vz =1 
~ ~ 1 
we have w(v2 =1)1(w{v2 =1»=,p{9 1 )y(9 1 ) and hence profit equals 
zero. But for v2 decreasing the discrepancy between 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
w(v2 =1)l(w(v2 =1» and w(v2 )1(w(v2 » increases as v2 decreases. 
From this the result follows. 
So far the discussion offered has taken as given the value of v2 ; 
the ex-post probability that 0=9 1 • We will now consider the 
repeated relationship somewhat closer. The aim is to give a fully 
dynamic analysis and hence to make v2 endogenous. The firm was 
supposed to be restricted to choose Walrasian levels of 
employment and prices during the first two periods. Denote these 
variables by (1(9 1 ) and p(9 l ), respectively. Consider the 
following three period games. In the first and second period the 
agency puts forward a wage claim. The firm, whether faced with a 
realization of 9=9 1 or 9=9 2 , chooses some labour input and a 
corresponding price. Faced with 1(9 1 ) and p(9 1 ) the agency has to 
decide upon the ex-post probability that 9=9, and 9=9 2 • 
Obviously, in making its decision the firm takes this into 
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consideration. This structure is identical to the one analysed in 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), for which the Kreps-Wilson (1982) 
notion of Perfect Baysian Equilibrium is relevant. 
For any equilibria to be a Perfect ~aysian ~quilibrium we require 
(cf. Freixas et al (1985»: 
P . 1 1 3 = 1 (w 3) i s a rna xi m i z e r for p 3 F 
and is consistent with the announced value of e 
P.2 w2 is a maximizer for u given subsequent actions 
P.3 l1=l(w1 ), i=1,2 is a maximizer for (1t,t"+1t 2 f +1t J F 
given the subsequent actions 
P.4 w1 is a maximizer for u+~u given the subsequent actions 
BD v2 the updated probability of 9=9 1 is Bayes-consistent 
with prior probability v1 and 11 (w1 ) 
We restrict attention even further to continuation equilibrium. A 
continuation equilibrium is a PEE with an exogenous wt • Hence, 
for any given value w1 a continuation equilibrium is a vector 
(1 1 ,W2 ,1 2 ,v2 ) satisfying P1,P2,P3 and Be. The idea of perfectness 
requires that the continuation equilibrium is induced by the 
equilibrium of the initial game. We consider the existence and 
uniqueness of a continuation equilibrium. First we derive the 
following two lemmas. In particular Lemma 1 is necessary for the 
existence of pooling equilibria. 
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Proof. 3 ) A firm facing 9=9 2 will never deviate and play 1*(02» 
11 (8 2 ), i=1,2 as the agency then infers a value of O>02 and hence 
the third period wage increases. If such a firm were to deviate 
* and play 11 (02 »1 1 (8 2 ), i=1,2, then it would incur a loss in the 
first two periods. It would still, however, be met by the minimum 
wage claim in the third period. Hence, n r 3 is the same as the 
firm did not deviate and in period Tt and T2 the first best 
solution is realized. 
Q.E.D. 
* Lemma 2. 11 (9 1 ) E: { 11 (0 2 ) ,Ii (9 1 )} i = 1 , 2 
* Proof. If 11 (8 1 ) i=1,2 belongs to the support of the firm faced 
* * with 9=9 1 , then unless 11 (0 1 )=1 1 (9 2 ),1=1,2, v2 = 1. For 11 (9 1 ) l-
II (9 2 ), i=1,2, hence v2 =1 and third period profits are zero. In 
the first two periods the first-best solution (1 1 (9 1 » i= 1,2 1s 
realized. 
Q.E.D. 
Hence, we may obtain three types of continuation equilibria. 
Referring to Lemmas 1 and 2 we see that in a pooling equilibrium 
both firms employ a labour force equal to that of the firm faced 
with 0=9 2 , In a separating equilibria the firms employ 11 (0 t ) and 
11 (8 2 ), i=1,2, respectively. In a semi-separating equilibrium a 
firm faced with 9=9 1 randomizes between 11 (9 1 ) and 11 (0 2 ), i=1,2. 
Proposition 2. There exists a continuation equilibrium, in 
particular. 
i) for 9 1 such that nF (v2=v 1 )~nF(v2=1) we have a pooling 
equilibrium 
ii) for 9 1 such that nF (v2=v 1 )~nF(v2=1) we have a separating 
equilibrium. 
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iii) for 9 1 such that nF (v2 =v1 ) >nF {v2 E: (VI' 1 ) )n F (v 2 = 1) we have a 
semi-separating equilibrium. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
We concentrate in the following on pooling equilibria. We note 
I 
/ 
that the existence of pooling equilibria arises because the firm 
with the lowest value of e always faces a second period profit of 
zero. Hence, in our model the existence of pooling equilibria is 
not pathological. We briefly discuss the likeliness that the 
continuation equilibrium turns out to be a pooling equilibrium. 
Normally pooling equilibria occur only if the different types are 
not too "far apart". This we may illustrate, and hence we provide 
some insight into the proporties, we must be satisfied for a 
pooling equilibrium to exist. 
Using (1)-(3) we find the competitive solution, given the wage 
ruling in the first two periods and the value of e to be 
(6) 
(7) 
y =f- 1(2J(wr)-9) 
w 
p =2[(wr) w 
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Now, a firm faced with 9=9 1 may choose to pool, i.e. it attempts 
to make the agency believe that it faces 9=9 2 • The profit to a 
firm with this behavior is, in each of the periods Tl and Tl 
In a pooling equilibrium the wage ruling in period TJ is decided 
upon with knowledge of the priors v1 t 9 1 and 8 2 • Call this wage 
w. This wage is assumed to be known by the firm. That is, we have 
assumed that the firm has perfect knowledge of the preferences of 
the agency. To evaluate third period profits note that in a 
pooling equilibrium the wage, w, dictated by the agency solves. 
w w 
Now consider the competitive solution to the optimization problem 
of the firm with w=w and 9=9 1 • We have 
(4') le=[(~)f-l(2[(:r)-91) 
w 
Comparing lw d with the right hand side in (9) we conclude lw d ) 
~ 
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led. But as w is set to equate led to 1s , labour supply, we see 
that the firm in the third period faces a quantity constraint. 
Only Is can be employed and at a wage w which is not subject to 
negotiation within the period. The equilibrium condition for the 
market for capital reads. 
From (10) we find dk/dl<O. Hence k>kw(e 1 ). Using the first order 
condition for the optimization problem for 9=9 1 , 
(11) ~=(f(Y)+91)h 
~ ~ ~ 
we have rk>rk(S1 )=[(wr)f (w[(wr)-9). Furthermore, for any fixed 
~ ~~ ~ ~~ :::: 
wage w we have that lw=w 2 /a. Using (8) we obtain wl=vt[(wr)f- t 
~ ~ ~ 
(w[(wr)-S1 )+( 1-V1 )[(wr)f- t (2[(wr)-9 1 • 
Thus, we obtain 
Hence, using (8) and (12) pooling occurs if 
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Hence for 8 1 -9 2 sufficiently small, that is, if different types 
are sufficie~tly alike, pooling obtains. This is quite in line 
with results available elsewhere. Furthermore, due to the 
convexity of f- 1 we have that for 9 1 -8 2 constant but for a 
different level (9 1 +e)-(8 2 -e) the cost of pooling increases. In 
the following we consider only pooling equilibria and the 
dynamics and quantities. 
III. Towards a Dynamic Analysis. 
We now consider changes in the level of demand occurring in 
between T1 and T2 • We assume that these changes are unexpected 
but observable to both parties. We may consider a change in 
either 9 1 or 9 2 or, perhaps most interesting, a change in both 8 1 
and 9 2 • This last possibility can be interpreted as a fully 
acknowledged increase in public demand. 
Before we continue, let us briefly recapitulate the structure set 
out in the proceeding section. During periods Tl and T2 t 
defining the first period of the continuing relationship, workers 
observe the input of labour but not the input of capital and 
total output. After period T1 t respectively period T2 t P1 t 
respectively P2 t is observed. Based upon observation of prices, 
as a proxy for demand, a wage ruling in T3 t the second period in 
the continuing relationship, is dictated by the trade union. 
Employment during this period has to be in accordance with the 
announced level of demand and a competitive solution. Otherwise 
workers may quit. However, only after this period when the game 
ends, the price ruling in this period is observed but is 
obviously not relevant. 
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Assume that for some values 01 and 02 (14) are satisfied, and 
hence a pooling equilibrium obtains, that is, a firm faced with 
9=9 1 behaves as if 9=92 • How, consider the effects of a change in 
0 1 , so we have 0=9 t +c in T2 where 8=8 2 remains unchanged in T2 • 
First of all we have to be concerned with the nature of the 
equilibrium. To have a pooling equilibrium after the change of 01 
to 01+£' the equilibrium condition reads (this is a sufficient 
condition only). 
where (15) is evaluated at the start of period T2 when the change 
in the intercept of demand has become known. In the case that the 
inequaility in (15) is satisfied, the firm continues to pool in 
T2 - In this case a change in demand occurring in between Tt and 
T2 results only in an increased input of capital and consequently 
an increased output. In the pooling equilibrium the input of 
labour as well as the price remains unchanged (given by (4) and 
(7), respectively). We have the following multipliers. 
dk k 
= ae - fi(y).y 
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dy -1 
CIE = f i (y) 
dl 0 ere = 
dp 
= 0 ~ 
Before the start of period T3 a new wage is dictated. This wage 
is based upon knowledge of 9 1 +£ and 9 2 • In particular, it is 
reasonable to assume that the wage ruling in T\ and T2 is given 
by 
w w 
whereas the wage in T3 is 
Using (16) and (17) we see that wo>w, but Wo is still lower than 
what would be contained in a separating equilibrium, that is, the 
wage set in period TJ is not efficient as it fails to equate 
marginal disutility of working to the value of marginal product 
of labour. A result of this is that the use of capital is 
expanded compared to what is the case in a first-best world. 
If £ is sufficiently big, then (15) is violated; call this value 
EO. In case that (15), devaluated before T~, is no longer true, 
the firm changes its strategy and a separating equilibrium 
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obtains in period T2 • Hence, production, input of labour, and 
capital and the price are given by (4)-(7). Notice that compared 
to the previous case the use of capital declines, whereas the use 
of labour increases. Output as well as prices are unchanged 
compared to the previous case. In period T) we obtain a wage 
satisfying 
WI and the price Pw=[(w1 r) imply that efficiency is obtained as 
these values result in equality between the marginal disutility 
of labour and the value of marginal product of labour. 
Consider a change so that the upper value of the intercept is 
9 t -e. If e 1 and 9 2 are values resulting in a pooling equilibrium, 
then for e 1 -e)9 2 , e>O, 9 t -e and 9 2 will also result in a pooling 
equilibrium. In period T2 production and use of capital is 
adjusted downwards. Price and use of labour remain the same. We 
have the following set of multipliers 
dk k 
Oc = - fi(y).y 
dy -1 
Oe = f i (y) 
dl 0 Oe = 
~ = 0 
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The price which obtains in period T3 is given by 
This wage is lower than the one which ensures efficiency, which 
in this case is given by w=a[C~)f-l (2[Cwr)-8 1+E). Also in this 
case we do not obtain equality between marginal disutility of 
labour and the value of marginal product of labour. 
Consider now a change in 9 2 , First, if 92 decreases to e~-E where 
E is such that the pooling equilibrium is maintained, then a firm 
characterized by 9=9 1 has to behave as if 9=9 2 -c. Consequently, 
the use of labour is adjusted downwards. However, as prices 
remain unchanged (in this particular model) and demand has to be 
fulfilled, actual production remains the same. Hence, more 
capital is used in period T2 • Using (4)-(7) we find the following 
multipliers. 
dl [cG) 1 Oe = f ' (2J ( wr ) - ( e 2 - E ) ) 
~ = 0 
dk k -[C~) 1 ae = I f I (2J ( wr ) - ( e 2 - E: ) ) 
~ = 0 
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Comparing the wage ruling in period T1 and T2 to that of period 
T3 , we have that the former is given by (16) whereas the latter 
is given by 
Again, as O2-E>01 we have that w)<w, where w is the wage which 
solves w=af(~)f-1 (2[(wr)-9 t ). Hence, the wage dictated in period 
T3 , although it adjusts the shock E falling upon demand in bad 
states of nature, is too low to ensure equality between the mar-
ginal disutility of labour and the value of marginal product of 
labour. Obviously, if 9 2 changes to 9 2- C such that from period Tz 
donwards it is unprofitable to maintain the pooling equilibrium, 
then in period T2 production use of capital and labour is 
adjusted according to equations (4)-(6). In period T) the wage 
is given by w=a[(&)f- 1 (2[(rw)-01 ). This is the wage which 
guarantee efficiency. 
If 9 2 changes to 9 2± such that 9 2+ <q1' the pooling equilibrium C E 
is maintained in period T2 . However, production is unchanged 
whereas labour input increases and the use of capital decreases 
in period T2 compared to period T1 . We have the following 
multipliers 
/ 
dp 
ere = 0 
dk ¥[(~) 1 ere = - f i (2J ( wr ) - ( A 2 - E: ) ) 
dy 
Q£ = 0 
The wage which obtains in period TJ is given by 
Obviously, as 9 2 +£<9 1 this wage is still too low to guarantee 
efficiency. 
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Finally, let us consider the case where both 9 t and 9 2 change. 
This case may be considered as the situation where the government 
adheres to general expansive or contractive policy. Consider an 
increase, so that the support is now 9 2 +£ and 9 1 +£ respectively. 
The change takes place from period Tl to T2 and is unexpected. 
Obviously, from the curvature of f we see that the possibility of 
maintaining a pooling equilibrium declines with further increa-
increases. If the pooling equilibrium cannot be maintained, we 
return to the case where 9 1 changes to 9 1 +£, 9 2 is the same and 
a separating equilibrium obtains in T2 • If the pooling 
equilibrium is maintained, we obtain the results from the case 
where 9 2 changes to 9 2 +£ and 9 t is unchanged. Obviously, the wage 
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ruling in TJ is adjusted to reflect the new value of the support. 
If we have a general decine, then surely, if we start off from a 
pooling equilibrium, this is maintained, and we refer to the 
results given for the case when 02 changes to 02- , 01 remains 
~ 
unchanged and the pooling equilibrium is maintained. Also in 
this case the wage obtaining in period T) is adjusted to reflect 
the new value of the support. 
The above-mentioned analysis is amended only slightly if we 
introduce perfect foresight. In this case the profitability of 
pooling is evaluated from the start, that is, if for example 9 1 
changes to 9 1 + c ' the relevant condition for pooling equilibrium 
to occur is (15) evaluated before Tl whereas with myopic 
foresight the relevant condition is (14). Clearly the change is 
here that if a pooling equilibrium cannot profitably be 
maintained, a separating equilibrium results right from the 
start. Otherwise the analysis is similar to the one presented 
above. 
IV. Conclusion. 
In this chapter we gave some conditions under which a pooling 
equilibrium obtains when demand is characterized by small 
uncertainty. In such a pooling equilibrium, the level of 
employment chosen by the firm is too small if economic 
efficiency is the hallmark. Whether this is important or not, is 
not to be judged within the confinements of this model. The 
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reason is, of course, that in a general context a competitive 
firm is small (of measure zero) compared to the economy. However, 
in the case where a continuum of firms is present, we have shown 
(Chapter 3, also Laffont and Tirole (1986» that a non-degenerate 
subset of firms deviates. Hence, the deviation will certainly be 
finite. It is obviously unreasonable to attempt to give similar 
arguments in a model characterized by a two-point distribution. 
In Section III we analysed quantity adjustments as well as wage 
adjustments. We found that changes in demand, in both directions 
and in both states of nature, are followed by wage adjustment. In 
a pooling equilibrium, however, if we assume that the economy is 
in a good state of nature, the wage was, even after the 
adjustment, too low to ensure economic efficiency. This is purely 
a result of the fact that the wage is based only upon 
probabilistic knowledge. The results with respect to quantity 
adjustments are perhaps more interesting. In the case that demand 
in the good state changes, this is not reflected in the level of 
employment a~ it is the case in a bad state of nature. 
Conversely, if demand in a bad state of nature is changed, this 
is reflected in the level of employment. If demand in both states 
of nature changes, this is also reflected in the level of 
employment. 
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v. Notes. 
1. Two types of equilibria obtain, pooling and infinite 
reswitching equilibria. The pooling equilibrium is the simple 
one. 
2. Infinite reswitching equilibria are ruled out. 
3. This proof relies upon the assumption that l(s) is the 
Walrasian level of employment. for s, i.e., 1 is increasing in 
s. This may be somewhat of a restriction. On this, see the 
discussion in Chapter 2. 
v. Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Consider the wage claim. Firms maximize third period profit 
~3 = p . y - wI - rk 
We have 
w = p 
y 
"2T 
r = p y ~ 
Hence w k = T r 
We have 
w = (9 + f(.[(~)l» [(w/r) => 
r 2 
2.[(wr) = 9 + f(.[<;)l) 
Hence, (2.[(~)-f'(.[(w/r)1)~ .[(~r)l)dw = f'(.[(~)I).[(~)dl 
We have dl = < 0 Ow 
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dl We have as > 0 
Hence 1 d = ,I, ( w , t;;\ ) ,h < 0 ,I, > 0 
't' 1;;1 't'w 't'E) 
Let v2 to the updated belief that 9=E)1. The wage is set according 
to 
Hence 
=> 
dw 
= > 0 
Consider the wage which is established by the first order 
condition. Call this wage W=T(V2 ). We have just shown that TI>O. 
Profits are written 
p = py - wI - rk 
Consider two values of 9; 9 1 > 9 2 • Now, for the competitive 
solution we have 
w p(S i) 
y(Si) 
= 21(S1} 
1 = 1 ,2 
r P(9 l ) 
Y(Sl) 
= 2k(Sl} 
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Hence, 'Jt(Si) = 0 
Consider what happens to a firm of type 01 if the wage is given 
by ~(1/2=Vl). Since ~I>O we have 
As the firm is of type 9 1 , labour demand exceeds labour supply at 
the wage ~(V2=Vl). Consequently, the firm chooses an input 
1 ='1:' ( V 2 =v 1 ) • 
The firm also optimizes with respect to the level of capital. We 
find 
Hence profits 
1[3 = P(S1)y(9 1) - (~(v2 = v » 2 1 
p(9 1)y(9 1) (-r(v2 v » 2 'Jt 3 = 2 - = 1 
P(S1)y(9 1) (,;'(v2 v » 2 1[3 = 2 - = 1 
Since we have ~(V2=Vl »w(St) and 1(-r(v2 =v t )<l(Sl)' we find that 
-r(V2 =V 1 )1(,;'(V2 =V 1 »<P(Sl) ~ and in consequence 
233 
In particular, the lower is v2 and hence "'C(v2 =v 1 )1 (-r(v2 =v t » the 
higher is 'JtJ. 
Consider a firm of type °2 • We have that labour demand at the 
going wage rate is less than labour supply. In consequence 
profits to such a firm is zero. Hence, profits to a type 8 2 firm 
does not change with changes in v2 • 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Ad i). Consider the possibility that a firm with 8=8 1 plays 
1*(91 )=1(9 2 ) against 1*(01 )=(91 ). The gain by doing so is 
(A. 1 ) F F 1t (v 2 = v 1) - 1t (v 2 = 1) 
Hence, a necessary condition for playing 1(02) 1s 
(A. 2) F F 1t (v2 = v 1) > 1t (v2 = 1) 
Consider now if (A.2) 1s a sufficient condition. We specify the 
following out of equilibrium beliefs. 
(A.3) 
Hence, if a firm employs anything but 1(82 ), it is believed that 
this firm is of the high capacity type, i.e., v2 =1. But if (A.2) 
is satisfied, it obviously pays such a firm to employ 1(9 2 ) as 
this results in the ex-post probability V2 =V1 . 
It is trivial (cf. (A.3» that a firm faced with 8=8 2 chooses 
1*(92 ) = 1(92 ). 
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Ad ii). Consider again, the possibility that a firm faced with 
9=9 1 plays 1*(9 1 )=1(9 2 ) against 1*(9 1 )=1(9 1 ). The gain by doing 
so is 
(A.4) F F 1t (v2 = v 1 ) - 1t (v2 = 1) 
Hence, a necessary condition for playing 1(8 1 ) is 
(A. 5) F F 1t (v2 = v 1) < 1t (v2 = 1) 
Consider now, if (A.5) is sufficient condition also. We specify 
the following out of equilibrium beliefs 
(A.6) 
(A.?) 
From (A.6), respectively (A.7) we see that a firm faced with 
9=9 1 , respectively 9=9 2 , optimizes by playing 1(9 1 ), respectively 
1 (9 2 ) • 
Ad iii). Referring to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 for 9=9 2 1*(92 )=1(9 2 ) 
wi th probabili ty 1. Hence, if 1 (9 2 ) is observed v2 E: (v t , 1). 
Consider a firm for which 9=9 1 • The gain of playing 1(92 ) against 
1(8 1 ) 1s 
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(A.B) 
Hence, a necessary condition for the existence of a semi-
separating equilibrium is 
(A. 9) F 1t (v2 = 1) 
From Proposition 1 we know that n F is strictly decreasing in v2 • 
Hence, for tr2 • 
Assume that (A.10) is satisfied. As n F is decreasing in v2 ' there 
exists one and only one real number V2 E(V 1 , 1) such that (A.9) is 
satisfied. Hence, there exists a real number x such that if 1(8 1 ) 
is employed with probability, x and 1(9 2 ) are employed with 
probability 1-x the posterior of vt :V2 =(v 1 0(1-x)(1-v 2 »))-tV I 
whe~ ~lik,~(k,p,wt» is produced whtn v2 satisfy (A.9). 
Consider the following out of equilibrium beliefs 
(A 12) 
Clearly, from Lemma 2, (A.11) and (A.12) a low capacity firm 
prefers to produce 1(9 2 ). Consider then a high capacity firm. 
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Taking the beliefs as given in (A.11) and (A.12) any out of 
equilibrium production 1*( )=1(° 1 ) and 1*( )=1(02) is inferior 
to the equilibrium strategy. 
Finally, we have to show that for any given value of 0 t and 02 , 
only one of the conditions in the proposition is satisfied. 
Consider the conditions (A.2), (A.5) and (A.10). These conditions 
are mutually exclusive, hence the continuation equilibrium is 
unique. 
CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
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Despite the, admittedly, weak empirical content of this thesis 
som general conclusions emerge. It has been demonstrated that if 
the wage is determined in a bargaining process between a firm and 
a trade union, the information structure characterizing the 
economy is important. This is so in the sense that if firms are 
better informed about the value of the marginal product of labour 
compared to the union, then in addition to price signals also 
quantity signals are needed to support an incentive compatible 
solutin. The conclusion to emerge in this respect is that 
underemployment is needed to support the revelation of relevant 
information. 
other general conclusions to emerge are that the nature of the 
equilibrium is not unambiguous. This is seen clearly comparing 
Chapters 2 and 3. Introducing a zero profit constraint in an 
otherwise separating equilibrium can lead to a pooling 
equilibrium. Thus, the qualitative nature of the equilibrium is 
very much dependent upon whether one has in mind a very partial 
model or say a monopolistic competition model. These results 
suggest that this is an issue which should be addressed more 
generally. 
Also, and partly following from this, Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate 
the potential effects of eocnomic policy in respectively a 
separating and a pooling equilibrium. Since Chapters 2 and 3 
demonstrated a non-robustness of the nature of the equilibrium, 
policy conclusions should be drawn with great care. 
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Finally, Chapter 4 illustrated (with respect to investments) that 
when monopoly effects are present, the introduction of asymmetric 
information and thus incentive constraints do not have an 
unambiguous effect either increasing or reducing the level of 
investment. This again points to the fact that when evaluating 
the effect of asymmetric information, care must be taken in the 
specification of the model, in particular with respect to 
assumption regarding the market form. 
/ 
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